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
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Soviet Union

International Affairs

19980515 243

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Soviet Union

International Affairs

JPRS-UIA-89-001

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5 JANUARY 1989

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Response to Query on Perestroyka Within MFA Institute

18070043 Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian
No 44, 29 Oct-4 Nov 88 p 8

[Unattributed response in ARGUMENTY I FAKTY to query on perestroyka within MFA Institute]

[Question] Several issues of ARGUMENTY I FAKTY discussed the Moscow State Institute of International Relations [MGIMO]. Specifically they stated that this institution was 'outside the zone of criticism', that there was no information about it in references, etc. I would like to know how perestroyka is proceeding within the walls of this institute. For example, who became students at the MGIMO in the current year?—M. Golyayev, Khabarovsk.

[Answer] The VESTNIK MINISTERSTVA INO-STRANNYKH DEL SSSR, No. 17, 1988 published the results of the regular admission of students to the MGIMO of the USSR MFA.

In the daytime departments, 96 students of the preparatory department were accepted from the results of their graduating exams. A competition was announced for the remaining places, separate for persons having more than two years work experience, and persons without such experience.

Of the 1304 secondary school graduates applying for the competition, 210 of the most prepared and worthy became students. Among those accepted to the institute from the competition, 57 percent passed all entrance exams with grades of excellent. Half of them had graduated from secondary school with a medal. Many have a good deal of life experience and labor tempering. Two thirds of those entering have labor experience of more than two years, a fourth are members or candidate members of the CPSU. Every eleventh student in the first year is a soldier-internationalist returned from Afghanistan.

Representatives of 21 nationalities have become students at the institute. Muscovites and residents of the Moscow Oblast make up less than half of those registered (49 percent). The others have come from other regions of the Soviet Union, from all allied republics. Among those accepted, 88 percent are men and 12 percent are women.

The department of international economic relations remains the largest daytime department. One third of all first-year students will study in it. A fourth of those entering will study in the international law department, 27 percent, in the department of international relations, and 14 percent in the department of international information.

On 1 September classes also began in the evening department, which trains students of international economics. Around 150 employees of associations, enterprises, organizations, and institutions maintaining ties with foreign countries have been registered in it.

The composition of the students of the preparatory department has been determined. More than a half of them are soldier-internationalists who receive government stipends, and young people who took part in eliminating the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, 21 percent are young persons sent for applied training by the USSR Ministry of the Maritime Fleet and the Main Administration of State Customs Control, the others are workers and discharged soldiers who received 12-14 points in the three competitive examinations, and who were not accepted in the competition for the daytime departments.

During the receipt of applications and conduct of examinations, the marked expansion of glasnost played a positive role in the work of the admissions commission. The admissions process for the institute was preceded by broad information-propaganda work in enterprises of various cities, in military units, and in schools. A number of publications about the institute in the central press were arranged to coincide with the admissions process.

Information about the MGIMO was published for the first time in a reference for those entering institutes of higher learning. Meetings were held between the members of the admissions commission and secondary school graduates. Information about the competition and passage of the examinations was efficiently publicized on display boards. Written work with a critique of errors was regularly shown. The applications and appeals of the secondary-school graduates were considered collegially.

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Resistance to Cooperation with Noncommunists Decried

18120031 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 40, Oct 88 p 3

[Article by Boris Pankin under the rubric "The World on My Personal Computer": "Still Fearful of New Ideas"]

[Text] Sven Johansson (Tumba), brilliant ice hockey player in the 1950s, who recently introduced us to golf, returned to Stockholm from the opening of Moscow's first golf course in an effusive and un-Swedish mood. He addressed every Soviet person in Sweden as "droog" (friend) or "podrooga" (girlfriend). He doesn't know many other Russian words. Addressed as "podrooga," one of my countrywomen thought it so unceremonious that she pronounced the Swede ill-bred.

Didn't the same thing happen recently in our country with the formula on the priority of values common to all mankind, interests of social development over class

interests, even if that class happens to be the proletariat? Lenin first expressed his idea during his exile in Shushenskoye. And he did well since reflections on values common to mankind continue to embarrass people in spite of positions taken in relation to this at the 19th Party Conference.

But what are we afraid of? Or what do we not want?

I think it is more dangerous when we are afraid. We are afraid of new words, we shun new ideas, and the phenomena behind them. We still do not risk breaking a taboo which takes its origin from Stalin's Short Course, already rejected three times. In the final analysis, the fear of accepting the primacy of human over class interests means subscribing to the popular US aphorism "Better dead than Red"—only the other way around.

A year ago, on the basis of my work in Sweden, I suggested in MN that we stop automatically ranking all Social-Democrats as social and class collaborators and instead take a closer look at their socio-economic experience, including the 50-year-old Swedish model. At that time, some of my colleagues looked at me as if I wanted to burn myself alive. But rather than "burn," I took part in a round-table conference on the subject in Stockholm last summer.

Let's expose this tendency and fight it. This won't run counter to our principled approach or to glasnost or democracy.

On the one hand, we admit in Party documents and in the press that in many areas, particularly in the economy, things are bad in our country that they couldn't be worse and, on the other hand, we retreat in horror at the mere mention of a radical remedy.

Turning down those who opposed concessions in April 1921, Lenin said that their main argument was that the concessioner would cheat us, but I maintain, said Lenin, that there is nothing terrible in that, and that to raise productivity it is desirable that he should come...

Listening today to the arguments of the opponents of modern forms of cooperation with the West (zones of free trade, special economic zones, convertibility of the rouble, and concessions), it seems that 70 years have passed leaving no trace.

However, we have even lost pace when introducing joint ventures with the West. The reason is that the legislation, on the basis of which these ventures can exist, was written piecemeal, and some people are still engaged in this fascinating work today.

...I looked into an old dictionary of foreign words. It explains revolution as a radical spasmodic transition from one state and one quality to another. No, there's nothing piecemeal about that.

Central TV International Affairs Editor
Interviewed on Improvements in Coverage
18070067 Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian
19 Nov 88 p 7

[*IZVESTIYA* Interview with Central TV International Affairs Editor Eduard Sorokin: "Compass in a Sea of Facts"]

[Text] A year ago Central TV created a Main International Affairs Editorial Office. In an interview with an *IZVESTIYA* correspondent, chief editor E. Sorokin tells about the initial results of its work and prospects for the near future.

[Question] Eduard Alekseyevich, to what extent have last year's "organizational measures" justified themselves?

[Sorokin] The creation of a unified editorial office permits us to conduct a better-edited and thought-out line in covering international affairs, helps us to avoid duplication of efforts and shallowness, and allows us to work in the main areas.

[Question] Incidentally, do you agree with the opinion that international journalists have started their perestroika later than their colleagues covering domestic subjects?

[Sorokin] In the initial stage of perestroika, the most significant events for us, the Soviet people, occurred inside the country. These were precisely the object of general attention of readers and viewers. Subsequently the situation balanced out, and very serious changes have been planned and are being implemented in foreign policy, directly affecting the work of international journalists. Surely it is no secret that the "thawing" of the international climate also gives rise to new forms of ideological cooperation, even with our erstwhile opponents. A special term was even coined for our "shop" perestroika—"new thinking in journalistics".

[Question] What does that mean specifically? What demands does it impose?

[Sorokin] The time has come to rethink many former, seemingly unshakable truths. For example, peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems—what is that? A special form of class struggle, as was asserted in the past, or a means of joint defense of general human values, uniting countries and peoples? The question is not an idle one, it tears away customary cliches and stereotypes formed over decades.

For many years our journalists held no serious discussions and substituted propagandist sketches for serious analysis of ongoing processes and events. As a result, many broadcasts suffer from facelessness, and information is superficial. The problem is that we do not have

enough "stars" of the television screen, original "soloists" capable of interpreting and presenting the material in an uncommon way. And this even though the volume of editorial broadcasting is great, around 300 hours a year...

[Question] Let's look at the individual broadcasts on international subjects. What innovations have appeared in them in the last year?

[Sorokin] Not only I, but many viewers have noted that finally we have begun to argue, that we are abandoning ready-made formulations and evaluations. In my opinion, serious analysis distinguishes the program "Problem in Focus", which discusses European security questions, Soviet-American relations, and the most complex regional conflicts. The problems are studied from different viewpoints, and specific arguments are reinforced with video spots.

Sharp discussion has flared up "At the Crossroads of Opinions", where foreign journalists accredited in Moscow meet with Soviet colleagues: until just recently they were rare guests on CTV... And take the traditional "Studio 9", in which speakers may be observed totally disagreeing with one another.

Another trend is stories on political leaders. The first broadcasts have already been aired, under the rubric "Political Portrait", about the General Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party Karoly Grosz, and Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, and broadcasts are being prepared on George Bush and Margaret Thatcher. Their distinguishing feature is that the particular figure is presented more fully and more profoundly, and not only their utterances and actions that are "convenient" for us are shown.

[Question] You are talking about broadcasts devoted to "great" politics. But we the viewers want to know how simple Americans, Frenchmen, and Spaniards live...

[Sorokin] In addition to stories in the most varied programs, an entire show is devoted to this subject, "In the World of Real Facts". In it one may also learn how tourism is organized in Austria, what, for example, the Italians eat, the income of English pensioners, and much more. You know, this is a whole trend of journalistic activity, showing "life as it is".

[Question] You worked abroad for many years, as a special correspondent of State TV and Radio in Indonesia, India, Great Britain. In your opinion, what can we learn from foreign journalists?

[Sorokin] First of all efficiency, mobility.

The technical level is also worthy of attention. Computers, sophisticated television and video cameras, studio equipment, communications resources—our employees should also be supplied with all these things.

Report on Paris Trade Unions Conference on Economic Security
*18070176f Moscow RABOCHIY KLASS I
SOVREMENNYY MIR in Russian
No 3, May-Jun 88 (signed to press 30 May 88) pp 189-191*

[Report by V.Ye. Mozhayev: "Unions of the World for Economic Security"]

[Text] *"The demand for international economic security corresponding to the needs of the people of the whole world is... a natural continuation of the unions' basic demands"—the unions proceed from this in their attitude toward this problem. The adduced premise was formulated in a document submitted for the approval of the "Trade Unions and International Economic Security" world conference (February 1988, Paris). The document earned the unanimous support of the participants in the forum and formed the basis of the fruitful debate which developed thereat.*

The forum was highly representative and authoritative. There were many prominent union and public figures and scientists among its participants. Among the 164 emissaries from 99 national (from 74 countries) and 28 international organizations, there were 46 delegates at trade union center president, vice president, secretary general and secretary level alone. More than half the unions represented at the conference were from the ranks of those which are not WFTU members. But it was not only, of course, a question of figures, although they were eloquent testimony to the breadth and diversity of the composition of the conferees and in this respect characterized the content of its work. The main thing was the essence of the debate itself.

The multifaceted concept of economic security has become established increasingly firmly in international political vocabulary, particularly since the UN General Assembly, which discussed this problem at the initiative of the USSR delegation, determined its basic contours in the resolution of 12 December 1985.

The attitude toward the problem on the part of the trade union movement was discussed in earnest at the 11th World Trade Unions Congress (September 1986, Berlin), which adopted the decision to study this question and convene a broad trade union forum devoted thereto. Endeavoring to preserve the unitary spirit of the 11th World Congress and the atmosphere of the dialogue which characterized it, from the very outset the WFTU adopted a policy geared to the preparation of the conference being performed collectively, and not only by forces of organizations which are members of the federation but also with the participation of those which are not members thereof. The initiative did indeed meet with a response on the part of a number of unions which are not members of the WFTU, certain research institutes and

individual scientists of various countries. The International Preparatory Committee (IPC), on which unions of the USSR, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Cuba, France, Cyprus, Austria, Lebanon, Syria, India, Congo and Ethiopia and also WFTU non-member unions of Great Britain, Ireland, Portugal and Yugoslavia were represented, was formed; the IPC included representatives of the African Trade Union Unity Organization, the International Arab Trade Unions Confederation and scientists from the United States and Colombia who are close to the unions; representatives of Australia, Finland, Japan and some other countries participated subsequently. The well-known economist J.-C. Le Duigou, member of France's CGT Confederal Committee, was elected chairman.

At the very first IPC session in April 1987 there was an interesting exchange of opinions on the basic principles of the preparation and convening of the conference and the very content of the "international economic security" concept from the unions' viewpoint.

The participants in the discussion agreed that international economic security is closely connected with the position of the working people in each individual country and that the instability of economic relations is directly associated with such unpropitious trends in social development as the growth of unemployment, a decline in wages and the standard and quality of life as a whole, a deterioration in labor safety and the undermining of social security. It was affirmed that there had been an increase in the course of development of world economic relationships in the role of the TNC and the transnational banks in the adoption of the most important decisions affecting the vital interests of the working people of many countries and that these relationships were being further developed by increasingly authoritarian methods, in circumvention of the unions' opinion, this creating an atmosphere of insecurity for the working people in many regions of the world. The topic discussed was closely linked with the problem of a new international economic order. It was emphasized that the establishment of a normal situation in the world economic mechanism, without which economic security is impossible, presupposes a particular degree of equality of the components of this mechanism, renunciation of the policy of boycotts, embargoes and blackmail, elimination of the current disproportions in the world economy, escape from the debt impasse and so forth.

Particular mention was made of the fact that under present conditions international economic security is based on general security and efforts leading to a relaxation of tension since the militarization of the economy and the growth of unproductive military spending are shaking the world economy, undermining development trends in the "third world" and, what is most important, creating a threat to the survival of mankind itself.

An international seminar on the problem of international economic security held in Moscow in 1987 and a session of the new IPC, enlarged by participants in the

seminar, were an important stage of the conference's preparation. The broad participation of scientists and representatives of unions of various schools and their profound speeches in the course of the seminar considerably enriched the subject matter of the future conference.

At the decision of the IPC a working group was set up which applied much effort to organizational support for the conference and the preparation of the document which served as the basis for discussion at the conference and with a quotation from which we began our survey.

The document adduces a number of facts, figures, evaluations and opinions of various organizations and individual experts approaching the problem of international economic security from various sides. It observes that the working people and unions of the world are concerned at the deterioration in economic growth indicators in the majority of countries, which has in a number of cases been accompanied by an increase in unemployment, a decline in the living standard and the growth of the poverty of working people. The interrelated character of the present condition of the world economy has intensified the impact of crisis phenomena on the economy of many countries, having given rise to difficulties of a global scale and simultaneously having shown that surmounting them demands a new approach to questions of international relations—from standpoints of international cooperation and an endeavor to resolve even the most complex conflicts and contradictions on the paths of the new political thinking.

In this connection the unions welcomed the Soviet-American agreement of 8 December 1987 and the agreement in principle affording the possibility of further arms reductions and an improvement in the world political climate. "From the unions' viewpoint," the document observes, "these events have increased the prospect of a global reconsideration of international economic relations for the purpose of their democratization. They have enhanced the possibility of the transfer of resources for development purposes and social programs. Proceeding from the successes which have been scored, the unions recognize the need for the working people's even greater, more assertive participation in the discussion of global economic issues and the development of international economic cooperation and international economic relations between states."

Such guidelines of the adopted document predetermined the conferees' active approach to the problems discussed. The document notes particularly the tremendous harm caused international economic security by the arms race and the militarization of the economy; the close connection of disarmament and development and the importance of a halt to the arms race for the solution of global problems and use of the potential of the world economy for the purpose of the solution of most important economic and social questions in the interests of the working people are emphasized.

The socioeconomic consequences of the crisis phenomena in the present-day world economy, the recent stock market upheavals, the development of the "symbolic economy" and currency-finance speculation and the debt crisis are analyzed. The discriminatory trade and economic and credit-finance practice of the capitalist powers in relation to both the socialist world and the developing countries is criticized. The conclusion that this practice is harming not only those against whom it is applied but also its initiators themselves, distorting normal exchange between countries and limiting their export potential is drawn.

Certain principles of international economic relations essential for economic security were formulated in conclusion in which the unions have a particular interest, including stability, dependability, predictability, equality and a readiness for cooperation on an equal basis.

As already said, the document met with the conferees' approval. Debate began. Its tone was set in the opening remarks of IPC Chairman J.-C. Le Duigou and the speeches of A. Krasucki, secretary general of France's CGT, and representatives of international organizations—the WFTU (General Secretary I. Zakhariya), the African Trade Union Unity Organization (Deputy Secretary General A. Ibrahim), the Dublin Committee (Chairman C. Christie), the Permanent Congress of Trade Union Unity of Latin American Working People (Bureau Member J.G. Ibarra), the Coordinating Committee of Unions of Asia and Oceania (President B. [Tupaz]) and the Committee of Trade Union Unity of Central America. Representatives of the ILO, UNCTAD and the World Peace Council spoke at the plenary session also.

The main debate was conducted in two commissions—"Trade Unions for Equal International Economic Cooperation" and "Disarmament and Development". If we attempt to reduce the entire wealth of the fervor, thoughts, facts and computations contained in the speeches of the delegates both at the plenary session and in the commissions (and virtually all the participants spoke) to certain basic points, the following four would seem to be the most important and summary.

1. The conclusion concerning the particularly disquieting nature of international economic instability and insecurity in the present situation was drawn. The huge foreign debt and trade and payments imbalances, the massive transfer of capital, privatization in the public sectors and the growth of unregulated practices are depriving the working people of social confidence and contributing directly to a deterioration in their situation. Under these conditions the unions frequently agree to concessions to the employers, which is increasing the pernicious influence which both objective socioeconomic factors of the modern world and the antiworker policy of capital are exerting on the position and struggle of the working people.

2. The need for the assertive actions of the working people and the unions for a strengthening of economic security at all levels—from the enterprise through the bodies at which decisions of a national and international scale are adopted—was indicated. The significance of the demonstrations of the working people and the unions which contributed to the achievement of the Soviet-American nuclear accord and also the unions' struggle for the development of normal East-West economic relations and a new international economic order was emphasized in this connection.

3. The place of the unions in the processes of practical disarmament and reorientation of the world economy to the needs of peace and international cooperation was pointedly raised. The role of the unions in the struggle against the military-industrial-financial complex, which is assuming an increasingly transnational nature, was emphasized and the need for the adoption of even more effective measures to mobilize the working people for struggle for further progress along the path of specific actions in support of disarmament was pointed out. Proposals were expressed concerning the convening of an international trade union conference on conversion and the retraining of personnel connected with it and also on a group of representative working people in the ILO taking the necessary steps at the 1988 General Conference even for the realization of effective action on this question. The proposition concerning the *social content of economic security* formulated at the conference is of fundamental importance.

4. Close attention was paid to the relationship between disarmament and development from the viewpoint of the working people and the unions. Having emphasized the extraordinary importance of the problem, in this connection also the conferees supported an active approach and access of the international trade union movement to participation in the distribution of the fund which could be created within the UN framework from the resources saved thanks to disarmament.

The discussion of all questions at the conference was conducted in a spirit of unity and openness. The debate invariably emphasized the points on which there is consensus in the international trade union movement; no proposals or ideas of a confrontational nature were put forward, although the spectrum of opinions expressed on a number of questions was quite wide. Contrary to the traditions in the trade union movement, there was on this occasion no draft final documents which had been prepared in advance. They (that is, the communique and the reports of the two commissions) were drawn up directly as the conference progressed and were approved by the final plenary session without a vote.

The conclusion of the conference did not put an end to the discussion in the trade union world of the problems of international economic security. On the contrary, it

merely initiated discussion thereof. Nor, incidentally, was the IPC "dissolved": it is prepared, in accordance with the conferees' wishes, to resume its work as soon as the trade union movement needs to return to this problem as a whole or to some aspect thereof. I believe that we may consider the fact that *the problems of international economic security have firmly entered—in all*

its multi-aspectuality—the sphere of the long-term attention of the world's trade unions a most important result of the Paris conference.

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Helsinki Process, Common European Home Viewed

*18120041 Moscow NEW TIMES in English
No 48, Nov 88 pp 19-20*

[Article by Galina Sidorova: "Our Common Home"]

[Text] We are Europeans. Though each of us, naturally, regards himself a citizen of his own country. The concept of Europe is for us today purely geographical. But what of tomorrow.

An attempt "to perceive themselves as Europeans," members of a common family, is how I would interpret the Budapest meeting attended by peace campaigners from almost all the countries that signed the Helsinki Final Act. It was sponsored by the Hungarian Peace Council and held under the motto "Together for the promotion of the Helsinki process."

It was probably the first time ever that a conference of the kind had represented a wide range of public opinion not only from West but also from East European countries. Only yesterday we dubbed some of our colleagues today "dissidents," a word we borrowed from the West. Today they—together with "formal" (also a Western coinage) peace committees—are reflecting on and debating the future of Europe. The USSR delegation at the Budapest meeting included spokesmen from the Soviet Peace Committee, the Club for Social Initiatives and the Democratic Perestroika Club.

Too Small a Basket

I look through the Helsinki Final Act, the document whose complete text, when printed in the USSR, occasioned a burst of pride in some of our leaders, as was constantly emphasized both in speeches made by high-level officials and in the media, our magazine included. Taking a fresh look at this document now, you cannot fail to see in it an increasing number of norms that have not yet become norms for us in the Soviet Union.

For a long time the Soviet side attempted to put all its eggs in one basket, the military-political basket of the Helsinki Final Act. That basket, however, proved too small. Though arms control has made most headway compared with other issues, this has not helped reduce the number of issues that are still outstanding. Why? Because there cannot be genuine security without economic cooperation, contacts between people, the exchange of information and ideas, and above all genuine observance of human rights, which is only possible, in my view, at a certain level of economic development and democracy in society, and a certain level of civic involvement on the part of its members. My viewpoint may seem disputable, but I am convinced that only by recognizing the priority importance of resolving human rights issues—alongside military-political ones—can we speak in earnest of a common European home.

In no sense do I think human rights can be "sorted out" at an international forum. Each country will have to resolve these issues on its own, exchanging experience but not making its own binding on others.

As always, human rights sparked off lively discussion at the meeting.

There was something unusual, however, about the Budapest debates. I would say that fuel was added to the flame by the dramatic changes under way in our country, changes that naturally affect the human rights sphere. Whether we like it or not, the fact remains that perestroika and democratization have turned some of our tried opponents into "ardent well-wishers" while some of our tested friends have been plunged into a state of confusion. It is no accident that the discussion of humanitarian problems revealed a difference of opinion between members of the Dutch delegation, between Germans from the GDR and the FRG, and between the Hungarian delegates.

There were debates and dialogues inside the Soviet delegation as well, which is also a sign of change.

We Need Guarantees

I spoke with Boris Nazarov, LLD, Head of the Human Rights Department at the All-Union School of Law.

"Boris Lazarevich, to my mind the present meeting is further evidence of how differently democracy is interpreted by us and our otherwise like-minded partners.."

"People use the same terminology, unaware that they are reading completely different meanings into these concepts."

"Are we not narrowing the gap between our interpretations of democracy?"

"Certainly. The attempt to do so is so sincere that many I talked with did their best to play down the differences even when they were ideological. But it is ideological differences that prove irreconcilable."

"What about our common European home?"

"We should approach the question realistically. The idea of a common European Home is not at odds with what I have said. Since ideologies and positions differ, we should be looking for common interests in the areas in which they are to be found—in economics, politics, morals, ideological confrontation finds its most concrete expression in the argument about the respective merits of capitalism and socialism. So let this argument continue, provided no armed force is used."

"Yet what, in your opinion, is democracy as it should be seen today?"

"Democracy is the advancement of the state, law and legality. Democracy primarily presupposes government by the people, popular self-government. The better this concept is implemented the more democracy there is."

"Democracy is often interpreted as all-permissiveness. We associate democracy with a certain degree of discipline in man which would prevent one doing what one wants without taking the interests of others into account."

"If I am not mistaken, the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen states in part that every individual has the right to everything, the sole restriction being the right of others to the same. Today we are talking about a law-governed state...."

"In no sense do I believe that this is a panacea. The law-governed state has existed in the West for centuries, but we cannot borrow this concept in the form in which it is practised there for the simple reason that these practices have shown that the law-governed state in existence has failed to eradicate violations of human rights. We have still to elaborate the concept of a law-governed socialist state. We may then be able to find the optimum variant to raise the level of democracy."

"Is there any real prospect of cooperation in the area of human rights?"

"The Helsinki Final Act and international human rights covenants are evidence of cooperation. All these, however, are at the level of normative acts. What we need is guarantees. Incidentally, the Western democracies have set up regional institutions on human rights, for example, a court to protect them, and a convention. Perhaps the time has come for us too to elaborate declaration formulating the essence of a socialist concept of human rights. In my view, the socialist countries need a regional institution on human rights issues. I believe that the existence of such an institution would help us improve the situation in this field, and at the same time, we would be more aware of the areas in which we could cooperate with the West Europeans."

"Human rights are a universal humanitarian concept. Then, what's the point of having 'our' concept differing from 'theirs'?"

"The socialist concept proceeds from the premise that human rights should be guaranteed for everyone, while bourgeois democracies do not set themselves this objective."

"Don't you think that if society can afford to maintain millions of unemployed—I am leaving aside the moral aspect of the issue—and some of the unemployed do not feel broke at all, this is a sure guarantee of the economic rights of all. I have in mind developed Western countries..."

"I don't think so. A million-strong army of the homeless eking out a miserable existence. Where do you see a guarantee of right in that? In no sense, however, can this paradox provide us with any excuse or satisfaction with regard to our own situation in this field."

"The question of human rights guarantees is topical for us too...."

"We need above all firm guarantees of human rights. This is, in my opinion, the weakest point in our legal system. Guarantees must be enshrined in the act itself to ensure the legislative protection of citizens. But here trying is not enough; it must be underpinned by the realization of what the substance of a normative act is. When we speak of the socialist concept of human rights we always imply that rights and duties are inseparable. Our normative acts, however, do not reflect this. I shall make myself clearer. An individual's rights are infringed on. He looks up the normative act and does not understand where he should turn for help. He cannot identify the party that should comment his right with a duty towards him. It could be the organization in which he works, it could be a district executive committee, but what is important is that the law should indicate the official responsible for this particular problem. All must be as clear as it can be. It could be the courts, also one of our weak points. This institution should address itself primarily to the protection of human rights whenever they are violated, in any sense, in any sphere, in any field."

"Does our System contain guarantees against violations of human rights in the future?"

"We have now started reforms in economics, politics, law. Either we measure up to what we are planning to do, and serious legal guarantees will be an outcome, or we fall by the wayside, in which case any legal guarantees are out of the question."

"We lawyers must seriously address ourselves to elaborating the mechanism of human rights guarantees worldwide. Otherwise we shall not succeed. I have touched upon this problem here in Budapest. Lawyers from different countries could combine their efforts to bridge the gap between normative acts and the way they are implemented. In the different socio-political systems the gap is caused by different factors to be found in the economy, politics, morals. This is a humanitarian problem. All together we could work out the most acceptable mechanism to guarantee human rights...."

Tracing One's Origins

Guarantees. This must have been a key word during our dialogue on rights and democracy. Yet besides the legal guarantees for the democratization of society, there is a further and to my mind very important element—the civil activity of its members.

Among the participants in the Budapest meeting I saw many familiar faces, despite the extended list of the people who were invited. It was not just that this conference was not just because "formal" peace committees from socialist countries were not ready to cooperate with all of their young and obstinate fellow-countrymen, sometimes of a different political complexion, who sat on many alternative committees and participated in civic initiatives. The reason lay in the low level of political activity among citizens in the West and the East alike.

Why do so few people join the various peace-making and human rights organizations? Reasons for this vary. In Eastern Europe, it is accounted for by economic problems and the fact that "human rights champion" was until recently a term of abuse in the socialist countries' political lexicon. Recently, though the Soviet Union and some other socialist countries have seen a surge of political activity on the part of some strata of society. In the West people withdraw and concentrate on their individual concerns either because of economic difficulties or, on the contrary, because they are well off.

Two trends are now confronting each other and interacting in Europe. Every nation is becoming aware of its own uniqueness and assessing its history and identifying its problems, thus trying to get, as it were, a correct perception of itself. On the other hand, a large number of common problems are drawing all of them together. People are now beginning to reassess many post-war European phenomena.

Take, for instance, the presence of foreign troops on the territory of European states—the issue received lively discussion at the conference. The Hungarian journalist and member of parliament Zoltan Kiraly proposed a pull-out of all foreign troops by 1995, when the 50th anniversary of the end of the Second World War is to be celebrated. He said it would help to resolve many political issues. I do not share Kiraly's optimism that such a step could bring about a speedy solution of all political problems. Furthermore, NATO has not yet shown away enthusiasm for the idea of substantial reductions of the USSR and U.S. troops. Could it be that the member of parliament from Hungary was trying to look slightly beyond tomorrow? Meanwhile, more modest proposals are on the agenda. Among them are a reduction of the Allied troops in West Berlin to a negligible size.

What is our idea of a common European home? That was the question the participants in the Budapest meeting tried to answer. All agreed on one thing, to wit, the idea itself is fine. It has so many supporters that for the voices to acclaim one almost fails to hear the expressions of healthy skepticism and doubt, or see conflicting interpretations of the concept which, unless clarified, could prove an insurmountable barrier on the way to translating the idea as such into reality.

British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher said recently that she would like to see a common European home but with privately owned furniture. A similar interpretation of the concept has also been manifested by some delegates I have talked with. And here, I think, is a more realistic idea of a common home.

Says Walter Bohle, of the Labour Party's international department vice secretary (Netherlands):

"It is very important to build West-East relations on the basis of cooperation in as many fields as possible. Then even if something happens to some of today's leaders or if it occurs to a madman to set politics back, the situation will not change as quickly or easily as was the case in the past. We will have to become accustomed to a home that accommodates different systems, and their distinctive features will be respected in so far as both sides respect basic human rights."

...A home inhabited by prosperous neighbours who respect each other despite their considerable differences, active participants in the work being done at its numerous storeys. Today we Russians, Britons, Hungarians, Poles, French and Germans from both the GDR and the FRG, and the other European nations, are still on its threshold. We are attempting to build something of the kind in our respective countries and are probably becoming Europeans in the wider sense of the word. For the time is drawing near when we will have every right to call our Old World a common home.

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Symposium, Commentary on CEMA-EEC Relations

Symposium on CEMA-EEC Cooperation
18250006a Moscow OБSHCHESTVENNYYE NAUKI
in Russian No 5, Sep-Oct 88 pp 195-200

[Article by M. Matytsin, candidate of economic sciences, and Ye. Tyagunenko, candidate of economic sciences (Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System of the USSR Academy of Sciences)]

[Text] Optimization of national economic structures of the socialist countries during the process of their integration, structural changes and world scientific and technical progress, methods of active inclusion of the national economy in international division of labor—these issues were at the center of attention of participants in the symposium entitled "*International Comparison of the Structures of the National Economic Complexes of the CEMA and EEC Countries*," held in March 1988 in Prague. Participating in it were economists from Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, the USSR, and Czechoslovakia.

In their papers the scholars proceeded from the assumption that the provision of a new quality of economic growth is inseparably linked to structural changes directed toward reducing the energy-, material- and capital-intensiveness and also toward increasing the export potential of the socialist countries. Processes of internationalization of productive forces that have accelerated recently which are typical of a world economy are exerting an ever greater influence on national economic complexes. Under these conditions external factors of the reproduction process operate as an objectively given amount. The major task of the structural policy is more effective adaptation of the economy to international requirements.

A most important area of the structural policy of the European CEMA countries in the modern stage is improvement of sector and branch proportions of national economic complexes. This is predetermined by the fact that scientific and technical progress, on the one hand, and the growth and diversification of the needs of the population, on the other, change the basic macro-structural relationships in the economy and influence the general nature of the socioeconomic processes in the society. As was noted at the symposium, the formation of sector and branch structures of the economy, including the structure of employment, reflects the degree of development of productive forces and is governed by general laws that are typical of all developed countries.

A comparison of the structures of the gross domestic product (GDP) and employment in the CEMA and EEC countries with a breakdown for the various sectors of the national economy (taken over periods with similar levels of economic development) shows that the CEMA countries typically have a much larger proportion of the primary and secondary sectors with a smaller proportion of the tertiary sector. Czechoslovakian scholars are inclined to explain the fairly significant differences observed in these processes, particularly when comparing Czechoslovakia with EEC countries, by the subjective factor (the influence of various socioeconomic subsystems on the sector and branch structure of the national economy) and also by the special historical role of the production sector of Czechoslovakia (especially machine building) in the process of industrialization of the other CEMA countries during the 1950s and 1960s (K. Zeman, Ya. Gutarzh, CSSR).

If one considers the dynamics of the sector structure in the CEMA and EEC countries, one should note that in the majority of them identical tendencies are manifested. One can include among these the gradual reduction of the proportion of branches of the primary sector, the stabilization (or reduction) of the proportion of branches of the secondary sector with an increase in the proportion of the tertiary sector both in the structure of the GDP and in the structure of employment. These tendencies are conditioned above all by the reduction of the dependency of a number of branches of the production sphere on the resource base. At the same time there

are stronger possibilities that the branch structure of the national economy will "break away" from this base under the influence of scientific and technical progress.

Obviously, one can speak about a change in the hierarchy of factors that predetermine the structure of national economic complexes: there is a stronger priority for the factor of scientific and technical development and the role of the resource factor is weakening. This general tendency is modified to a certain degree depending on the objective possibilities of bringing natural resources into production, on the specific conditions of the socio-economic development of individual countries and, to a certain degree, also on the scale of the national economy (G. Ganchev, Bulgaria; K. Zeman, Ya. Gutarzh).

The mutually conditioned nature of these two tendencies in small national economic complexes of developed countries at the present time lead to an interweaving of the two basic kinds of specialization. On the one hand one can still see the structure-forming influence of natural factors that are more typical of the traditional types of specialization based on the utilization of advantages in providing natural resources. On the other hand a new type of specialization is being established which utilizes the advantages related to the breakthrough in individual areas of technical equipment and technology or progress in the area of scientific research and development (E. Mikelka, CSSR).

During the course of the discussion on sector and branch structures of the economy, emphasis was placed on the persistent need for accelerated development of the tertiary sector. Attention was drawn to the fact that the developed sector of services exerts an effective stimulating influence on the sphere of material production. Predictions show that in most developed capitalist countries the proportion of the sphere of material production by the year 2000 will drop to 20 percent (at the present time it is 30-40 percent).

In the modern world the structures of small national economic complexes are typically much less comprehensive than the economies of large countries. Small countries are more specialized and depend to a greater degree on the world market, and they participate more intensively in international division of labor. The reasons for this situation lie in the limited nature of natural resources and also the inability to remain competitive for very long on the foreign market with a broad assortment of products. The branch structure of national economic complexes of the European CEMA countries, however, differs strongly from this model and is more likely to have the typical features of the branch structure of large national economic complexes. This leads to a dispersion of the limited resources with serious negative consequences for the effectiveness of production and the scientific and technical level of the products (A. Bykov, USSR; M. Kudla, PMR).

It was emphasized at the symposium that the aforementioned countries at the present time have a critical problem of essentially deepening specialization through their more intensive inclusion in international division of labor. The inadequacy of this inclusion is shown by the fact that the value of per capita foreign trade circulation in the EEC countries is higher by a factor of 2-3 than it is in CEMA countries. And this when for socialist countries as distinct from Western ones foreign trade activity is the leading form of participation in international division of labor (A. Shinkovich, VNR; S. Tikal, CSSR).

The fact that the majority of products of machine building in European CEMA countries serve to satisfy domestic needs shows the inadequate level of their specialization. And the consequences of inadequate specialization, the low competitiveness of these products and small volumes of their sales on the world market. This circumstance, along with low indicators of imports of machine-building products, explains the unsatisfactory quality structure of the fleets of machines and equipment in the economy of the European CEMA countries (S. Tikal, Z. Shchakovski, PNR).

The structural policy is intended to serve to a decisive degree to increase the product's ability to compete as a result of consistent and effective specialization of the economy. In this connection it was emphasized that certain features of the modern structural policy of small EEC countries are of undoubted interest to socialist countries. In particular, at the present time an extremely typical tendency in the EEC countries is to depart from state support of branches and subbranches whose products cannot compete in the international market with the simultaneous redistribution in favor of promising subbranches.

When searching for new areas of specialization small developed capitalist countries are oriented toward the production of high-quality technologically complicated items, above all science-intensive ones, but for a particular, narrow sector of the world market that requires small-series or individual production. This tactic makes it possible to keep under control (from the standpoint of volume) a large part of the insignificant market but requires essential changes in the internal structure of the processing industry (K. Mikhalkovski-Gorivoda, PNR; E. Mikelka).

The result of this structural policy is a reduction of the volumes of production and employment in individual subbranches of the processing industry of small EEC countries with the parallel growth of certain subbranches of machine building and electrical equipment. This, in turn, leads to an essential weakening of the factor of the dependency of the reproduction process on the availability of raw material, energy, and processed materials with a simultaneous strengthening of the factor of a highly skilled work force (M. Kudla).

Another aspect to which participants in the symposium paid special attention is that the most important area for adaptation of national economic complexes of the CEMA countries to world economic processes is selective transformation of the branch structure of the economy, above all industry. The most important prerequisite for further successful development of the national economy is the requirement to obtain positive results in any particular, fairly narrow areas. It was emphasized that the most effective solution to the problems presented above is actually attainable within the framework of the structure of the national economy where a decisive role is played by the processing industry (M. Yashper, VNR).

One of the most serious problems considered at the symposium was the interconnection between the branch structure of the national economy and scientific and technical progress. This interconnection is manifested in two basic areas. On the one hand, the aforementioned structure acts as a factor in scientific and technical progress. On the other, it is a consequence of scientific and technical progress. In the first place, this takes place when the tendencies in the development of individual directions of scientific and technical progress lead to the objective appearance of new subbranches. This process takes place as a result of expansion of the scale of production of items created on the basis of the latest technical achievements. As a result there is a significant improvement in technical and technological parameters and the structure of the products produced changes in favor of technical progressive items. Another important area of structural influence of scientific and technical progress is the introduction of progressive means of labor, reduced-waste and waste-free technologies, and improvement of the utilization of all kinds of resources (V. Ruzhichka, CSSR).

Despite the fact that this area looks less effective it should be noted that it is especially crucial in European CEMA countries, especially on the plane of increasing the degree of mobility and flexibility of the branch structure. In order to satisfy the rapidly growing, diversified needs of the population it is necessary to have a systematic formation of new subbranches, restructuring and improvement of old ones, and a mechanism for the existence of a flexible branch structure. One should note the close coordination of issues of flexibility of the structure of the national economic complex and the universality of this structure for the development of the economy. While right up to the 1950's this kind of universality could be simply understood as development of the primary sector of the national economy (and above all branches of heavy industry that provide the entire national economy with raw material, fuel and energy), during the 1960s and certainly today the situation has changed radically. The role of the universal structural basis has shifted to the processing industry and above all machine building, electrical equipment, the electronic industry, and so forth. Having lost their universal nature branches of the extraction industry

have been transformed from a guarantee of mobility of the branch structure into a kind of limiting factor in the adaptation of this structure of production to the new conditions of socioeconomic development. This is precisely the role played at the present time by branches of the extraction industry of a number of CEMA countries.

Thus real scientific and technical progress in traditional branches that are oriented toward ensuring high effectiveness of their functioning through a reduction of the proportional indicators of the consumption of raw material, energy and processed materials should provide conditions also for more extensive influence of scientific and technical progress on the branch structure of the economy through the first path—through the appearance of new subbranches and kinds of productions.

At the symposium attention was drawn to another aspect of the interaction between the national economic structure and scientific and technical progress. It is manifested most appreciably in developed capitalist countries in the form of a shift in the center of gravity of scientific and technical development from the production to the nonproduction sphere, the sphere of services. This is manifested most clearly in the increased role of information science, information technology, and communications. In the European socialist countries this tendency is still being manifested extremely weakly (N. Antyushina, USSR).

Some of the speakers noted that an essential aspect of the analysis of structures of national economic complexes is the determination of their effectiveness, above all their socioeconomic effectiveness. The latter under socialism can be regarded as the degree of achievement of the goal determined in the main economic law with minimization of the expenditures of labor and embodied labor. The structure of the national economic complex can be considered effective if it provides for rational consumption to the greatest degree—either through its own production or through foreign economic ties (Ye. Kamykina, USSR). It was also emphasized that foreign economic ties are exerting an ever-growing influence on the improvement of the structure of consumption. This tendency exists both in the CEMA countries and the EEC countries. But the inadequate participation of the economies of the countries of the first group in international division of labor is most clearly manifested in trade (and above all in imports) in consumer goods. In small EEC countries the proportion of imports of consumer goods in domestic consumption is 60 percent and more, and in the CEMA countries this proportion is much less. In the CSSR, for example, it is about 9 percent, which is much less even than in large countries of the West (S. Tikal).

Participants in the discuss came to the unanimous conclusion that the structure of national economic complexes of the European CEMA countries is in need of improvement. The basis for this improvement, as was noted by the majority of speakers, should be priority subbranches of machine building. They are called upon

to create prerequisites for an essential transformation of the structure of public production and, in the final analysis, the structure of consumption.

A serious problem in the development of consumption in the European CEMA countries is its extensive nature. In the first place, they are using an ever greater volume of resources per unit of consumption. This results in a reduction of the proportion of personal consumption in the GDP, which reduces its stimulating influence on economic growth. Second, what is being reproduced is essentially the outdated structure of consumption which typically has a large proportion of poor-quality goods with a low technical and aesthetic level. This is a result of the orientation toward satisfying mainly the basic, reproduction needs of the population (J. Kucherak, CSSR).

In conclusion, let us discuss another principal issue—the possibilities and limits on the utilization of the experience of the structural policy of the EEC under the conditions of the CEMA community. Taking into account the universal nature of the processes of internationalization of economic life in the age of the scientific and technical revolution, it is possible to determine certain promising areas of application of this experience. This pertains first and foremost to the very goals of the structural strategy. It is the most important instrument for the development and implementation of the foreign economic policy. The EEC has interesting experience in utilizing a coordinated policy in individual branches as instruments for the formation of an integrated structure.

CEMA countries have favorable possibilities of optimizing the structures of national economic complexes. But this process will be effective only if worldwide tendencies in this area are taken into account. COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo "Nauka", "Obshchestvennye nauki", 1988

Citizen's Comment on CEMA-EEC Ties
18250006a Moscow NEW TIMES in English
No 41, Oct 88 p 2

[Article by Alexei Kurganov, Moscow Region, USSR]

[Text] The present period should, I think, be most appreciated for its emphasis on genuine realism, including a realistic approach to international relations. Only recently our press castigated and disparaged the so-called Common Market. To listen to it, the member states of the organization were always in conflict and, in general, the EEC was about to crumble like a house of cards. On the other hand, the press glorified the CEMA organization. Here, according to the press of the time, everything was in perfect order, if not better. And if something bad did happen, it was laid at the door of the crafty capitalists. Yes, those were sad times.... Glasnost has irrefutably demonstrated the one-sidedness and bias of such reasoning. Only now are we beginning to appreciate the role played by the EEC and the importance of cooperation rather than confrontation between the CEMA and the

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EEC. I know that this summer official relations were established between the two and that the sides are working out a major agreement. Steps like these can only be welcomed as in the long run they work for a common goal—the strengthening of peace and friendship between

nations. We often talk big but in this case—and it is a pleasant exception—there are deeds as well as words. This offers hope.

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**Progress of Reform Efforts in Socialist States
Assessed**

*18070176a Moscow RABOCHIY KLASS I
SOVREMENNY MIR in Russian
No 3, May-Jun 88 (signed to press 30 May 88) p 3-14*

[Article by Liliya Fedorovna Shevtsova, candidate of historical sciences, lead scientific associate of the USSR Academy of Sciences Economics of the World Socialist System Institute: "Inevitability of the Renewal of Socialism"]

[Text] The concept of "reform" in the life of the socialist countries was not born yesterday. Yugoslavia took the path of a departure from the traditional model back in 1950. Poland embarked on reforms for the first time in 1956, Hungary, in 1968, and China, in 1978. There have in a number of countries been changes in the economic sphere accompanied by changes in the political system.

In the majority of cases the reorganizations which have been undertaken have led to positive changes and contributed to the emancipation of society, although have not always achieved all the set goals. They have frequently stopped half-way and slid back even. In the countries implementing reforms it has not been possible to avoid contradictions and crisis situations even. The example of Yugoslavia shows that the search for the new is a complex and dramatic process. Adjustments in the system of the leadership and control of society have been made repeatedly in recent decades here. However, it has still not been possible to avoid serious conflict situations in its development.

At the present time, as the 13th League of Communists of Yugoslavia Congress observed, the country is once again faced with a crisis in all walks of life (source 11, 1986, Nos 6-7, p VII). Following a 20-year period of the implementation of a reform of economic management, difficulties in Hungary have intensified.* The attempt at economic reform made in 1982 in Poland also failed to solve the problems which had accumulated here. Using these facts, the opponents of reforms are endeavoring to show that restructuring is to blame for everything and that it is alien to socialism. They are presenting a return to the previous forms of leadership and management as a guarantee of society's stability.

Today, when the task is to find new incentives to the development of socialism, it is important to answer the question: why did the previous reforms fail or produce partial results? Perhaps it is truly a question of the "unreformability" of socialism? Or of the content of the reforms themselves or of their implementation? Available experience enables us to affirm that the reason for the failures was not restructuring but its insufficiency. "We lacked consistency and decisiveness," W. Jaruzelski observed (source 10, 5 November 1987). The leadership of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia pointed to the "differences between the stipulated goals and social practice" (source 11, 1986, Nos 6-7, p VIII). Decisions of

the leadership of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party also affirmed that "the mistake was not the implementation of the 1968 reform but its slow and inconsistent realization" (source 8, 1988, No 2, p 104).

What prevented what had been contemplated being brought to completion? The reason for the failures is frequently sought in the position of former leaders or in the conservatism of society; sometimes everything is dumped on international economic conditions. I believe that the fate of the reforms in individual countries was determined by an aggregate of factors. An influence was exerted by the mood among the working people and their readiness for or, on the contrary, nonacceptance of new forms of life; the correlation of reform and conservative forces in the leadership; the inadequate critical analysis of the overall concept of the renewal of socialism; the nature of relations between fraternal countries and the forms of realization of national and international interests; the international climate as a whole. Also of significance was the fact that there was frequently an endeavor to achieve new goals by old methods. This contained the inevitability of failure. Too strong also was the fear of rattling evolved notions of socialism or upsetting the monopoly on the interpretation of the normalities of its development which existed.

The need for emphatic renewal is observed in the majority of socialist countries. There is a growing recognition that perfecting what is obsolete is pointless and that half-measures are not enough. The positions of socialism and its future are under threat. All-around restructuring is the sole way to reveal the potential of the socialist system.

At the same time, however, it has become obvious that the implementation of reforms has become increasingly complex at the present stage. It is primarily a question of the fact that we have some catching up to do, raking apart problems which have built up over decades. "We are behind," "we have let slip too much time"—such are the confessions of Hungarian, Chinese and Bulgarian leaders (source 5, p 28; 8, 1988, No 11; 14, 1987, No 1). Society itself does not always actively support the idea of reforms. The existence of the psychological mechanisms of social inertia takes its toll (source 8, 1988, No 1, pp 64-75). A distrustful attitude toward what is new is the sole defense of reaction and a consequence of the aspiration of the masses and individuals to safeguard their social security. It has to be seen, however, that the wait-and-see position of individual strata has been brought about also by their disenchantment with the results of previous and sometimes repeated attempts at restructuring. There are many who do not approve of reform, fearing a deterioration in their material position. Indeed, reforms have repeatedly culminated in a lowering of the living standard of whole social groups. Thus enlivening activity and getting society on the move is more complex now than previously. A principal, if not the main, problem is achieving the necessary social support for renewal.

It is noted in certain countries that resistance to reforms has grown recently. The point being that the former methods of leadership and management are still in effect. They have been shaken somewhat in the economy. But in political life they are relatively strong. Their defensive reaction has intensified. These structures are providing for the consolidation of forces not interested in reforms. But even where restructuring has affected the basic forms of the organization of society, the former practice and cliches of thinking penetrating the new structures also persist.

The interweaving of conservative interests in different sections of the political system existed earlier also. It was frequently an obstacle in the way of reforms. At the present time a new phenomenon has been manifested more distinctly: the convergence of the opponents of restructuring among managers and managed not interested in a transition to more productive forms of activity. The community of their interests has already been recognized, among bureaucratic forces at least. It is not for nothing that they are attempting to take as a basis the egalitarian sentiments of some of the working people and to artificially excite them even and, presenting themselves as the "people's defenders," to torpedo the measures aimed at an increase in efficiency. Narrowly interpreted slogans of order and discipline and wholesale calls for ideological vigilance aimed essentially against a broadening of democracy and glasnost are meeting with support in certain social strata.

The social base of public conservatism is heterogeneous. There are whole groups here associated with obsolete forms of production, distribution and power. Considering the objective nature of their interests, it is becoming clear that reeducating these groups and enlisting them on the side of progress is impossible. There is just one solution—elimination of the organizational, economic and other conditions of their existence. But there are also broad strata of the working people which are not yet aware that the reforms correspond to their vital requirements.

Resistance to the reforms is assuming various forms. The method of combating the renewal under the cover of reconstruction phrase-mongering is relatively developed. Reorganizations which do not change the essence of management methods and are aimed merely at preserving the existing alignment of forces are far from new. An endeavor to reduce the reforms to a minimum, pass off the wish for reality and stop at certain intermediate stages has intensified recently. At times half-measures are portrayed absolutely sincerely as a qualitatively new mechanism. Thus the working people's extended participation in management is frequently presented as a transition to self-management, which is a new form of social life. Even greater perplexity is caused by attempts to equate self-management with the activity of the state.

There are other dangers in the way of the reforms also. They include premature anticipation and the endeavor to stride over objectively necessary stages of reconstruction or to implement it by directive methods. The

attempts of certain groups to use it in their egotistical interests, having placed all its burdens on other strata of the working people, may be encountered also. Hankerings in the guise of reform after a departure from socialism are encountered. But the most serious obstacle in the way of restructuring is the fear that it could shake the foundations of the system. Pondering the "blocking factors," M. Rakowski, member of the Polish United Workers Party Central Committee Politburo, noted among them "fears of a loss or weakening of power." "The opinion is held," he said at the end of 1987, "that realization of the reform in full would deprive us, that is, the directive center, of the instruments with which it is possible to determine the directions of social and economic development" (source 13, 26 December 1987).

The questions and doubts connected with the implementation of reforms under socialism are not exhausted. A source of many of them is the adherence to the traditional form its development and an incapacity or reluctance to recognize the need for the renewal not only of individual aspects of the socialist society but its entire organization. Yet V.I. Lenin called for the constant "finishing" of the primary "rough-hewn" structure, by no means considering it ideal.

The solution of practical questions is complicated appreciably by the fact that the process of the formation of the new model of socialism has yet to be completed and that the illusions which have taken root here have not been fully overcome. One such is the perception of socialist development as an ideal straight line and nonstop movement in the course of which, if individual malfunctions do occur, they are overcome of their own accord. Faith in the infallibility of leadership, in the inexhaustible potential of the self-perfection of the managerial system and in its adequate reflection of the working people's interests has become too deeply rooted also. Practice, however, shows that, given certain circumstances, political and economic mechanisms begin to operate to the detriment of society, fettering its development and giving rise to a waste of its material and spiritual forces. Certain components of management may, as observed at the Bulgarian CP Central Committee July (1987) Plenum, be a "hotbed of bureaucratism" (source 6, p 52). And the continuous movement of socialism is, as a whole, impossible. Noting this fact, J. Berecz, member of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party Central Committee Politburo, emphasizes: "The guarantee of success currently is flexibility and a capacity for accomplishing exceedingly rapid changes" (source 9, 1987, No 9, p 14). However, the question of their limits, fullness and pace remains a subject of debate.

V.I. Lenin understood reform as a "certain step" and "stage" en route to something better (source 1, vol 15, p 107). However, the content of this step at different stages of socialist building has been understood dissimilarly. Previously reforms amounted mainly to an improvement in management methods. They occurred within the framework of the structures of that time, not affecting

their content. Nor did a change of leadership alter the essential characteristics of the social system. The reform was perceived subjectively as a precautionary reaction aimed at a strengthening of the existing order.

At the present time the concept of "reform" in the socialist countries is being interpreted increasingly often as a restructuring of the social system top to bottom. This process includes the formulation of new social goals and a search for new means of realizing them. The success of the reforms is associated also with the promotion to key roles of the more progressive strata and the renewal of the social basis of power and management. The essence of the change is the formation of a new model of socialism. Effecting this in evolutionary fashion is impossible. A leap forward, and for this reason, radical measures are needed. Under these conditions the "reform" concept begins to acquire revolutionary content. "We have opted for the revolutionary path because the possibilities of the preceding model of socialism in Bulgaria are exhausted," the Bulgarian CP National Conference affirmed (source 10, 29 January 1988).

The relationship between reform and revolution is emphasized by the leadership of a number of ruling parties. More often than not the reform is regarded as a means of revolutionary transformations. "The revolution continues to develop after victory has been won by way of reforms," J. Kadar said (source 12, 15 September 1987). Sometimes reform is equated with revolution. "Reform of the socialist mechanism, if we mean the breadth and depth of the social changes which it has brought about, represents one further revolution," the 13th CCP Congress observed (source 8, 1988, No 1, p 111). This understanding of reforms is similar to the approach of the CPSU leadership, which sees perestroika as a revolution (source 4, p 46). Of course, there is a boundary between them. But, as V.I. Lenin said, "this is not a dead but a living, mobile boundary..." (source 1, vol 20, p 167). The leap forward and sudden change in social development are prepared by a number of reforms, which make space for the new mechanism and for this reason cannot fail to be of revolutionary significance.

What is the content of the social system taking shape in individual socialist countries? It may be defined thus: transition from management based on pressure to management by means of the influencing of actual interests. The very approach to the "interest" category is changing. Even recently it was perceived as something base and seen as the embodiment of cupidity or egotism. Today there is a deepening realization that interest is a basic driving force of human and social activity. The turning point is recognition of the existence of social diversity and the need for consideration of various aspirations and positions. A reassessment of the role of the individual is under way. Earlier the individual was seen as an instrument, a "screw" in the intricate interweave of social processes. The diffusion of personal in general interests and the de-individualization of development were seen

as the way to tackle socialist tasks. The basic feature of the new model of socialism, on the other hand, is the development of the diverse aspirations of the individual. The path of realization of the general lies not through the limitation of individual but primarily through the greatest possible satisfaction of private interests. The problem of the choice and realization of social priorities remains, after all, the possibilities of society are not limitless. But they may be achieved only if each individual voluntarily incorporates them in his own system of values. "If we wish to help the cause in some way, it should first be our own, egotistic cause..." F. Engels wrote (source 2, vol 27, pp 11-12).

It has come about historically such that the social system of socialism has been geared primarily to self-defense and the securing of internal stability. This has forced us to fence ourself off from the surrounding world and eschew everything going beyond a strictly determined framework. The possibilities of democracy have been constricted and all that might have introduced to the development of society elements of spontaneity has been limited. This practice could not have failed to have undermined dynamism. The task of the creation of guarantees of the constant renewal of social, economic and ideological life is being set in many socialist countries at the present time.

An endeavor to find one's own approach to determination of future path is perceived in each country. Some are speaking of the need for a leap forward to a qualitatively new organization of society. Others are setting the task of individual reforms. Yet others are expressing the opinion of the need for an improvement in the existing forms of life. In the one case the emphasis is being put on what is new, in the other, on continuity. There has not previously, perhaps, been so active a search for national paths in the development of socialism. Essentially the concept of "sole" (or "common") model has ceased to exist. The "pluralization" of the socialist world and the search for a multi-variant character within the framework of a single formation have been dictated by the aspiration to a more creative approach to the accomplishment of development tasks.

At the same time, however, there sometimes arises also the idea of exaggeration in the assessment of the "extent" of national specifics. Even in countries which have proclaimed the path of the formation of national models like Bulgaria, the PRC and Poland, for example, the reforms which are being implemented essentially have much in common. The distinctiveness applies mainly to the methods and pace of their implementation.

Simplistic approaches to social reforms are gradually being overcome. Even recently restructuring was perceived as a forced step, as a means of making ends meet and overcoming current difficulties or disproportions. This narrowed the horizons and limited the possibilities of the reforms. An absence of a strategy of renewal

prevented the anticipation and, even more, the control of their consequences, and these consequences have been ambivalent and have not coincided with their immediate results.

The reform has usually amounted to "compensation" and to a response to an external impetus. When, however, the outside influence has come to an end, the system has frequently reverted to the initial state. This has been the case with the majority of economic restructurings. The task today is to make the renewal process a natural inner requirement of society.

The surmounting, which has now begun, of the mechanistic understanding of reform, which has been reflected in the reduction of one principle to its opposite, is worth mentioning also. Thus decentralization was often seen as the main direction of the surmounting of excessive centralism in management. However, the experience of Poland in the 1970s and the development of China on the eve and at the outset of the 1980s demonstrated that this path could lead to a growth of the bureaucratic stratum. And, furthermore, as V.I. Lenin foresaw, a local bureaucracy is in no way better than a departmental bureaucracy, quite the contrary even—the "worst mediastinum" between the authorities and the working people.

The appearance of a peculiar vogue based on pluralism, in which this phenomenon is perceived not as a natural state for society but merely as a response to the wage leveling which has occurred, may be observed currently. Pluralism here is frequently being elevated to the level of sole form of social development. Yet diversity may be constructive only if there are effective forms of coordination.

The understanding that a systemic approach to the formation of the new model of the control of society is essential is becoming increasingly noticeable at the present time. This means not the abandonment of something (this or the other—centralization or decentralization and so forth) but a combination of the one and the other, but in a different proportion and different quality now.

All countries which have embarked on the path of reforms are paying great attention to the problem of stability. The disruption of former social relations and customary forms of life and the shaping of new ones is a complex process. It may be accompanied by social conflicts and the appearance of centrifugal trends and, finally, psychological dramas. For this reason it is important to decide whether to effect an abrupt change or reorganize by gradually, where possible, alleviating for society the sharpness of the changes. This dilemma confronts many countries. In Poland the leadership resorted to a referendum, resolving to give the working people the right to make the choice. The results of the ballot showed society's unreadiness for radical transformations. Ways to mitigate them had to be sought.

The task of finding a form of combination of the new and the old which had commended itself was set right from the start in a number of countries. The Hungarian and Chinese leadership adhere to this line. They are orienting their countries toward the implementation of reforms "step by step," employing transitional forms. This is intended to facilitate consideration of the mood of society.

At the same time the aspiration not to exacerbate the situation and avoid conflicts could hamper the restructuring. Thus at the start of the 1970s it was these fears which played a decisive part in Hungary in impeding the economic reform and in the application of administrative levers of management. These actions not only did not bring about the desired tranquillity but, on the contrary, made the situation in the country worse. Continuation of the reform had become an acute necessity. But it had to be implemented under less propitious conditions.

The positions of the supporters of radical solutions have been strengthening in certain countries recently. Their line of reasoning is as follows: compromise between the old and the new is impossible. Given gradual implementation, restructuring loses its mobilizing force and cannot produce a tangible effect. There is also the danger that the new will be rejected by the old system. For this reason it is essential to implement the reform in a "package"—at once and at all levels. It is clear, however, that this way will prove painful for very broad strata of the population. Nor are social upheavals precluded. The future will show the merits of each of these versions of development. The policy of the gradualness of the transformations would seem the most likely meanwhile. It does not rule out decisive measures but they are to be combined with this social stabilizer or the other.

Each reform has its stages of development. "What we call renewal is not a one-time act.... It is a gradual, dialectical process," W. Jaruzelski wrote (source 13, 3 May 1987). It is observed in the majority of countries that they are as yet "at the start of the road". In this transitional period, the most critical, perhaps, in the process of formation of the new society, the danger of a return to the old is particularly great. After all, the new forms are only just being introduced and cannot produce an immediate effect. Costs are particularly great at this point, a deterioration in the material position of the masses is possible and the appearance of a mood of disenchantment cannot be ruled out. There is a temptation "at the top" to push through restructuring by an effort of will. Everything indicates how dangerous impatience both "at the top" and of the masses and an endeavor to obtain results from the reform right now are. This is why it is so important to overcome illusions and abandon the idealization of restructuring: it may not only intensify existing contradictions but also give rise to new ones. Thus contradictions between the expectations of society and the possibilities of their satisfaction; between the masses' need for social security and the need

for a break with fixed forms; between their aspiration to harmony and the inevitable intensification of the conflict nature of development and elements of struggle are unavoidable. The perception and evaluation both "at the top" and "below" of the contradictions between customary ideas concerning equality and justice and the increased material and social differentiation of society could prove most delicate and difficult. Reforms unfailingly give rise to conflicts connected with a change in the social position of individual groups and strata and their influence on management and a redistribution of their share of the national income. All this creates a new social atmosphere far from serenity.

There is no automatism in the implementation of restructuring. It is constantly influenced by diverse factors. They could bring about a slide backward also and lead to impasse. For this reason close attention is being paid in the socialist countries to the search for guarantees of the irreversibility of the progressive changes. The most important of them is all-around democratization. The fraternal countries have set the task of enlisting the masses in the formation of the concept and program of restructuring in the research effort phase and not only the adoption of ready-made decisions. An example is the extension of the system of public advice bureaus, the introduction of the institution of referenda and the preparation and discussion of several alternative solutions. Various social forces are joining in this process increasingly extensively. In Hungary and Poland individual organizations (people's fronts, the unions) are putting forward their proposals pertaining to reform issues and criticizing this official goal or the other. Society is gradually becoming an equal participant in the reform movement. This process is not moving smoothly, however. Prejudices of the past are still pressing down and a disregard for democratic procedures and an attitude toward the masses merely as an object of administration have not disappeared.

At times individual social forces are themselves not prepared to conform to the demands of restructuring. Under these conditions the expansion of democracy may strengthen the positions, if not of avowed conservatives, of the hesitating majority. There is the problem of the combination of the power of the people and the political will of the leadership and its endeavor to bring what has been started to completion.

An active social movement in society, primarily the consolidation of the forces of renewal and their recognition of the community of their interests, is vitally necessary for the success of the reform. As yet, however, the organized, legal, political basis for their unification is insufficient. The further broadening of glasnost and conditions for an open confrontation of views are essential. This will allow the masses to themselves assess the arguments of the supporters and opponents and to weigh the pros and cons of the reforms. The further development of movements and initiatives "from below" and the emergence of new structures as a counterweight to

those which exist, which are incapable of overcoming excessive formality and bureaucratism, would be useful. In any event, in a number of socialist countries the revival of spontaneous movements and the appearance of various societies, clubs, interest partnerships and associations has contributed much to the renewal of the activity of traditional social bodies and forced them to struggle for their influence.

This process will be accompanied by demarcation and increased confrontation. But, after all, without this the consolidation of the masses on a platform of renewal is impossible. It must not be forgotten that the advancement at the moment of social change of the traditional slogan of the moral and political unity of the people could play into the hands of the opponents of reforms. Bureaucratism once flourished and social progress subsided under the unity slogan in Poland.

Nor should personal aspects be disregarded in the business of real renewal; it is very important who is implementing the reforms at all levels. They will hardly evoke the working people's trust if they are implemented by those who were involved in the mistakes of the past and associated with the previous forms of management.

How actively the masses support the restructuring and join in its implementation will depend on the distribution of the burden of its costs. This is seen as a most acute problem in the socialist countries. The following questions are being asked increasingly insistently: how justified are the attempts to withdraw managers, those who are elaborating the concept of reform and guiding its implementation, from the "danger zone"? To what extent should the personnel be responsible "with their own wallet" for its successes and failures? The political climate in society and the effectiveness of the reform itself will depend on the fair distribution of the burden of difficulties among individual social strata.

Few people are benefiting from the reform as yet. Most obvious is the growth of the well-being of the part of the rural population employed in the cooperative and small-scale commodity sectors. And this is explicable: invested capital and labor multiplied by risk produce returns more rapidly. Studies conducted in a number of countries have shown that considerable numbers of the workers are beginning to feel themselves done out of their fair share, and their unhappiness is on the increase. A similar mood is emerging among certain strata of the intelligentsia also, although here dissatisfaction with the material position is being alleviated partially by the broadening of political liberties. However, we cannot turn a blind eye to the emergence in society of the problem of the "rich" and "poor," which is contributing to an upsurge of wage-leveling sentiments. A certain disenchantment is emerging, to judge by the Polish press, in the public sector since there are no opportunities therein for a rapid growth in well-being. Under these conditions the danger of a return to what went before under cover of leftist

appeals for equality and a struggle against the private-ownership mentality arises. In 1972 this occurred in Hungary, when limits were placed on the incomes of rural workers. Shortly after these measures struck at the interests of the urban population. V.I. Lenin, incidentally, warned that any infringement of the peasants would jeopardize the interests of the working class and socialism as a whole (source 1, vol 43, p 219). This manifests the systemic nature of the development of society and the dependence of some interests on the guarantee of others.

The socialist countries have embarked on their reforms variously. The majority of them began with the restructuring of the system of planning and management in industry. China embarked on reforms initially in the countryside. It was believed for some time that for imparting new dynamism to socialism economic reforms were sufficient. It has now become clear that a restructuring of the economy will not lead to the desired growth of efficiency if it is not accompanied by a renewal of the institutions of power. "The crux of the matter is that the political structure does not correspond to the demands of the reform of the economy. This is why the successful reform of the economy cannot be secured without a reorganization of the political structure," the Chinese leadership maintains (source 8, 1988, No 1, p 159). Economic requirements have been a powerful impetus to a change in ideas concerning policy. The invariability of political institutions is ceasing to be equated with the stability of the system and perceived as a basic principle of socialism. The restructuring of political systems has been seen in a number of countries recently as a most important factor of the surmounting of contradictions and deformations which have built up over decades. The task of political reforms has been set at this time or the other by Bulgaria, Hungary, China, Poland and Yugoslavia. Thus the renewal processes in many countries are assuming a global, comprehensive nature. This goal was set by the 27th CPSU Congress also.

However, the reform movement continues as yet to rely on the preservation of a number of ideological rules and principles formulated at the time of transition to the building of the new society, when the Soviet model was borrowed uncritically. "There is a real difference between the ideas concerning socialism which took shape earlier and in which in many cases were idealized and sometimes illusory even and present-day reality," the 13th Hungarian Socialist Workers Party Congress affirmed (source 3, p 43). In the sphere of the social consciousness the processes of restructuring are occurring far more slowly than in other walks of life. In a number of countries it is observed that a qualitative change in ideological life has yet to occur. A confusion and uncertainty of positions is perceived. It is still not infrequently that reform ideas are perceived as a departure from socialism and ideological "sabotage". The very role of ideology is understood simplistically. It is sometimes seen as the sole regulator of social life. The urgent

measures pertaining to the development of commodity-money relations and self-management are being evaluated not in terms of the extent of their social efficiency but of whether they are undermining traditional principles, primarily the leading role of the party and the positions of the state. The practice of even trifling questions of production and social life being correlated with established ideological rules has not disappeared. Another extreme is being encountered also—the conversion of ideology into the "servant" of practice and a cover for this voluntarist action or the other.

Ideology remains as yet the weakest link in the unfolding social renewal movement. "Great practice needs great theory," the 13th CCP Congress pointed out. Yet "the situation concerning the building of Marxist theory of the party is far from corresponding to the great work in which we are involved" (source 8, 1988, No 1, p 127). The reason for this, evidently, is not only the distinctiveness of the regularities of the development of ideological-theoretical processes. It is a question of something else also—the preservation of the former vertical organization of the mechanism of the formulation of ideas and principles. They are formulated, as before, by a small group of theorists and then "submitted" to the masses. This model corresponded to the requirements of the revolution period and the first years of socialist transformations. This was the extensive path of the assimilation of Marxist propositions by society conditioned by the insufficient level of maturity of broad strata. Limitation of the role of the working people merely to the passive consumption of ideas could now result at best in their declarative adoption. People's increasingly broad enlistment in discussion of the problems of scientific socialism and the shaping of theoretical ideas, on the other hand, should lend new impetus both to the development of Marxism and its perception by society. There is a growing need primarily for the more active participation in ideological debate of members of the party and the enhancement of its role of "collective intellectual".

Although the process of the renewal of the ideological life of socialism has only just begun, a number of trends in its development may be ascertained today even. The comprehension of the essential characteristics of the socialist society and the distinctiveness of their manifestation at individual stages is becoming more profound. What seemed transitory is frequently being seen as the basic content of the system. But at the same time it is becoming necessary to abandon a number of propositions, which have been interpreted as "principles of socialism" but which in practice were the product of a certain historical stage and not essentially socialist.

Interest in ideas expressed in the course of the popular-democratic stage has increased in a number of countries. The appeal to the model of a "three-sector" economy, peaceful coexistence and the interaction of the state, cooperative and private sectors is indicative.

The aspiration to an unbiased evaluation of the West's achievements is growing. Having done away with the bourgeois social system, socialism at one time rejected a number of principles and standards which were the fruit of the development of world democratic thought. It is a question, *inter alia*, of the principle of the division of power (representative, executive and judicial), which has made it possible to avoid an inordinate strengthening of the executive authorities. The existence of progressive mechanisms in the functioning of Western society, which were created by the persistent struggle of progressive social thought, was for a long time ignored. These were guarantees of political rights and freedoms and barriers in the way of authoritarian tendencies and the usurpation of power. The following question is entirely justified: how far was this nihilism justified and did it not lead to a limitation of the democratic content of socialism. A more constructive approach to world experience and the use of individual components thereof for one's own purposes is necessary. "Retiring into one's shell... would be stupid," Chinese leaders observe (source 8, 1987, No 18, p 119). The restoration in a number of countries of the practice of referenda and the creation of constitutional courts and state tribunals, which are cognizable by top civil servants, and the institution of defenders of citizens' rights, the stimulation of a multiparty system—all this testifies to increased attention to the achievements of world democratic practice. The work of economic mechanisms in Western countries is being studied also. As Bulgarian comrades observe, in implementation of the reform, specifically the creation of business associations, they took advantage of the experience of British firms. There is greater ideological flexibility in the solution of questions of socialist building.

An indication of this is the attention which is being paid in certain countries to the ideas and proposals of non-Marxist forces. Communists are recognizing increasingly that there can be no monopoly on the truth. The ideas of humanism, democratic communication, dialogue and tolerance developed by certain non-Marxist forces and the emphasis on moral-ethical aspects may be considered their contribution to the building of socialism, although they have an unwonted ring. Recognition of this fact is reflected, for example, in the expansion of the participation of nonparty persons and believers in the discussion and preparation of specific political decisions. All this signifies not a weakening of the positions of Marxism but movement toward a new level of ideological life and an endeavor to take advantage of the constructive content of other ideological-philosophical currents which have long felt the influence of Marxist ideas. Incidentally, the experience of Poland and a number of other countries with traditional ideological-philosophical pluralism shows that under these conditions it is necessary to give more thought to the competitiveness of Marxism and more actively seek ways of its renewal.

The extension of the ideas concerning socialism is broadening the possibilities of restructuring. Hungary, the PRC and Poland have embarked on a new stage of the

implementation of economic reforms. Their content is an increase in the role of the market and simultaneously a quest for more flexible forms of state regulation of the economy. It would seem that the leadership of a number of ruling parties is trying, as far as possible, not to take abrupt steps. The idea of the need for the creation initially of a "stabilization basis" is being expressed. This idea has been expressed in Yugoslavia, where a corresponding long-term program has been adopted. A similar task has been set in Hungary also. V. Benke, chief editor of the theoretical organ of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, observes that the purpose of the stabilization efforts is "the creation of the sources and the base of subsequent acceleration" (source 8, 1988, No 2, p 104). The need for consideration of the interests of the least protected social strata—senior citizens, the youth and large families—is having to be taken into account in the solution of problems of an increase in economic efficiency.

A dual situation essentially persists in the economy of many socialist countries. The Hungarian economist J. Kornau defined its content thus: "The director of an enterprise is forced to keep one eye on the consumer, and the other, on his superior in the bureaucratic hierarchy. And this second eye is open far wider, what is more" (source 13, 9 May 1987). However, it would seem that the intrinsic requirements of development, the demands of the S&T revolution and the impact of a number of international factors, primarily the debt problem, which is acute for a number of countries, will in the near future persuade society of the need to make an important choice. The 10th PZPR Congress defined the essence thereof thus: "We need to decide: either a difficult today in the name of a better tomorrow or half-measures and their corresponding results" (source 7, p 28).

The endeavor to release economic incentives to development proper testifies to a fundamentally new approach to the relations of politics and economics and an intention to abandon traditional directive influence on economic development. For a long time political measures were considered the most efficient control mechanism. The nonconcurrence and possibility of contradictions even between political and economic goals and the dissimilar content of the corresponding interests were ignored. Things were further complicated by the simplistic understanding of the political approach and the reduction thereof to pure bureaucratic administration. Of course, there is no strict boundary between politics and economics. However, the search for new forms of political influence on economic development which would not fracture its inherent logic is natural.

The accomplishment of this task is connected with the transformation of the political system of socialism. Its main content is the formation of effective guarantees against the bureaucratization of power and its separation from society. Socialist democracy is being extended to this end. Until recently the masses were assigned a consultative, auxiliary role in the running of society.

Today the task is to convert them into an equal partner of professional politicians. However, reduction of the problem to "participation" and "supervision" is insufficient for breaking the power of the machinery and subordinating it to society. For this reason the decision on the transition to self-management which has been adopted in a number of countries is an important step. Several directions of its development may be distinguished. Yugoslavia and now Bulgaria were the first to embark on the path of a fundamental transformation of the system of power on a self-managing basis. The policy of interspersing elements of self-management in the existing subsystem has been adopted in other countries. This is happening thanks to the development of the appropriate institutions on the shopfloor and at the place of residence and by means of the introduction of principles of self-management in the activity of individual organizations. In a word, self-management is beginning to develop as an intricate and ramified structure. Many of its forms are of a transitional nature as yet: the working people's direct solution of a number of questions is being combined with professional leadership. However, the goal of the handover to society of some commanding and managerial functions is being set increasingly insistently in order to rid it ultimately of the tutelage of the administration.

It should, however, be noted that in the development of self-management there are many unsolved questions. The experience of Yugoslavia, which has been proceeding along this path for a long time, shows that the transfer of management to the working people still does not protect against bureaucratism. The 13th League of Communists of Yugoslavia Congress pointed to the persistence of "bureaucratic statism" and the fact that administrative structures are frequently the main center of decision-making. The question arises: is it that the self-management authorities lack sufficient rights or that they do not know how to avail themselves of them. Finally, the self-management authorities themselves sometimes become bureaucratic departments. The ascendancy may be gained on the self-management wave by demagogic slogans and egotistic interests. The self-managing procedure of the formation and adoption of decisions is proving far longer than the administrative procedure and engendering its own contradictions. Nonetheless, only real self-management, however complex this process may be, can create the conditions for the uplift of society.

No less important is the problem of consideration of the multiplicity of interests, positions and opinions. Certain experience of its solution has been accumulated. However, the mechanisms to control confrontations and a struggle of interests in society still have to be adjusted. It is as yet unclear what the forms and limits of the manifestation of pluralism in the activity of individual institutions, primarily within the party, are and in what way it might be combined with the principle of democratic centralism.

The question concerning the possibility of an opposition under socialism is in need of new interpretation also. After all, the extension of pluralism will inevitably be accompanied by a display of opinions opposite to the official opinion and the position of the majority of the working people. Nor can the association of the citizens adhering to different views and their attempts to defend these views be avoided. Dissidence is an inalienable component of a democratic atmosphere and at the same time a consequence of its existence. And, furthermore, it is the minority which is frequently right. "Our past experience has provided several examples of rejected and even vilified conclusions and views subsequently proving correct," the 10th PZPR Congress observed (source 7, p 49).

All this is forcing the leadership of a number of ruling parties to seek more flexible approaches to the opposition. An endeavor to undermine the foundations of the system is unconditionally rejected. However, a struggle of views on specific questions of socialist building is coming increasingly often to be considered a natural phenomenon. This is seen as a guarantee of choice of the optimum solution. The existence of such an opposition factor could even contribute to a strengthening of the viability of socialist power, after all, it would protect against complacency and compel proof of one's own rightness and a struggle for the masses. G. Dimitrov once wrote: "We support an opposition which criticizes the shortcomings and weaknesses of state administration and legally propagandizes its goals. Such an opposition could be useful even" (source 10, 11 June 1947). W. Jaruzelski believes that an opposition factor in respect of the negative phenomena in the state is essential in society today. In turn, Hungarian leaders observe: "...It is essential to continue the exchange of opinions and dialogue with dissidents.... In raising questions of our weaknesses they are helping us" (source 13, 15 October 1987). However, use of the opposition factor in the interests of socialism is compelling a search for a form of control of this phenomenon.

The direction of the restructuring of the political system of socialism will depend on the processes occurring in the ruling parties. The task of a renewal of their leading role has been set in Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria and the PRC. It is acknowledged here that its former mechanism had come into conflict with the requirements of social development. Instances of certain party organizations, fearing a loss of their influence, beginning to impede the economic reform and the development of society's independent activity have been observed.

The restructuring of party activity is proceeding along the lines of the democratization of intraparty relations and the abandonment of the party's petty interference in social life and the work of other institutions. A new image of the Marxist-Leninist party—an organization with features of a social movement and elements of self-management—is taking shape. The ruling parties' relations with the state and with social bodies are being

reconsidered and a search for guarantees which would prevent a duplication of their activity is under way. This is a complex process, traditional views of the party's role being too deep-rooted. Doubts arise at times whether the party's positions in society are strong enough to switch from directive influence to influence by authority and conviction.

The reforms in the socialist countries are only just unfolding. Various turnings are possible on this path. Many questions have to be decided. But one thing is obvious: only in the renewal of socialism is its viability guaranteed.

Footnote

* See K. Pecsi, "Reform and Commodity Production," RK i SM No 1, 1988.

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13. POLITYKA.
14. TARSADALMY SZEMLE.

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Socialism, Its 'Infantile Disorders' Examined
18070044 Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian
No 41, 8-14 Oct 88 p 3

[Article by P. Oldak: "How Strong Socialism Must Be, To Have Survived Such Disorders"]

[Text] In our country today, at all levels and in the most varied auditoriums, the same question is asked, one of the sort called "tricky". It comes in several variants: was there socialism, is their socialism, do we know "where the plane will land after taking off from the airfield of perestroyka?"

I decided to make a response. So as not to "come to grief", I thought up the following allegory.

Imagine that one day an orchestra of many thousands of musicians has gathered on a very large stage to perform the *Eroica* symphony for the first time. Although there has been only one rehearsal, the start of the symphony is fantastic, much to the surprise of the audience and the musicians themselves. Then the problems start. But the ingenious director steers the orchestra along. And again the great work rings out, with increasing confidence.

Suddenly the director dies. In his place comes another, one who has sworn to follow the counsels of the Teacher strictly. But he is jesuitical, contriving countless Bartholemie nights for the massacre of the musicians. Many of those most talented and most devoted to the Teacher perish. Their places are taken by the less ready. They "go all out", sparing no efforts, grow quickly, and the orchestra plays on.

After his death, another man comes and attempts to correct matters, but has neither the strength nor the breadth of personality. He is replaced. A "hero" comes, whose motto could be expressed by Galitskiy's recitative from the opera *Prince Igor*: "Drink, drink, and make merry." And he drinks away many costly instruments with his cronies.

Again the times change. A new generation of musicians grows up, a new director comes, people begin to look at the past. So much tragedy, so much chaos is brought to light that ordinary concepts seem to float in the air. Many, coming from the darkness into the light, have to squint...and are confused.

So as not to fool ourselves and others, let us ask a direct question—what were the musicians performing: the *Eroica*, or awkward variations on arbitrary themes? I know many who have difficulty in defining the past and the present, but I do not know anyone who would claim that they were performing awkward variations on arbitrary themes.

The symphony is in an orchestration that is pathetic, preposterously tragic, and shockingly parodical. Not for a single day has the sound of the great work been

SOCIALIST COMMUNITY, CEMA

interrupted, because the musicians accepted it in their hearts, because not one contemporary dared to say: "Away with this music, it's time to play something else."

Leftist revolutionary extremism, Stalinism, Brezhnevism - all of these were 'infantile disorders' of the new order. But how strong this order must be, to be able to survive such disorders! Today, having passed through a circle more terrible than Dante's Hell, we need not lose our heads. For these are our disorders; the sources are in us. Man may be great or he may be small. Not a single social system is capable of separating the light from the dark. The dark will always be the shadow of the light. Such is the nature of our world. But we cannot and should not allow the darkness to spread. For this we need light, much light.

Having affirmed itself in the framework of a hostile world, the new socialist republic saw the chief danger in a repetition of intervention and in the factional struggle of various tendencies of the revolutionary movement itself. It still did not recognize its own great strength, or its most dangerous disorders.

Today, enriched by costly experience, we know—the greatest danger threatening the new order is the lack of control of those to whom power is entrusted. Hence also an answer to the question of where are the guarantees that there will be no return to the past, that we know where the plane will land, after taking off from the airfield of perestroika—the affirmation and unswerving realization of the norms of the legitimate socialist state, the formation of lofty civic-mindedness, and the resolute collective defense of the rights and dignity of every Soviet person.

Socialism is a struggle of people for affirmation of the principles of a new life. From the definition of the very concept of "struggle", both victories and defeats are possible. Within the framework of the once-engendered socialist order, there may be more or less real socialism. There is as much of it as there is faith, strength, and ability of the ruling party to plot a new course, within the framework of the legitimate socialist state, and readiness of the broad strata of the people to struggle for implementation of this course.

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**Selected Articles from AZIYA I AFRIKA
SEGODNYA No 7, July 1988**

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Problems of South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone

*18070010 Moscow AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA in
Russian No 7, Jul 88 pp 2-4*

[Article by Yu. Lugovskoy under the rubric "South Pacific": "The Problem of the Nuclear-Free Zone"]

[Text] The first naval commander to sail across the largest ocean on our planet, Ferdinand Magellan, named it the Pacific. The weather conditions in that far-off year of 1521 really were favorable. The ocean later displayed to the fullest its harsh disposition more than once, engulfing in the deep the ships of El Canho, Urdaneto, Mendana, La Perouse and many other brave explorers. But perhaps no storms and hurricanes can compare with the trials that have befallen the great ocean and the people living in the lands adjoining it with the onset of the era of military nuclear power.

"Peace is our profession" is the inscription over the entrance to the American Anderson Air Force Base on Guam. But danger has taken on the wholly palpable image of the United States armed forces for the residents of Oceania. No one has ever caused greater harm to their living conditions than the American military. The monstrous symbol that was seared into the memory of humanity by the hellish flame of Hiroshima and Nagasaki is reminiscent of this. This tragedy had a continuation as well. The United States carried out 66 test detonations on the Bikini and Eniwetok atolls, which were turned into nuclear testing grounds. The Pentagon

has also buried radioactive wastes there. France has carried out over 80 nuclear tests on the Muroroa and Fangataufa atolls. Also not forgotten is the fact that in the 1950s and 1960s, England carried out its own nuclear tests in the Australian desert of Victoria. Their ruinous consequences are a permanent warning to the inhabitants of Oceania. Who would believe that these sinister preparations were dictated by a concern for peace? They are dangerous because they not only whipped up the arms race, but also created a most immediate threat to the inhabitants of many archipelagos.

As recently as the not-so-distant past, these people were colonial subjects without rights, and their sentiments did not have to be reckoned with in the capitals of the mother countries. But times have changed, and they are speaking up at the top of their voices. Today, when many independent island states have arisen in the Pacific Ocean that are actively involved in the solution of problems of international life, this extensive region has ceased to be a forgotten periphery. The states of Oceania differ appreciably from each other in social structure and political order, but there are factors that bring them closer together. The growth in the national self-awareness of the peoples inhabiting them, feelings of personal affiliation to the resolution of the most important problems on which the fate of war and peace depend, can be pointed out first and foremost. This was expressed in particular in the fact that in 1971 they created their own regional organization—the South Pacific Forum (SPF). It includes 11 states and two self-governing territories: Australia, New Zealand, Papua-New Guinea, the Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Niue, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Western Samoa. They have all come out in favor of declaring the southern part of the Pacific Ocean a nuclear-free zone.

A treaty on this score was devised and approved on 6 Aug 85 at a session of the SPF held in the capital of the Cook Islands—the city of Avarua on the island of Rarotonga. A year later, having gathered at the next session in Suva, the capital of Fiji, the participants in the forum discussed questions of the ultimate formulation of the nuclear-free zone. The Treaty of Rarotonga envisages the refusal of all of the members of SPF to develop, acquire or deploy nuclear explosive devices on their territory. It imposes a ban on holding any nuclear testing, as well as the burial of radioactive wastes, in the zone where the treaty is in effect. "We do not want our land to suffer the fate of Runit Atoll!" the forum participants declared, having in mind the island in Micronesia that was turned into a radioactive-waste dump.

The Rarotonga Treaty has been signed by eleven of the 13 member states of the SPF and ratified by nine of them. It made a large contribution to reviving the international climate in this part of the world, stretching from Latin America to the Indian Ocean and from the equator to the 60th parallel of the southern hemisphere, when it went into effect at the end of 1986. Three protocols have been added to the treaty that stipulate the

obligations of the nuclear powers to respect the status of the nuclear-free zone and not to employ weapons of mass destruction against the countries taking part in the treaty, as well as not to hold nuclear tests in the zone where it is in effect.

How have the nuclear powers reacted to the treaty? The Soviet Union signed protocols 2 and 3 of the Rarotonga Treaty, which stipulate the obligations of the nuclear powers to observe the nuclear-free status of the zone, without delay. Expressing a readiness to be a guarantor of the zone, the USSR proceeded from the fact that its creation in the South Pacific served as an important contribution to the formation of a reliable system of security in the whole Asian-Pacific region and would facilitate a reinforcement of international rules on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Favoring the creation of an all-encompassing system of security, the Soviet Union feels that the region of Asia and the Pacific Ocean should become an inalienable part of it.

Two years ago, speaking in Vladivostok, M.S. Gorbachev especially emphasized the necessity of erecting a barrier to the spread and accumulation of nuclear weapons in Asia and the Pacific. The start of negotiations on reducing the activeness of naval forces in the Pacific, first and foremost via limiting the operating regions of the vessels equipped with nuclear weapons as well as limiting rivalry in anti-submarine warfare, was proposed in this regard.

The PRC also signed the protocols to the Rarotonga Treaty. And what of the other nuclear powers?

Protocol 1 of the treaty calls upon the United States, England and France in particular to take on the obligation of ensuring the observance of the principles of the Rarotonga Treaty in relation to the territories controlled by those powers in the Pacific. This appeal was ignored, however, in the West in a most haughty and challenging form. It was officially declared in Washington that the United States refused to sign the protocols to the treaty; England also declined. As for Paris, they reacted not only negatively, but with overt hostility. France intentionally timed its next nuclear explosion on Mururoa Atoll, the 81st, for the day the Rarotonga Treaty went into effect, 11 Dec 86. And recently the commander-in-chief of French armed forces in the Pacific region, Vice Adm Pierre Tireau, declared that France would soon begin to use Fangataufa Atoll, about 40 kilometers from Mururoa, for testing again. This reaction worsened the confrontation that had earlier been revealed between the countries of the Pacific and the imperialist West.

It is true that certain differences in the treatment of the problems and ways of resolving them are observed among the SPF member countries. Some of them feel that the provisions of the treaty are insufficient, since they do not envisage a ban on the transit of naval vessels and aircraft with nuclear weapons through the zone. The treaty also does not pose unconditional obstacles for the

calling of such ships at the ports of the member states of the forum or the landing of aircraft at their airfields, but leaves the resolution of the issue to the discretion of the individual countries. Such a formulation was the result of a compromise achieved under the influence of Australian diplomacy, which did not want to sacrifice its obligations to the United States. It elicited considerable dispute. Taking this circumstance into account, such countries as Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands have as yet refrained from signing the treaty, feeling it to be insufficiently consistent, although they have declared their intention of observing it. As for Australia, that country, as opposed to New Zealand, has not closed off access to its territorial waters for ships with nuclear weapons or its airspace to aircraft carrying such weapons. Nonetheless, the treaty in its current form can serve as a solid platform for common actions aimed against the dangerous militaristic preparations of the West.

The Pentagon assigns an ever growing role to the Pacific Ocean in its strategic planning. The United States has created a broad-scale military infrastructure there that includes 160 bases. They have thrown together a "strategic triad" of Washington-Tokyo-Seoul for the purpose of developing it further, serving as the foundation for a broader Pacific alliance analogous to NATO as planned at American headquarters.

The second strongest strike force of the American armed forces outside the United States is concentrated in the Pacific region. Six aircraft-carrier groups and approximately 190 American naval vessels, 1,125 aircraft and about 180,000 servicemen are stationed there. According to the estimates of the foreign press, the Pentagon has roughly 10,000 nuclear warheads located at U.S. bases in the Philippines and Micronesia, on ships and in submarines. The Tomahawk cruise missiles, the electronic memories of which have hundreds of new Hiroshimas, have been arriving to arm the U.S. Pacific Fleet since 1984. The flight range of 2,500 kilometers transforms these missiles into strategic weapons for "limited nuclear war," for which the Pentagon has devised scenarios for the Pacific Ocean as well.

In the event of nuclear conflict in Europe, the United States intends to open a second front in the Far East immediately. This is the sense of the steps to "NATOize" Japan, this is the essence of Pentagon preparations in the Pacific. It is not for nothing that the Paris journal AFRIQUE-ASIE noted that "the Pacific Ocean conceals, beneath its image of tropical paradise and unconcern, one of the most militarized areas of the world."

The strategic role of the Pacific in the eyes of the American generals increases even more in connection with the development of different versions of "limited nuclear war" and preparations for "Star Wars." In recent years the United States and some of its NATO allies, as well as Japan, have been holding the large-scale RimPac

maneuvers in which major air force and naval formations are taking part. Various systems related to SDI are being tested in the Pacific. Minuteman missiles are launched from the Vandenberg Air Force Base in California which, covering about 7,700 kilometers in half an hour, reach targets in the lagoon of the Kwajalein Atoll. Altair stations for tracking space targets have been constructed on that atoll and on Saipan. The Pentagon is creating the far-flung Seaguard ocean radioelectronic listening system at bases in the Pacific and conducting tests of the ASAT anti-satellite system, which is a prelude to the Star Wars program.

Pentagon officials and other officials in Washington are mentioning some "new ocean strategy" in their appearances of late. Its parameters were recently outlined by the journal NUCLEAR TIMES, published in New York: "First of all, this strategy envisages waging a global war. In the past, United States doctrine proceeded from the fact that the main theater of military operations would be Europe. Today the Pentagon, and especially the Navy, is oriented both toward Europe and toward the Pacific Ocean. Second, having backed away from previous thinking, according to which any employment of nuclear weapons would quickly grow into a global war, the Pacific command has at its disposal the appropriate means and is prepared to wage a nuclear war limited to the Pacific theater of military operations. If war breaks out on the Korean peninsula, the land forces envisages, for example, a nuclear offensive limited to that region. If an exchange of nuclear strikes occurs in the northern part of the Pacific, the Navy feels that it can be limited to a battle at sea."

Taking these circumstances into account, the United States intends to consolidate its hold on "advance lines" in the Pacific, striving to set up new strong points here. The Pentagon is carrying out intensive military preparations in Hawaii. Easter Island, belonging to Chile, has fallen into the field of its steadfast attention, where American military specialists have modernized the Mataveri Airfield, now even able to receive space-shuttle type reusable space vehicles. The United States also has possible anchorages in Western Samoa, their colonial possession.

At the same time, Washington is applying strong pressure on a number of island nations to incline them toward collaboration with the Pentagon and threatening those of them that are displaying a lack of receptiveness to American military doctrines. The reaction of the United States to the decision of New Zealand not to allow any foreign vessels with nuclear power plants or weapons in their ports is instructive in this regard. They do not want to tolerate such "free thinking" in Washington. The United States declared in reply that they would "cease the fulfillment of their obligations in the sphere of security to New Zealand according to the ANZUS treaty." Washington also put levers of economic pressure into effect, and they have them: over 15 percent of New Zealand exports go to the United States.

The United States was also clearly troubled by the fact that the example of the SPF member countries could create a precedent and prove to be attractive to the states of other regions of the Pacific and Asia as well. Say, the members of Association of States of Southeast Asia (ASEAN), upon which Washington assiduously foists its military and political protectorate, if not via inclusion in the planned "Pacific community," then on a bilateral basis. "Fear of the fact that the anti-nuclear infection will encompass the whole Pacific" is growing stronger in the United States, notes AFRIQUE-ASIE on this score.

It is appropriate to note here that the signing of the Soviet-American INF treaty has had a noticeable effect on the political mindset in the countries of the Asian-Pacific region. Overt mistrust of the concepts of nuclear restraint and confrontation that Washington justifies with the aid of an artificially created "face of the enemy," is expressed here more and more often, with preference given to steps to ensure overall security. Such a tendency reflects the appearance of a world view formulated on the basis of a new scale of moral values in politics based on the realities of the surrounding world.

The development of such political trends, entirely natural, can disrupt all of the Pentagon's plans. The movement against calls by U.S. vessels with nuclear death on board has, after all, taken on the broadest scale in the Pacific. It has obtained great sweep in Japan, where already half the population lives in cities and districts that have been made nuclear-free zones. The movement to eliminate the U.S. military bases at which nuclear weapons are located has taken on a new impetus in the Philippines. The support that the new constitution, which includes anti-nuclear articles, has received testifies to this as well. Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands, Fiji, Tuvalu and Papua-New Guinea, following the lead of New Zealand, have also refused to allow the American floating arsenals of nuclear weapons into their ports.

It should be noted that the nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific is immediately contiguous with an analogous zone in Latin America as defined by the Tlatelolco Treaty signed by 23 states in 1967. There also exists a treaty on the Antarctic from 1959 that bans any military activity on that continent. Taken together, they could lead to the removal from the sphere of the arms race of enormous spaces south of the equator and to the creation of a nuclear-free belt embracing a large portion of the Southern Hemisphere.

As for the Soviet Union, it entirely supports the declaration of the South Pacific as a nuclear-free zone and calls upon all of the other nuclear powers to guarantee its status in either unilateral or multilateral fashion.

In the opinion of the Soviet Union, such a step would be a material contribution to the formation of a system of security in the Asian-Pacific region. The USSR, for its part, provides full guarantees that its will not be the first to employ nuclear weapons, the more so against states

that do not possess nuclear weaponry and do not permit them on their territory. It is taken into account in Moscow herein that it is impossible to devise measures on which a rise in the level of security in the Asian-Pacific region immediately depends without the participation of the United States. Proceeding from this, the Soviet Union also favors holding concrete negotiations on reducing the activeness of military fleets, and first and foremost vessels equipped with nuclear weapons, in the Pacific Ocean. It has declared unambiguously its readiness to negotiate on the extension of confidence-building measures to this ocean region, especially to those regions where the most vital shipping routes run.

The timeliness of these measures cannot even be denied at American headquarters. The chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm Crowe, thus recently acknowledged that the idea of a dialogue on confidence-building measures in Asia and the Pacific merits attention.

Soviet initiatives in relation to the Asian-Pacific region are an important component of the overall program of activities of the Soviet Union in the international arena as developed by the 27th CPSU Congress. The projection of this program to Asia and the Pacific, developed so visibly and in such detail in Vladivostok two years ago, serves as a convincing example of how vital and effective the influence of the new thinking implicit in Soviet foreign policy is on international life.

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Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee Secretary Interviewed
*Moscow AZIYA I AFRICA SEGODNYA in Russian
No 7, Jul 88 pp 9-11*

[Article by Soviet Committee for Solidarity with the Countries of Asia and Africa Executive Secretary S. Kalandarov under the rubric "Toward the 7th AAPSO Congress": "Solidarity of Peoples in Action"]

[Text] The fate of all mankind is closely linked with peace on the planet. It is namely for that reason that ensuring the security of peoples and the fight for peace and social progress persistently demands a unity of action of all liberation forces and mass democratic antiwar movements. The peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America, who in the era of colonialism were crudely alienated from real policy and were just the passive objects of historical progress, are being included more and more actively in the battle for survival and against the reactionary policies of the ruling circles of the imperialist powers.

Mass democratic movements have today been transformed into one of the motive forces of contemporary social development. "These movements," the CPSU Program states, "are objectively directed against the

policies of the reactionary circles of imperialism and spill over into the general flow of the struggle for peace and social progress. A constituent element of the world revolutionary process is the anti-imperialist struggle of peoples and countries that have thrown off the colonial yoke for the consolidation of their independence and for social progress."¹ And the might of this flow is connected to a considerable extent with the power of the Afro-Asian movement of anti-imperialist solidarity that unites mass organizations and solidarity committees of over 80 countries on the two continents in its ranks.

Created more than 30 years ago, the Asian and African Peoples Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) has gained a lofty reputation and respect around the world through its consistent and purposeful appearances in defense of the rights and interests of the peoples of the two continents and service to the ideals of national liberation and social progress. It has become an important factor for cohesion among broad national-patriotic and progressive circles of Afro-Asian society on an anti-imperialist basis, playing a significant role in the fight for peace and the triumph of reason and free will.

AAPSO is moving toward its 7th Congress, which is called upon to be an important milestone in its life and activity in the modern era. The merits and achievements of the solidarity movement are considerable, and they cannot fail to be recognized even by its ideological adversaries. Whole generations of fighters have acted and are acting in its ranks, guided by the principles of international solidarity, cohesion and unity. It lifted up the social forces of various countries and continents to repel the imperialist aggression against the peoples of Indochina and the Near East and raised its voice as a token of solidarity and support for the struggle of the peoples of the former Portuguese colonies in Africa at the end of the 1960s and beginning of the 1970s, while today it is a passionate champion of freedom and independence for the peoples of South Africa and Namibia and the just settlement of the Iran-Iraq conflict and the problems surrounding Afghanistan, Kampuchea, Nicaragua and other countries in various parts of the globe.

Whereas in the initial stage of the existence of AAPSO (middle of the 1950s and beginning of the 1960s), its activity was focused on the task of achieving political independence for the countries suffocating under the burden of colonialism and imperialist exploitation for many centuries, the goals of the organization later embraced a broader spectrum: it became actively included in the process of solving the problems of economic decolonization, disarmament in favor of development, for a universal nuclear-free and non-violent world and for the preservation of human civilization. Today the concerns of AAPSO include the struggle for an all-encompassing system of economic security, the establishment of a new world information order, the preservation of the environment and many regional and international problems that go beyond the borders of the Afro-Asian world.

Some of the most important conquests of the national-liberation forces, including the solidarity movement, are by rights considered the preservation and further strengthening of the anti-imperialist thrust of the non-aligned movement, which is becoming a material factor in consolidating the peoples of the young states in their aspiration for the ultimate liquidation of the remnants of colonialism and racism and getting rid of neo-colonialist forms of exploitation of the natural and human resources of Third World countries. These two movements—the socio-political and the intergovernmental—born and tempered in the crucible of the national-liberation struggle, are not related in their anti-colonial origins alone. Today they are united by an adherence to the ideals of independence, peace and progress and opposition to the policies of racism, neocolonialism and imperialist dictate in its new face of "neoglobalism." A further expansion and strengthening of the ties between these two prestigious movements is taking on a particular topicality for AAPSO, the members of which represent the public opinion of the overwhelming majority of the non-aligned countries, under contemporary conditions. AAPSO enjoys observer status in the non-aligned movement, which unites over a hundred states in its ranks.

* * *

The dialectics of life are such that against a background of overall successes for the national-liberation forces, difficulties and new problems can arise and really do arise. Whereas the peoples of Asia and Africa had one common enemy in the stage of struggle for independence—colonialism—and they were a unified front against it, employing all possible forms and methods of struggle, today, after the winning of freedom, the enemy has many faces, and the skirmishes are being displaced more and more from the political and military spheres into the economic realm. The liberated states consequently face different and no less complex tasks. They are associated with creating an energetic national economy, surmounting poverty and backwardness, providing for cultural and social development and, finally, a just solution to the problem of foreign indebtedness.

Roughly a fifth of the accumulation fund and a third of the export receipts of the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America goes to pay for foreign debt, which in the middle of this decade has crossed the trillion-dollar mark, as a result of which the West annually receives up to 40 billion dollars "cash." And it must be said that the insidious mechanism of indebtedness is far from the sole and far from the most powerful source of enrichment for the imperialist powers at the expense of the former colonies and semi-colonies.

It is clear that economic difficulties lie at the heart of all of the misfortunes and struggles of the peoples of the Afro-Asian world, both those that came as the legacy of the not-so-distant colonial past and those that arose as a result of the neocolonialist policies of the former mother countries, American imperialism and the pursuers of

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these policies—the multinational corporations. The imperialist powers moreover make broad use of these difficulties to foist their hegemony onto the liberated countries so as to bind them more tightly to their own capitalist "train," relegating to them the perpetual role of "caboose."

Questions of economic decolonization and surmounting the development weaknesses of the liberated countries are indissolubly linked with the efforts of peoples to avert nuclear war and are taking on priority significance in the contemporary activity of AAPSO. The curtailment of the arms race and military spending would free up enormous resources essential for solving the most acute problems facing the greater portion of humanity. There is an undoubted causal link between the trillion-dollar debt of the developing countries and the more-than-trillion-dollar growth in U.S. military spending over the last decade. It can be concluded from this that it is namely militarism that has a vested interest in the arms race first and foremost, in the preservation and tightening of the system of neocolonialist exploitation, namely it that stands as the barrier on the path of economic decolonization and the social progress of peoples.

A solution to development problems that meets the goals of economic decolonization for the liberated countries is thus simultaneously becoming a most important form of anti-militarist and anti-imperialist struggle for the peoples of the Third World in our time. As was emphasized in the resolution of the 14th Session of the AAPSO Presidium that was held in January of this year in Cairo, "the problems of development are closely interconnected with the reinforcement of peace and security around the world, while the just and effective resolution of these problems requires the creation of an all-encompassing system of economic security."

The struggle for the aversion and just settlement of regional conflicts, the majority of which take place in Asia and Africa, is an indispensable part of the antiwar activity of AAPSO. The international conference "The Role of Public Opinion in Settling Regional Conflicts" that was held in Kabul in March was dedicated to this most important problem, which is taking on a global scope. A profound analysis was made of the primary causes for the appearance of such types of conflicts, and ways of resolving them with the active participation of broad segments of society both of the conflicting parties and other states of the world were considered at this forum, which assembled eminent state, political and public figures from 50 countries around the world. In the evaluation of the leadership of Afghanistan, the holding of such an imposing and exceedingly timely international conference in the Afghan capital was an impressive demonstration of solidarity and recognition of the international significance of the policy of national reconciliation being pursued in that country.

Public opinion on the planet greeted the news of the signing in Geneva of agreements for a political settlement to the situation in Afghanistan with profound

satisfaction. They were perceived by peace-loving forces as a victory of reason and common sense, political wisdom and realism, as a concrete manifestation of new political thinking. The participants in the Afro-Asian solidarity movement are justly proud of the fact that they also made a contribution to the success of the Geneva process. In a statement on the occasion of the signing of the Geneva agreements, AAPSO justly notes that the most important task now is to ensure the unwavering observance of the agreements and principles of settlement by all parties. The Geneva agreements on Afghanistan can have a significant influence on the whole international climate and serve as an example for the resolution of other regional conflicts.

It must be said that by virtue of a number of objective reasons, such as, for example, the shift in the center of gravity of the national-liberation struggle to the Arab and African regions along with a number of others, AAPSO has until recently devoted insufficient attention in its work to the Asian-Pacific region (APR). Today, as a result of efforts of the AAPSO Permanent Secretariat and a number of solidarity committees in the countries of Asia—the USSR, India, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka and the Philippines among others—the interest of the organization in the problems of the APR has grown appreciably. The holding of the international conference "For a Ban on Nuclear Arms, for Peace and for Anti-Imperialist Solidarity in the Asian-Pacific Region" that was held in Pyongyang in September of this year with the participation of delegations from 50 countries, principally from that region, along with a number of representatives of international organizations, testifies to this to no small extent. The forum, organized by AAPSO in conjunction with the Korean Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity, showed that the rejection of the militarist course of the United States by the peoples of the APR is becoming more and more decisive, while positive processes, an impetus for which was given by the constructive proposals for transforming the region into a zone of peace, good-neighbor relations and collaboration advanced by M.S. Gorbachev in Vladivostok and in an interview with the Indonesian newspaper MERDEKA, are gaining more and more force.

The international conference "For a Nuclear-Free and Non-Violent World" that was held in Tashkent in November of 1980, timed to coincide with the anniversary of the signing of the Delhi Declaration, occupied an important place in the work in the Asian-Pacific sector. Its participants, noting the historic significance of the Soviet-Indian declaration, emphasized that it is a model of the new thinking that is permeating ever more deeply into the circles of world public opinion and the political life of the Afro-Asian countries. This is a document meeting the realities of the contemporary era and pointing out to mankind the path to achieving a stable and non-violent world free of nuclear weapons.

* * *

Any organization—state, political and the more so public, such as AAPSO—is strong in its ties to the popular

masses, how actively, broadly and deeply they are embraced by its activity, how completely it satisfies the diverse interests of the segments of the population taking part in it.

Today AAPSO makes its goal expanding the social base of the solidarity movement, which over the 30 years of existence of the organization has not undergone radical changes. A constructive program for involving broad segments of the peasantry, which, as is well known, comprises the overwhelming majority of the population of the Afro-Asian countries, in the solidarity movement has to be composed and brought to life. It is proving to have the predominant influence on the formation of ideological and theoretical foundations of national-democratic parties and movements in many of the liberated states. A whole set of measures to make ties with religious believers and the youth and women's movements more active deserves attention.

Steps are being taken to expand the interaction and coordination of the activity of AAPSO with the solidarity movement in the Latin American countries, where up until now there has been no regional public organization, although the national solidarity committees that exist there face similar tasks.

One important realm where considerable unutilized reserves exist is setting up interaction with public opinion of the developed capitalist countries. Hundreds of large and small organizations in these countries are participating actively in the movement against racism and apartheid, determinedly support the struggle of the peoples of South Africa and Namibia under the leadership of the acknowledged vanguard of this struggle, the African National Congress and the Southwest Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), are raising their voices in support of the policies of national reconciliation in Afghanistan, Kampuchea, Nicaragua and other countries, and are beginning to have a greater and greater understanding of the expediency of holding an international conference on the Near East with the participation of all interested parties, including the Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole legal representative of the Palestinian people. AAPSO is moving more boldly and with more initiative toward contacts with these organizations and attracting them to participate in its own forums.

The Afro-Asian solidarity movement is revealing new possibilities for bringing national-liberation forces closer to world socialism. A delegation of the Soviet Union, committees for solidarity from the European socialist countries and representatives of Cuban society all take part in all charter functions of the organization. This collaboration is constantly being expanded, taking on diverse forms, in the course of interaction of the forces of socialism with the national-liberation movements. "The committees for solidarity of the European socialist countries," noted AAPSO General Secretary Yusef as-Siban, now deceased, "are rendering great aid to the

national-liberation struggle in Asia and Africa... and facilitating an enrichment of the experience of the solidarity movement and a rise in the level of its struggle, opening up new prospects."

The contribution of society of the socialist countries is expressed not only in political support for the principles of the solidarity movement, but also in great practical assistance to national-liberation organizations. The political-academic seminars and conferences on the problems of the Afro-Asian world are striking a chord. The leadership of AAPSO and the solidarity committees of the socialist states have devised a joint document on the forms and ways of rendering assistance to the national-liberation movement and peoples of the developing countries.

* * *

The 14th Session of the AAPSO Presidium that was held in Cairo in January of 1988 under the slogan "For a New Strategy and Prospects for the Solidarity Movement of the Peoples of Asia and Africa" was an important stage on the path toward the 7th AAPSO Congress, which is planned for New Delhi in November. A spirit of innovative inquiry into solutions of problems and the determination of future directions for the activity of the organization predominated at the session. Especial attention was devoted to applying the principles of new thinking in analyzing the complex processes taking place in the Third World and the serious difficulties faced by the developing countries.

The participants in the meeting made a critical analysis of the state of affairs within AAPSO and recommended the adoption of effective measures to reinforce its vital ties with the national committees and collaboration with influential parties and mass public organizations. Paramount significance was assigned to raising the activeness of national committees and expanding their social base and contacts with religious circles. The complex tasks facing AAPSO can be resolved with support for their activeness.

The development of a contemporary strategy for the solidarity movement, at the heart of which should be placed the problems of supporting the struggle of peoples for economic decolonization and socio-economic development of the Afro-Asian countries, was advanced as a paramount task of the organization and its national committees, which should objectively lead to further growth in their coming out against imperialist exploitation and militarism and to the close interaction of national-liberation forces with the world democratic and antiwar movements.

A contemporary strategy for the Afro-Asian solidarity movement is called upon to assist the broader involvement of the developing countries in the solution of topical problems and the worldwide struggle against nuclear catastrophe and for the survival of mankind.

This is the behest of the times. And it is no accident that the program to create a nuclear-free world and eliminate all types of weapons of mass destruction by the end of this century as set forth in a statement by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev on 15 Jan 86 is highly regarded in public and political circles in the Afro-Asian countries. The principles of the Delhi Declaration and the Soviet-American treaty to eliminate medium- and short-range missiles have struck a chord in the Third World countries.

The Cairo session of the Presidium approved a program of actions aimed chiefly at preparing for the 7th AAPSO Congress. A working group was created at it to devise a strategic platform for the solidarity movement and proposals for improving the charter and organizational structure of AAPSO and the formation of its leading organs. The participants in the session confirmed anew their inviolable solidarity with the struggle of the Asian and African peoples against neocolonialism and for independent development along the path of economic and social progress.

The fruitful activity of AAPSO brings new testimony more and more often of the perspicacity of the great Lenin, who from the distant 1920s was able to see the birth of a historical process where "the working masses of the colonial and semi-colonial countries, comprising an enormous majority of the population of the Earth," would be transformed "into an active factor of worldwide politics and the destruction of imperialism..."² This process stands in worldwide historical importance alongside such epochal events of modern history as the Great October Socialist Revolution and the creation of the world socialist system.

Footnotes

1. Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Moscow, 1986, pp 13-19.

2. V.I. Lenin. Complete Collected Works, Vol 44, pp 4-5.

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Afghan Politburo Member N. Kawiani Interviewed
Moscow AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA in Russian
No 7, Jul 88 pp 13-14, 54

[Interview by AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA correspondent and editor for Asian Countries Department Leonid Mironov with Afghanistan Politburo member and Secretary of the Afghan People's Democratic Party Najmuddin Kawiani under the rubric "Our Interviews": "I Believe the Situation Will Be Better"]

[Text] "You were the first correspondent to interview me at the very end of December 1979, when I was named secretary of the Kabul City Committee of the NDPA," Kawiani recalled to my surprise.

That interview is solidly impressed in my memory. And not because N. Kawiani stood before me with a bandaged arm, dressed in a simple worker's quilted jacket—he had been freed the day before from the Amin torture chambers where he had undergone severe trials. The discussion took place at one of the most tense moments, when the issue of the fate of the April revolution that had inflicted a severe blow to the dictator Amin was essentially being decided. He was driven from the political arena on 27 Dec 79. The question in those days was acute: would Afghanistan be a sovereign and independent state or would it prove to be a puppet in the hands of those forces striving to bring a regime suitable to them to power in Kabul? The request of the government of Afghanistan to render the country urgent political, economic and military aid was met at that time on the basis of the Afghan-Soviet treaty of friendship, good relations and collaboration of 5 Dec 78.

Najmuddin Kawiani, now a member of the Politburo and secretary of the NDPA Central Committee, gave me a second interview when, in accordance with the Afghan-Soviet agreement, the withdrawal of units of the limited contingent of Soviet troops began on 15 May 88.

[Mironov] How do you, Comrade Kawiani, evaluate the significance of the Geneva agreements to settle the situation surrounding Afghanistan?

[Kawiani] I think that the situation in Afghanistan has never been so open to settlement as today. The Geneva agreements, the achievement of which required six long and tortuous years of negotiations, have created this prospect. Their signing was an enormous step on the path of realizing the long-held aspirations of the people: the establishment of peace and the improvement of the atmosphere in relations among the countries of the region and in the world arena overall.

We acted honorably in preparing and conducting the negotiations and we will now make every effort to bring the Geneva documents to life and establish peace in the country. We call upon all other countries to respect these agreements and assist in the cessation of bloodshed and the accomplishment of national reconciliation in Afghanistan. This will be a good and hopeful example for the resolution of other regional conflicts.

[Mironov] Pakistan, in accordance with the Afghan-Pakistani agreement on the principles of mutual relations, has taken on the obligation of not turning its territory into a beachhead for aggression against Afghanistan. Judging from the data coming from there, however, groups hostile to Afghanistan are still based there and receiving all sorts of assistance. The leaders of the "alliance of seven" continue to speak out on Pakistani soil with warlike anti-Afghan appeals. What can you say on that score?

[Kawiani] In the course of the Geneva negotiations, we constantly strove to achieve agreements that would eliminate all reasons to continue the war and bloodshed in

Afghanistan and would facilitate a halt to intervention in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and the creation thereby of conditions for the return of the limited contingent of Soviet troops to their peace-loving country. We consider the continuation of covert or overt arms shipments and military aid to the Afghan opposition as contradicting the spirit of the Geneva agreements. I hardly need remind you that the Pakistani government has signed an obligation not to permit the presence, location in camps or on bases, organization, training, financing, equipping and arming of political or other groups for the purpose of waging underground activity against the government of Afghanistan.

[Mironov] The facts testify that the platform of national reconciliation devised by the NDPA is gaining more and more support within the country. As you have already noted, the majority of Afghans greeted the Geneva agreements with approval and hope. What are the reasons for the "irreconcilable opposition" based in Peshawar to refuse to halt military activities?

[Kawiani] In order to answer this question, I must say at least a few words about the religious and political views of the leaders of the groups making up the "alliance of seven." The origins of the irreconciliation, dogmatism and reluctance to be aware of contemporary realities are in them to a considerable extent.

Four of the parties in the "alliance of seven" take positions of Islamic fundamentalism. They call for purifying Islam of all later "distortions" and "sentiments" and a return to the state structure that existed in the time of the prophet Muhammed, along with the creation of a "pure Islamic" state in Afghanistan. They see Khomeini's Iran as the model for this religious and political structure. The fundamentalists do not want to share power with any other political forces, and they moreover demand their complete elimination from the political arena.

The other three parties of the "seven" are numbered among the Islamic traditionalists. They are inveighing for the establishment of pre-revolutionary orders, even the restoration of the monarchy. They also allot an important place to the Islamic religion in the system of government control, although they do not advance the idea of creating a theocratic regime.

Today it can be stated with confidence that the goals that the parties of the "alliance of seven" are calling to achieve attract just an inconsequential portion of the population. And we have nonetheless declared more than once our readiness for negotiations with the leaders of the warring parties anytime and anywhere. We advance only one condition therein—cease efforts to resolve the political issues associated with the fate of Afghanistan through military means.

[Mironov] Recently Gulbuddin Hekmatiar, the leader of the fundamentalist Islamic Party of Afghanistan, entered the "alliance of seven" and declared that if his demands were not satisfied, the opposition would continue the armed struggle from Iranian territory, and as soon as the Soviet troops leave, all of the army of the "alliance" would move into Afghanistan. How serious is this extremist thrust?

[Kawiani] Today is no time for threats and emotions. We must proceed from the fact that now every Afghan family is hungry for peace. And we have the means to defend it. We have been engaged all these years in reinforcing our armed forces. Their numbers and morale have grown considerably, as has their equipping with arms and combat equipment. Our armed forces are a reliable shield for national reconciliation.

As for the threat-filled speeches of the opposition leaders, I repeat once more: if they want to play some positive role in a political settlement, they have no other path than to respond to our proposal for a ceasefire and to enter into negotiations with us on all disputed issues, including the composition and political platform of a coalition government.

[Mironov] Still, as they say, the ink hasn't had time to dry on the signatures to the Geneva agreements and key political figures have begun to speak out in contradiction to the spirit and letter of these fundamental documents. U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz, by way of example, declared at a press briefing on Afghanistan that "the people we support (having in mind the 'alliance of seven'—L.M.) will receive firm and reliable support, they will not be short of any means to conduct themselves decisively." What is this—a call to bloodshed, for the overthrow of a legal government to which Washington has given a guarantee of non-intervention?

[Kawiani] This speech is unfortunately difficult to reconcile with the guarantees that the United States gave in Geneva. Over the last eight years, American military aid to the Afghan opposition is close to three billion dollars. Further interference of the United States in Afghan affairs will lead to no good. Any digressions from the recorded agreements can only bring harm to the settlement process and, of course, cannot fail to affect the reputation of the state that violated the obligation taken on before the world community. The Afghan knot can be untied only by Afghans themselves. And relations with the "alliance of seven" is exclusively our own internal problem, which can be resolved only via direct negotiations.

[Mironov] There are many discussions on the possibility of the return of former king Zahir-Shah, who could, many Afghans feel, be a symbol of national reconciliation, to the homeland. Has the Afghan government considered the question of his return?

[Kawiani] We are not against the return of Zahir-Shah for a solution to the problem of national reconciliation. His coming could be useful.

[Mironov] What position could you offer to him?

[Kawiani] A fairly high one in a coalition administration. This question can only be resolved in concrete fashion democratically with his return.

[Mironov] The new political system in Afghanistan, based on the recently adopted constitution, envisages a multi-party system in the political realm. How is this reflected in life today in Afghanistan?

[Kawiani] Our party does not pretend to a monopoly on power. A union of left-democratic parties has been created in Afghanistan that includes the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, the Revolutionary Organization of Workers of Afghanistan and the Afghanistan Workers' Organization. The platform of the union of left-democratic parties of Afghanistan was published on the eve of the 10th anniversary of the April revolution. According to this document, it will accomplish its activity on the basis of full equal rights for all members and their organizational independence along with the widespread utilization of criticism.

Other parties are in the process of forming: the People's Islamic Party of Afghanistan and the Peasant Justice Party among others. The creation of parties that will occupy a noticeable place in the political life of the country will be possible as a result of the implementation of the policy of national reconciliation.

The principle of coalition arises from the principle of a multi-party system. All political forces will be able to take part in the process of reconciliation and the creation of an independent, neutral and non-aligned Afghanistan living in peace and harmony with all of its neighbors.

[Mironov] The Council of Ministers of the Republic of Afghanistan has adopted a decree to prepare to receive about a million refugees over the course of the year. Many problems are associated with this: people must be provided with housing, food, clothing, work...

[Kawiani] The whole country is preparing to receive the refugees. A State Committee on Refugee Affairs has been created. Refugees have already begun to arrive through special transit points in Torkham and Spin Buldak on the Afghan-Pakistani border. Inspection groups using United Nations manpower have already set to work there. Material, medical and other aid is being rendered to the refugees. The land they previously owned is being returned to them according to a recently adopted law. If it was distributed in the course of land and water reform, the state will allocate an equal-value parcel from its own land stock. The spending on receiving the refugees is high, of course, not able to be borne by our war-ravaged state. The Soviet Union has come to our aid again,

taking on a considerable portion of the spending on an uncompensated basis. The UN Committee on Refugee Affairs and the International Red Cross have also promised some aid.

[Mironov] How would you, Comrade Kawiani, briefly formulate today's chief goals of your government?

[Kawiani] There are perhaps two: ensure peace in the country and preserve popular power through coalition government.

[Mironov] How do you see Afghanistan a year from now?

[Kawiani] I believe that the situation will be much better. About half of the refugees will return home. I hope for a successful settlement of unresolved issues with the opposition. In many regions, especially in the north, a peaceful climate will be established. I would like peace also to rule in Kunar, Qandahar, Nangarkhar, Khowst and other regions adjoining Pakistan. But this depends greatly on the position of Pakistan.

[Mironov] What would you like to say to the readers of our journal?

[Kawiani] The journal AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA comes out in Dari too, after all. So it could thus be said that it is our journal too. We know it and read it, since many of the problems of Afro-Asian countries are similar to Afghan ones.

Taking advantage of the occasion, I want to express gratitude through your journal to the Soviet people for their internationalist solidarity with our people. We will hope for such support in the future as well, so that peace is established on the long-suffering Afghan soil, while interference and arms deliveries to the Afghan opposition—this contradicts the spirit of the Geneva documents—is completely halted. The activity of our 200,000-strong party, our realistic policies, the might of our half-million-strong armed forces, the ardent striving of our people to ensure peace, for a new life, as well as international support on the part of our friends led by the Soviet Union—all of this is a guarantee of the forward progress of the cause of the April revolution.

In conclusion I want to wish the editorial collegium and all of the editorial workers new successes in their important work.

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Contradictions of Social Progress in Third World
Moscow AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA in Russian
No 7, Jul 88 pp 17-20

[Article by I. Zevelev and A. Kara-Murza under the rubric "Problems and Discussion": "The Afro-Asian World: Contradictions of Social Progress"]

[Excerpts]

The Socialist Perspective: Theory and Practice

The practices of social development in the Afro-Asian countries shows that the majority of the attempts undertaken thus far to limit and even completely block the spontaneous development of capitalism in the Afro-Asian world has led to a strengthening of the state and its apparatus at the expense of a decrease in the initiative of the masses, which is far removed from socialist and even pre-socialist transformations.

If the new state is not supplemented with effective mechanisms for public administration and control, it can be transformed once again into a self-sufficient force possessing its own intrinsic interests alienated from the masses. Experience shows that for the countries of the contemporary Orient with its powerful traditions of a "strong state" and the undeveloped nature of "civil society," such a possibility is almost always transformed into reality at certain stages. After all, as K. Marx emphasized repeatedly, an amorphous and scattered social structure always and everywhere by necessity raises above itself a "centralized despotism"⁷ as a binding unity, and the secret of the power of the "omniscient state" is rooted namely in the "helpless lack of independence and loose and unformed nature of the actual social organism."⁸

V.I. Lenin, disturbed by the danger of a strengthening of bureaucratic perversions in a proletarian state, at one time also sought intensively, first of all, ways of reinforcing the economic integration of society through a strengthening of the "lower" economic ties (considering their absence to be a most important economic root of bureaucratism) and, second, organizational forms for the subordination of the state apparatus to the control of the working class and all workers. Both tasks, as testified to by all experience in building a new society, proved to be exceedingly difficult. A profound reason for this situation lay in the fact that "socialism was born and constructed in countries that were far from progressive according to their economic and social levels at the time."⁹ The unformed nature of "civil society" conditioned a reinforcement of a specific social segment, the new bureaucracy, with a vested interest in conserving the transitional (and essential for backward countries) state in which fixed state structures replace scattered social ties.

We note *en passant* that the CPSU has placed at the center of restructuring "more socialism, more democracy." Energetic actions in that direction should transform the dangerous tendency to replace true socialism, opening up space for social creativity and the self-management of the people, by "state" socialism with its authoritarianism, uncontrolled bureaucracy and stagnation.

We turn in this regard toward the development experience of those Afro-Asian countries where the theoretical possibility existed of bypassing capitalism and the subsequent transition to socialism through suppression of the rudiments of a bourgeois order in parallel with the transformation of communal structures and the imparting of a new impetus to them. The practices of some "first-generation" socialist-oriented countries (Guinea, Ghana, Mali, Tanzania and Burma among others) showed that the policy of limiting capitalism was not accompanied by a suitable replacement of its social relations with a higher type: the uncompensated slowdown of bourgeois development led under these conditions to the socio-economic stagnation of society. Efforts to close off channels of bourgeois development by measures of a purely legal nature (nationalization) opened up the way in practice not for consistent movement (through a series of intermediate stages) toward a progressivizing economic collectivization, but rather toward the appearance of such forms of state ownership as took shape first and foremost as tribal-bureaucratic upper reaches. The leaders of these countries, genuinely proclaiming their sovereign choice in favor of socialism, often proved involuntarily and unawares to be in the position of a person who, in the words of Marx, "has not only not risen above the level of private ownership, but has not even come up to it."¹⁰

It should evidently be added that the curtailment of progressive transformations in some African countries in the 1960s (Ghana, Mali), strengthened by impulses of capitalist development, nonetheless did not lead to a serious dismantling of the state structure. This, in our opinion, creates an objective base for the periodic resurrection of ideas of "national socialism" among the leaders of those countries.

Regimes are in power in the majority of the "second-generation" socialist-oriented countries, as is well known, that are inclined in favor of more decisive progressive transformations. As a rule, relying on the army they have been able to suppress capitalist tendencies quite successfully, stabilize the course selected and oppose counter-revolution. On the other hand, however, strict centralization in the absence of democratic traditions conceals the danger of a "hardening" of state factors, which together with the limited effectiveness of the state sector in economics can, under certain circumstances, lead to the "blockading" of further transformations (as took place, for example, in Somalia).

The distinctive cultural and historical environment of the countries of the Orient is evidently able to have a dual influence on the prospects for transition to socialism there. On the one hand, the traditions of a "strong state" could ease the resolution of difficult problems of pre-socialist transformations and the transitional period. On the other hand, however, the very same traditions create favorable conditions so as not to "shift" to true socialism, to "get stuck" in an intermediate "no-man's land" which, as history shows, the bureaucracy successfully makes "its own."

Does this signify that the Afro-Asian countries do not have prospects for real social progress, have they proven to be between the Scylla of capitalism in its "Oriental" manifestations, especially excruciating for the popular masses, and the Charybdis of an all-encompassing state system engendering stagnation, voluntarism and mass repressions? It seems that such a conclusion would be at least simplistic. It is, of course, also premature to declare the prospects for the building of socialism in the East to be serene. Recall the sobering words of V.I. Lenin spoken in 1921 on the score of the straightforward plans for the rapid "leap" of Russia "to socialism": "We are afraid to look the 'low truth' straight in the eye and too often give ourselves over to the power of 'the deception that lifts us.'" And another reminder: "Remnants of patriarchal society, half-wildness and most genuine wildness rule"¹¹ in the enormous spaces of Russia. Lenin therefore saw the task not in rejecting *a priori* the possibility of non-standard trajectories for social progress as conditioned by the specific nature of the preceding historical development of this or that country, but in "understanding what intermediate paths... are needed for the transition of pre-capitalist relations to socialism. That is the crux of the matter."¹²

It seems that in the transition to socialist or pre-socialist transformations in backward countries with strong state traditions, two elements take on a key role under contemporary conditions, and they were addressed at one time by the classic authors of Marxism-Leninism. First, the necessity of popular power utilizing the "civilizing" and "culturizing" potential of capitalism limited by a certain framework, "especially," wrote V.I. Lenin about Russia, moving into NEP, "directing it into the channel of state capitalism."¹³ Second, the necessity of a gradual but consistent and firm limitation of omnipotent state structures is being realized in recent years around the world (in different ways in different countries, it is true, and that is natural). It is appropriate in this regard to recall the idea of K. Marx expressed in 1875 on the score of the slogan of a "free state": "Freedom consists of transforming the state from an organ standing over society into an organ wholly subordinate to that society, and in our time greater or lesser freedom of state forms is determined by to what extent they limit the 'freedom of the state.'"¹⁴

The policy of restructuring in the USSR, the searches for specific ways of building socialism in Korea, the concretization of theoretical constructs on a society of social

justice—all of this undoubtedly should create favorable external conditions for the impetus of the new stage of development of the Third World now taking shape to serve the cause of social progress.

Footnotes

7. K. Marx and F. Engels. Works, Vol 19, p 414.
8. Ibid., Vol 8, p 157.
9. Materials of the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Moscow, 1986, p 7.
10. K. Marx and F. Engels. Works, Vol 42, p 115.
11. V.I. Lenin. Complete Collected Works, Vol 43, pp 227, 228.
12. Ibid., p 228.
13. Ibid., p 229.
14. K. Marx and F. Engels. Works, Vol 19, p 26.

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Prospects for National Reconciliation in Kampuchea Examined

Moscow AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA in Russian
No 7, Jul 88 pp 41-42

[Article by I. Ognetov under the rubric "Reader Conversation": "The Key to Opening Up the Situation"]

[Text] About a year ago a representative of the PRK [People's Republic of Kampuchea] proclaimed a policy of national reconciliation. Journal readers V. Lebedeva from Moscow and Muhammed Anvar from Afghanistan request that we relate what the essence of the policy of national reconciliation is under the specific conditions of Kampuchea and whether it is facilitating the resolution of the internal and external political problems of that country.

The provisions of national reconciliation were formulated in detailed form by the government of the People's Republic of Kampuchea in its declarations of 27 Aug and 8 Oct 87. "The policy of national reconciliation pursues long-term goals and is characterized by sincerity," says the declaration of August 27, "proposing the unification of all Kampuchean that adhere to patriotic ideals into a monolithic bloc in the name of building a progressive and equitable society with equal rights. All Kampuchean, regardless of their past, class or ethnic affiliations or ideological or religious views, can in fact collaborate in the building of an independent, peaceful and non-aligned Kampuchea maintaining friendly relations with neighboring countries, as well as opposition to

any intrigues directed against the restoration of the regime of genocide in Kampuchea which was condemned and decisively repudiated by the Kampuchean people and world public opinion."

It is extremely important and instructive that it is namely the government of the PRK, implementing control over the territory of the whole country and enjoying trust on the part of the people, that has extended a hand to emigre groups, offering to resolve from general democratic positions the questions concerning the future of the country, not advancing any preliminary conditions therein. The PRK agrees to the participation of the Khmer Rouge in the dialogue, excluding followers of Pol Pot. Pol Pot and those closest to him have put themselves outside of Kampuchean society, and attempts to "connect him" to the reconciliation process are an insult to the national feelings of the Kampuchean people and an infringement on their sovereignty.

The declaration of the PRK government of 8 Oct 87 sets forth the position on one of the most important issues of a settlement—the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea. "The Vietnamese volunteer forces," this document states, "will be completely withdrawn from Kampuchea simultaneously with the cessation of any outside interference in Kampuchean affairs and the use of foreign territory against the PRK." The UN representative of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam [SRV] spoke in this fundamental spirit at the 42nd session of the UN General Assembly, elaborating that the withdrawal of the Vietnamese volunteer subunits would be completed in 1990. It was announced in Phnom Penh at the end of May 1988 that agreement had been reached between Vietnam and the PRK on the return of 50,000 Vietnamese volunteers to their homeland by the end of the year, that is, half of the Vietnamese contingent in the country. The command of Vietnamese volunteer forces in Kampuchea is being moved to Vietnam, while command of the remaining portion is being shifted to the PRK. Representatives of all who display an interest in the Kampuchean problem are being welcomed to observe the troop withdrawal. A proposal has also been addressed to Thailand to create a peace zone along the Kampuchean-Thai border.

The government of the PRK is striving to bring the policy of national reconciliation to life. The idea of meeting with the Khmer groups opposing the PRK and their leaders, with the exception of Pol Pot and some of the individuals closest to him, has been embodied in the dialogue of PRK Council of Ministers Chairman Hun Sen with Prince Norodom Sihanouk.

The fundamental elements according to which the parties have displayed mutual understanding and agreement were recorded in a communique on the first meeting of Hun Sen and N. Sihanouk. The discussion concerns first and foremost the fact that a common conviction of the necessity of settling the conflict via political means was expressed. It is emphasized herein that the problem

should be resolved by the Kampuchean people themselves through negotiations between all of the conflicting parties for the purpose of putting an end to war and bloodshed and restoring a peaceful, independent, democratic, sovereign, neutral and non-aligned Kampuchea.

Hun Sen and N. Sihanouk called upon the other Khmer parties—the Khmer Rouge and the Son Sann group—to enter onto the peaceful path of achieving compromise.

A second round of discussions with Prince Sihanouk held in the Paris suburbs at the end of January of this year was described by Hun Sen as "a large new step forward in the search for ways of peaceful settlement in Kampuchea and around it." The discussion of questions concerning a schedule for the withdrawal of the Vietnamese volunteers from Kampuchea, the prospects for creating a coalition government, the political future of Kampuchea and its status in the international arena, as well as problems of international guarantees for ensuring a peaceful settlement, was described as "fruitful and efficacious."

The first exchange of opinions has already demonstrated that the discussion of specific material elements of national reconciliation is not a simple matter. Compromise will have to be reached through a complex comparison of positions, for which time is required. That is what happened, for example, with the question of the creation of a coalition government. Prince N. Sihanouk advanced the idea of disbanding the current Kampuchean government, eliminating the People's Republic of Kampuchea and creating a provisional coalition government. The chairman of the PRK Council of Ministers, however, felt this proposal to be incorrect and unequal. He came forward with a well-reasoned and substantiated compromise proposal to preserve the status quo in the country and to convene a multilateral committee to hold general elections. The PRK also reserves the right to study the proposal of N. Sihanouk to form a provisional bilateral government.

In the course of the second round, the parties came to a unified opinion on a multiparty system in a future Kampuchea and the holding of internationally monitored general elections to a National Assembly and the later devising of a constitution. Mutual consent was reached on the international status of Kampuchea as an independent, neutral and non-aligned state, as well as relative to international guarantees to ensure a political settlement.

As for the foreign-policy aspects of a political settlement, Hun Sen proposed, during the second round of negotiations, convening a representative international conference of a Geneva type after reaching political agreement by the Khmer parties to devise international guarantees and then to create an international monitoring commission that could be headed by India.

The question of Khmer refugees that continue to remain on Thai territory is a passionate one for thousands of Kampuchean families. The PRK government, within the framework of the policy of national reconciliation, has called upon the Thai authorities and international organizations to take steps for an immediate halt to the use of refugee camps for military and political purposes against the Kampuchean people. The PRK government is ready to discuss with international humanitarian organizations and various interested parties the question of an organized and orderly repatriation of refugees to their homeland.

No less attention is devoted to questions of the return to the homeland and reunification with families of those who for whatever reason are outside the country in the camp of groups opposing the PRK. This especially concerns members of the armed formations of each of the factions of the Khmer coalition. Civil rights and essential assistance in job placement are guaranteed to them in the event of return. About 4,500 former counter-revolutionaries laid down their arms and stopped fighting in the last year.

In speaking of the positive shifts in the development of the situation surrounding Kampuchea and the first steps in the practical realization of the policy of national reconciliation and the agreements reached in the course of the two rounds of dialogue, it must be clearly represented that this process has only just begun, and that no few obstacles remain in its path.

The Khmer Rouge and Son Sann groups have unfortunately not replied to the appeal to join the negotiations.

They retain demands in their positions that do not meet the political realities that have taken shape on the Indochina peninsula, for example, a demand for the elimination of the PRK.

This predetermines the complexity of the political and diplomatic struggle for the realization of the policy of national reconciliation. It is evident at the same time that the Kampuchean problem is moving ever more solidly onto the track of peaceful political discussion, that a vested interest in determining points of contiguity and discovering ways of mutual understanding is becoming more and more appreciable, and that these positive changes are striking a grateful chord in world society.

"We in the Soviet Union," declared USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs E.A. Shevardnadze in a discussion with Hun Sen, "feel that there are no alternatives to political dialogue among the Kampuchean parties, and welcome the consent that has been reached between Hun Sen and N. Sihanouk on a series of problems and their agreement to continue negotiating. The reconciliation of all national patriotic forces of Kampuchea is the sole true key to opening up the situation surrounding Kampuchea and affirming relations of peace, friendliness and collaboration in Southeast Asia."

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12821

Discussion of Joint Economic Organizations in USSR

18250003 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA ZAKONNOST in Russian No 7, Jul 88 pp 18-21

[Article by Doctor of Legal Sciences Professor M. Braginskiy, manager of the Department of Legal Problems in Foreign Relations of VNIISZ [All-Union Scientific-Research Institute of Soviet Legislation]: "Joint Economic Organizations"]

[Text] The joint economic organizations (henceforth JEOs) being created on the territory of the USSR are collective formations constructed like cooperatives and other public organizations on the basis of membership. One specific feature of them is the fact that the participants in a specific JEO can be Soviet and foreign organizations or firms at the same time.

JEOs are legal entities according to Soviet legislation. This signifies in particular that only such types of JEO in relation to which direct indications exist in union legislation can be formed on the territory of the USSR. The legal documents in force today allow for the possibility of creating a JEO with the participation of organizations of the USSR and the other CEMA member countries in the form of either a **joint venture**, an **international association** or a **joint organization**. A JEO with the participation of firms from capitalist or developing countries, as opposed to this, may be created in the USSR only in the form of a joint venture.

Each of the three indicated varieties of JEO is distinguished by the particular aims of creating it and the sources for the expenditures essential to their activity.

Joint ventures are formed for the direct accomplishment of a definite business purpose (the production of products, trade, services and the like), and they operate under the principles of profit-and-loss accounting (*khozrashchet*) therein.

International associations are called upon to coordinate production, scientific-production or other activity in a certain realm of the national economy. They do not engage in direct business activities or, if they do, they are not the chief aim of the association. It is assumed herein that the expenses of the international association are covered through the periodic fee payments of its participants.

The **joint organization** is created to implement scientific-research, planning-and-design or other activity in the interests of the participants. It is called upon to render the appropriate services to the participants without compensation. For this reason its expenses, like the income of the international organizations, are covered through fees. The organization can also render services

to outside enterprises or associations for the corresponding payment as well. Such business activity, however, as was already noted, cannot be its main activity. The joint organization must otherwise be transformed into a joint venture.

The JEO can be created and carry out its activity within the framework of the legal structure existing in our country. The discussion concerns first and foremost the necessity of observing the special norms contained in the documents devoted to JEOs. The first of these is the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Ukaz of 26 May 83 "Procedure for Implementing the Activity of Joint Economic Organizations of the USSR and Other CEMA Member Countries on the Territory of the USSR." The ukaz granted the opportunity of creating collective formations, established the legal foundations essential for this and defined the nature of the property rights belonging to the JEO (this is called common socialist property of the USSR and the corresponding CEMA member countries), as well as consolidated the procedure for granting natural resources (land, its resources, water and timber) to the JEOs.

Documents adopted on 13 Jan 87 comprise the foundation of existing legislation on JEOs. They were the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Ukaz "Questions Associated with the Creation of Joint Ventures, International Associations and Organizations on USSR Territory and Their Activity with the Participation of Soviet and Foreign Organizations, Firms and Management Organs," as well as two exceedingly voluminous decrees of the USSR Council of Ministers: No 48, "Procedure for the Creation and Activity of Joint Ventures, International Associations and Organizations of the USSR and Other CEMA Member Countries on USSR Territory," and No 49, "Procedure for the Creation and Activity of Joint Ventures with the Participation of Soviet Organizations and the Firms of Capitalist or Developing Countries on USSR Territory."

Notwithstanding the fact that the formation and activity of JEOs with the participation of organizations from the CEMA member countries, on the one hand, and the firms of capitalist and developing states, on the other, are regulated by different standard documents, the lack of coincidence in the legal frameworks created for them is nonetheless not great. The CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers 17 Sep 87 decree No 1074 "Additional Measures for Improving Foreign Economic Activity under the New Conditions of Economic Operation" moreover has made a significant contribution to making the conditions for the creation and activity of JEOs more uniform.

A number of ministries and departments have approved instructions and provisions devoted to individual questions in the creation and activity of JEOs in the development of the legislative documents cited. These documents include, in particular, the Instructions of the USSR Ministry of Finance of 24 Nov 87 "Procedure for

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Registration of Joint Ventures, International Organizations and Organizations Created on USSR Territory with the Participation of Soviet and Foreign Organizations, Firms and Management Organs" and those of 30 April 87, "Taxation of Joint Ventures," as well as the one approved by USSR Gosnab on 4 Jun 87 (with supplement on 4 Nov 87) "Procedure for Material and Technical Supply of Joint Ventures Created on USSR Territory with the Participation of Other Countries and Foreign Firms and the Sale of Their Products."

General legislative documents that are part of the civil, administrative, financial, labor and other sectors of Soviet legislation should also be employed along with the special ones for JEOs, but only where they do not contradict the special norms on joint ventures, international associations and organizations or, proceeding from the content of general law, a conclusion about the impossibility of applying them in relation to JEOs cannot be made. Certain exclusions from existing Soviet legislation can be established by international or intergovernmental treaties by the USSR. Such types of exclusions are sometimes established today in bilateral treaties on the creation and activity of JEOs that the USSR government has concluded with the governments of Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany, North Korea, Cuba, Poland, Vietnam, Romania and Czechoslovakia.

Joint ventures and international associations and organizations can be created in any sector of the national economy; there are no limitations stipulated by Soviet legislation in this sense. Among the JEOs already functioning, for example, could be cited the Soviet-Bulgarian Krasnyy Proletariy—Beroye Machine-Tool Association, as well as the Soviet-Bulgarian Ivanovskoye SPO-GKhO Scientific-Production Association along with joint ventures in the food, light, chemical, timber and other industries.

State, cooperative and other public organizations can take part in a JEO from the Soviet side, along with enterprises, associations and firms (companies, corporations and the like) on the foreign side. Certain civil-law relations arise in connection with the creation and activity of JEOs among their participants, as well as between each of them and the organization itself. Participation in a JEO is thus permitted only for such organizations as possess the rights of a legal entity. This requirement applies equally to Soviet and foreign participants.

Joint ventures with the participation of firms from capitalist and developing states can be formed only on the basis of a founding treaty signed by the participants. Agreements between states or governments, as opposed to this, can serve as the founding treaty for joint ventures, international associations and organizations created by the organizations of CEMA member countries. The creation of a specific JEO based on a founding treaty

signed by the ministries and departments of the USSR and the corresponding CEMA member countries or the participants themselves is permitted in these cases alone.¹

The charter of the JEO, which serves as a supplement and thus an inalienable part of the treaty, is developed at the same time as the founding treaty. The supremacy of the founding treaty over the charter is specially fixed in certain JEO charters created on USSR territory. One should be guided by the terms of the founding treaty in differences between these two founding documents.

Decrees No 48 and 49 stipulate that the JEO charter should directly indicate the goals of activity, the locations and makeup of the participants, the size of their shares, the procedure for forming the statutory (for international associations and organizations—the financial) fund (including in foreign currency), the structure, complement and authority of the JEO management organs etc. The participants are granted the opportunity to include other terms agreed to among themselves in the charter that do not contradict legislation.

The founding treaty or charter usually indicates the term of JEO activity. It is otherwise acknowledged that the organization has been created for an indefinite period of time, and that it could cease activity at any time upon demand by one of the parties.

The JEO is formed by permission. It was envisaged in the initial editions of decrees 48 and 49 that permission to create a JEO is issued by the USSR Council of Ministers in the form of one of its permanent organs. It is namely to them that the ministries and departments of the USSR that are superior to the participants or the councils of ministers of the union republics should appeal for this purpose. Decree 1074 simplified this procedure. Decisions on the creation of JEOs of all types can now be made by the USSR ministry or department itself or the councils of ministers of the union republics.

The compulsory registration of the JEO has been stipulated. It is accomplished by the administration for state income of the USSR Ministry of Finance. The JEO acquires the rights of a legal entity, and civil legal capacity thereby, from the moment of entry into the JEO register. State, cooperative and other public organizations are forbidden to make deals with a JEO before its registration.

A certificate on a completed registration is issued that serves as the foundation for placing in the press a feature on the creation of the corresponding JEO. This feature has important legal significance: the information contained in it thus becomes known to all participants in business. This presumption is indisputable, and thus parties that conclude an agreement with a JEO do not have the right to refer to the fact that they did not know some material circumstances afterward (for example, the

inadequate size of its statutory fund or what the object of the JEO's activity is, which ultimately defines the bounds of its special legal capacity).

The Ministry of Finance (its officials) is required to keep secret all the remaining information contained in the documents presented for registration, and it can be revealed only with the consent of the JEO itself.

The statutory (for international associations and joint organizations, the financial) fund comprises the property basis of the JEO. It is created through the contributions of the participants and can be later be augmented by them via additional fees (the profits obtained by a JEO engaged in business activity serve as the source for augmenting the statutory fund). The size of the contributions is determined by agreement among the participants. A certain limitation, however, is stipulated in legislation for joint ventures with the participation of firms from the capitalist and developing states: the aggregate share of the foreign party should not exceed 49 percent of it. A minimal size for the fees of foreign partners is not envisaged in the USSR, as opposed to a number of other countries.

Material assets, rights to the use of property (including natural resources), other non-property rights and, finally, monetary funding (in both Soviet or any other currency) can be included as part of the contribution. Valuation of the contributions of participants is done in rubles or, at the agreement of the parties, in foreign currency as well.

The JEO is endowed with all three of the legal rights of an owner in relation to the property belonging to it. The JEO should use these rights—possession, use and disposal—in accordance with the provisions of Soviet legislation, the goals of the activity and the purpose of the property.

The JEO is managed by two organs: a supreme and an executive one. The supreme organ (council, board) consists of individuals designated by the participants themselves under a procedure determined by the founding treaty or charter. These founding documents must also fix the procedure for voting in the supreme organ: how many votes each participant has, and what the issues are that should be resolved according to the principle of unanimity.

Both the managing and the executive organs are formed from citizens of the participating countries. The general director should be a Soviet citizen. A Soviet citizen should also hold the position of chairman of the board in joint ventures created with the participation of firms from capitalist and developing countries.

The joint venture carries out its business activity in accordance with programs it has developed and approved itself. USSR state organs do not set compulsory plan targets for JEOs.

The JEO, like Soviet state enterprises, operates on principles of self-financing and should correspondingly cover its

own expenses with income it receives, as well as make a profit. Joint enterprises should at the same time provide for currency self-sufficiency in its activity. What is in mind is that in principle they should cover their own foreign-currency expenses, including the payment of profits and other sums due to the foreign participants, out of the foreign currency received from the enterprise's sale of its own products, work and services in the foreign market.

The JEO opens bank accounts in Soviet money and foreign currency. Long- and short-term bank loans, in both rubles and foreign currency, are granted to it on the basis of credit agreements. They have the right to conduct foreign economic activity independently, making deals or contracts directly with foreign partners for that purpose.

The business activity of the JEO relies principally on contracts concluded by these organizations with Soviet enterprises and associations supplying them with raw materials, equipment, electric and thermal power and gas and consuming the products of the JEO, performing work according to their orders or rendering them services. *Jus dispositivum* and optional norms, as well as *jus cogens* norms with the presence of the appropriate pre-conditions, of the operative Provisions on Deliveries, Rules for Subcontracting for Capital Construction, transport charters and codes are employed in the relations of the parties in delivery contracts and subcontracts for capital construction and freight shipping. It is likewise necessary to employ standard documents regulating other types of business agreements as well.

The joint venture settles with the state budget and creates and later augments funds intended for the development of production, science and technology, as well as a reserve fund, using profits received.

Joint enterprises pay an income tax comprising 30 percent of the residual profits as determined after their deductions to the appropriate funds. The tax is also imposed on the portion of the profits due to the foreign participant as well in the event it is transferred abroad. This tax (if not stipulated differently in the treaty concluded by the USSR with the participating country) comprises 20 percent of the sum being transferred.

Legislation grants JEOs certain guarantees and privileges. Joint ventures in particular are released from paying taxes on profits for two years from the time the profit is declared. The USSR Ministry of Finance has the right to reduce the size of the tax for individual joint ventures or even to release it from payment altogether.

The preferential conditions established to protect state socialist property also extend to the JEO. What is in mind is that the JEO, like state organizations, possess the right of unlimited claim (it can demand property illegally taken from it by any method from a scrupulous as well as an unscrupulous acquirer), wherein the rules on legal statutes of limitations do not extend to their demands for

the return of property owned from the illegal possession of cooperative or other public organizations, as well as citizens.

The state guarantees the inviolability of JEO property in that it rules out the requisition and confiscation of it under administrative procedure. Finally, the property of joint ventures can be subject to recovery only by decision of organs whose jurisdiction includes considering disputes with the participation of the JEO (having in mind organs of state arbitration and the courts for a JEO with the participation of CEMA member countries, as well as courts and, by agreement of the parties, third-party courts for joint ventures with the participation of firms from capitalist and developing countries).

The Soviet state also grants certain guarantees and privileges directly to the foreign participants themselves. It is established in particular as an exclusion from the general framework that equipment, materials and other property that is imported by the foreign participant as part of its contribution to the statutory or financial fund is free of import duties.

The foreign participant is guaranteed the transfer abroad in foreign currency of sums due to it as a result of the distributed profits obtained by the JEO.

The JEO can cease its activity in the form of re-organization (i.e. with succession) or liquidation (i.e. without succession). Re-organization can be carried out only by decision of the supreme organ of the JEO, while liquidation, moreover, can also be carried out by virtue of the expiration of the term of activity stipulated in the founding treaty, as well as by decision of the USSR Council of Ministers (if the activity of the organization does not correspond to the aims and tasks envisaged in the founding treaty and charter).

The impending liquidation of the JEO should be reported in the press. After the completion of liquidation, it is essential to make the corresponding entry in the register in which the creation of the JEO was at one time recorded. The contribution is returned to the foreign participant in monetary or in-kind form according to the residual value at the moment of liquidation, but only after paying off debts to Soviet participants and third parties. Analogous consequences (the return of contributions) also ensue in cases where the participant withdraws from the JEO.

Footnote

1. In some bilateral governmental agreements (USSR—Bulgaria and USSR—Hungary, for example), the creation of JEO—CEMA interdepartmental treaties or treaties signed by the participants themselves is permitted.

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12821

IZVESTIYA To Initiate Foreign, Domestic Advertising Supplement
18250034a Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
16 Oct 88 p. 3

[Unattributed article entitled: "IZVESTIYA and BURDA Open A New Page In An International Cooperation"]

[Text] Let us begin with information that should interest mainly managers, enterprise leaders, scientists, designers, our engineering personnel, and students at various levels. Beginning in January of next year IZVESTIYA will begin to regularly publish advertising of products of both domestic and foreign enterprises, companies and firms. The advertising will be published in the form of inserts on two pages weekly. Attracting and publishing advertising—this is the essence of the agreement reached between IZVESTIYA and BURDA [FRG].

About our partners. This introduction might seem superfluous to the reader—people in our country have long known what the journal BURDA MODEN is and even who Frau Heinne Burda is; although the magazine is in Russian and is published in more than 100 countries of the world, we began to read it quite recently. But we are not speaking about the famous magazine BURDA MODEN. Burda is the name of the originator of the now-influential business dynasty of Senator Franz Burda, which after the war began to publish an illustrated weekly, BUNTE—a magazine for family reading which quickly became popular and now competes with such publications as STERN and KWIK.

To this day, this area determines the basic content of the publications of the BURDA group, whose circulation exceeds a billion marks. The group includes the firms: Burda GmbH, which after the senator's death was headed by his young son Hubert and the publishing house, named Heinne Burda, which belongs to his mother.

In addition to publishing activity, the Burda group actively participates in other branches of the economy and is expanding its influence, including abroad. But Hubert Burda is interested not only in foreign investments but also in improving forms of cooperation.

And so for the first time in many decades a central newspaper is beginning to publish advertising. We think that here we should give the reader a breather so he can gather his thoughts and formulate his questions for us more clearly and forcefully. We have been convinced repeatedly that this will be the first reaction. We can even guess what the questions will be—we have asked them ourselves and have heard them in the most diverse variants.

The main question: Why? What do you, dear sirs, intend to advertise? Specimens of domestic goods that cannot be sold? "Fly Aeroflot aircraft"? Toothpaste, tights and other things that are in short supply? Or will you gladden

us with the latest models of "Mercedes," suits from Cardin, or an invitation to spend a vacation in Fiji? What will you advertise? Do you really not understand that all of these advertising pictures—whether our own or others'—can do nothing but irritate the simple person?

We understand. We will certainly have to put off the "Mercedes" and Fiji, just as there is no need to advertise anything that is unavailable or that nobody needs. But let us look at what is taking place around us. Let us look at a couple of fairly widely known facts. The USSR Ministry of Foreign Trade no longer exists. From now on many ministries, but mainly the enterprises themselves will select their own partners and decide for themselves where and under what conditions to buy and sell. Healthy skepticism, of course, does not hurt anything, but while making fun of ourselves we must not forget that we also have something to offer the world—from Ivanovo machine tools to computer programs which, for example, are sold to the United States by Estonian exporters. There are representatives of about 900 foreign firms, banks, and organizations operating in the Soviet Union today. Moreover, each day there are more joint Soviet and foreign enterprises—the last, the 108th, was registered on 10 October. And, finally, there are some quite ordinary signs: consular divisions of foreign embassies, and the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs has difficulty keeping up with the flow of demands for visas, it is a serious problem to buy an airline ticket for an international flight, it is more and more difficult to find space in Moscow hotels, even for foreigners—agreements are being concluded, new plans are being developed, and we are groping for points of common interest for the future. The activity that is now being observed in the development of international economic cooperation has never before been seen by the current generation of Soviet people.

We shall not assert that everything in this business is proceeding just as we would like it to; unfortunately, both outdated policies and new fears are impeding us—it turns out that the hardest thing of all is to deal with our own brains. On the one hand, we are surprisingly sluggish, and on the other, we are extremely impatient. One can understand each person's desire to see for his own eyes, to feel with his own hands, to personally try out everything new that is brought into life by the restructuring. When this does not happen we are either irritated or we become sarcastic, forgetting that this is the special nature of the moment and that the processes that are now gathering force are so fundamental and profound, and touch the foundations of economic, political and social structures that we cannot apply them directly to ourselves—it is very difficult to see and grasp them with our minds. The time will come when we will see visible results of the hard and inefficient work that cannot be avoided today—if we really want to be and live as well as everyone else in the world, to show our own models, and not to carelessly imitate others.

But there are also difficulties that are quite new to us. One of them, and far from the last one, is business

information. Efficient, clear-cut, available. Advertising. The very mover of trade which we are lacking.

This is the circumstance that attracted the attention of our West German partners who have a great deal of experience in advertising. The preliminary consultations that BURDA conducted with many Western businessmen and advertisers reveal their immense interest in the possibilities of advertising their products in such a large and influential newspaper as IZVESTIYA. Attentively observing the course of restructuring, convinced of the stability of the course that has been set out, and foreseeing the radical changes in our economy, representatives of Western business circles are displaying an increasingly persistent and active interest in the Soviet market. As the consultations showed, the firms are ready, without expecting immediate advantage, to allot the funds intended for advertising their products to the Soviet Union so that by the time the new economic mechanism is in full force they will have not only the corresponding reputation but also significant stockpiles on the Soviet market.

Believe us, nobody is blinded by remote or immediate prospects—when beginning something new both sides soberly evaluate the essential requirements and the objective possibilities of the Soviet economy today.

This is why we are speaking about advertising mainly machine tools, equipment, the latest technologies, electronics, new materials, scientific developments, financial ideas, plans, and so forth. In addition to the immediate task of building bridges in international economic cooperation, the publication of advertising in IZVESTIYA, in our opinion, will contribute to extensive familiarity of specialists of various profiles with the condition and tendencies in the development of the world market, the penetration of new scientific and technical ideas, and the establishment of modern world standards in the awareness and activity of Soviet engineering personnel, designers, and researchers.

The readers, especially those who are directly interested in the new business, will probably have many specific questions.

How will the advertising be collected and transmitted—in the Soviet Union, in the CEMA countries, and in capitalist countries? What conditions must be observed in this? What price list has been established for the advertisers and what policy for keeping accounts?...

IZVESTIYA will give more details about everything related to publishing advertising on its pages after the press conference for Soviet and foreign journalists that will be held on 18 October. We are now touching only on one issue which will inevitably arise for the readers: under the conditions of the critical shortage, where will

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we get the paper for advertising? Our partners help to solve this problem. Moreover, it must be stipulated that at first the advertising will be published only in the Moscow edition and will be sent to subscribers to the newspaper abroad.

"The new forms of cooperation with the Soviet Union," thinks Dr. Hubert Burda, "are completely justified. We are convinced of this from the practical activity of joint firms created by Heinne Burda and Vneshtorgizdat. As concerns our new plan for publishing advertising in IZVESTIYA, we are convinced that through our common efforts we will not only attain purely commercial goals but will also help to deepen mutual understanding among the peoples."

The same opinion is held by Manfred Made, director of the Eine Burda Publishing House—an energetic and experienced manager who has a great deal of authority in industrial and financial circles of the FRG.

"Our cooperation will contribute to the growth of mutual understanding and improvement of economic, scientific and cultural ties.

"I am convinced that the joint venture between IZVESTIYA and BURDA will have a fruitful effect on the development of all publishing work. Our partner will take over tasks that are directly in the sphere of its competence. IZVESTIYA will be able to use its extensive ties in the Soviet Union and the CEMA countries in order to provide a forum for enterprises that are working for foreign contacts. BURDA will activate Western firms and their industrial philosophy, and will publicize the results of their scientific research. Of course we are at the very beginning of the path, but the tendency toward the creation of joint firms, which is becoming stronger throughout the world, inspires optimism."

Recently the mass media had been devoting an immense amount of attention to everything new that is being generated by mass research, which is entering powerfully into our lives. This is ordinary journalism—to keep the society up with events, with the help of specialists to assist and orient people in what is taking place, and to influence it. Today, having taken on something entirely new, the IZVESTIYA workers will be able to experience what it is to travel an unknown path. From the experience of others we know that the road is not strewn with roses. But we must proceed, we must move—we must!

11772

Belorussia Forms Foreign Trade Association
18250032a Moscow EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 40, Oct 88 p 21

[Article by P. Burak: "Local Resources for Export"]

[Text] In order to provide for more complete utilization of Belorussia's export potential, after the creation of foreign

trade firms a number of enterprises of the republic organized the foreign trade association Belorusintorg. It mobilizes export resources of industry under local and republic jurisdiction and also the agroprom and scientific organizations. In order to motivate the enterprises to work for the foreign market, the BSSR Council of Ministers established deductions for them in the amount of 45 percent of the currency received.

An Intermediary Looks for Partners

The general director of Belorusintorg, V. V. Andryushin, did not have to look into the archives in order to find out about the association's history. The dust from his first steps has not yet settled: the contract under No 1 was signed in the autumn of last year. Since that time, all three firms included in Belorusintorg have independently concluded more than 100 transactions for a sum of about 30 million rubles. Moreover, several dozens of contracts have been turned over to them by all-union foreign trade associations. The work is under way.

What have they managed to do?

S. Goysha, director of the Belintorgobmen firm:

"We have been exporting and importing consumer goods produced at local industry enterprises. We have signed more than 30 contracts, including with firms from the United States and Italy, for delivery of handicrafts and artistic items; for exporting pianos to France, skis to Denmark, rugs to the United Arab Emirates, and furniture and dishes to Lebanon. We have concluded a trade agreement with Bulgaria for 3.5 million rubles. We are selling household goods to firms of the European countries.

V. Volodin, director of the Beltekhna firm:

"Our main occupation is the sale of licenses containing inventions and 'know-how.' We help to arrange cooperation in the manufacture of fraction disks between the Belorussian NPO for powder metallurgy and the Polish combine Staleva Volya." Because of this the reliability and durability of automotive loaders produced in Poland increased. Recently we concluded a preliminary agreement with one Yugoslavian firm for the sale of the technology for processing rubber wastes which was created by scientists of the Belorussian Polytechnical Institute. We are preparing many partners—scientific organizations of the republic—for entering the world market."

V. Telushkin, director of the Belvneshprom firm:

"We have concluded our very first contract since the association's creation with the West German firm Dra-gewerk for the delivery of medical equipment to our republic. For export we are delivering timber, peat, and other fuel and raw material products. There may arise the question as to whether there is any benefit from the

fact that we are working to increase the exports of raw materials and the imports of equipment. But industry under the jurisdiction of the BSSR Council of Ministers does not produce machines which could be sold on the foreign market. Products going there are from enterprises under union jurisdiction such as BelavtoMAZ and the Minsk Tractor Plant. Some of the currency they receive is given to the city for social programs. Our task is to trade with it. The firm has become an intermediary in purchasing for the Minsk Telephone Exchange in Poland and the system for computer control of heating supply in the GDR.

Interest Comes With Cost Accounting

Our partners are ready to import. But there are problems with expanding domestic exports.

Many businessmen, as before, are not very convinced of the advantage of export work. Certain managers of enterprises are rather afraid that the currency they earn will be taken away through apportionment, as was the case not so long ago, and therefore they are not very willing to participate in foreign economic affairs. Without cost accounting there is no interest. Fact?

The Austrian firm Delta and the Novopolotsk Nefteorgsintez Production Association are creating a joint enterprise for processing heavy petroleum fractions—fuel oil with paraffin. Previously these fractions were shipped to the FRG, the paraffin was removed there, and the residual fuel oil was burned. We burned everything. The Austrians suggested that the BSSR Ministry of Construction construct an installation. For currency. Fearing that they might not get anything out of it and that the currency would be immediately taken away by the higher organizations, the builders suggested: it would be better to pay us with a couple of 40-ton cranes.

Because of this kind of lack of confidence on the part of the enterprises, Belorusintorg was forced to resort to real bartering, which so far is permitted only by Poland and Yugoslavia. The association is getting permission to conduct commodity exchange operations with Austria, the FRG, Denmark, and Finland. It is getting them in spite of the fact that barter is not so advantageous. For example, the kolkhoz has mushrooms but it is not advantageous for it to sell them on the foreign market—the currency they receive is not enough. Therefore it asks the intermediary to exchange the mushrooms for an imported line for freezing chickens which the farm needs very much. Belorusintorg finds the foreign firm which is ready to take the mushrooms and be the intermediary in purchasing such a line from another foreign firm. But for playing the middleman, it takes 10 percent of the commission in mushrooms. In other words, this 10 percent is lost for good. But still one cannot do without barter transactions yet.

For the local processing industry must be reequipped and domestic machine building will not soon reach these branches. Commodity exchange makes it possible to obtain materials and equipment that are in short supply. And in the final analysis, this turns out to be advantageous. Thus pianos from the Borisov Factory are exported for \$630. Almost the same pianos, but produced in the GDR, are sold for \$1,100. Almost—because our instruments have several parts that do not meet world requirements for quality.

Here, incidentally, it was necessary for the Belintorgobmen firm to act as intermediary. It prepared the barter transaction for the delivery of 30 pianos to Yugoslavia in order to replace the parts which would improve the quality of the instrument's sound. Cooperation was also organized between the Borisov Music Factory and the Dutch firm Pianoforteeks, which provides equipment for improving the production of pianos after which it is possible to get the real price for them.

Recently prerequisites have been met so that the enterprises will be more interested in working for export. Previously firms of Belorusintorg, like other foreign trade organizations, gave the enterprises schedule-orders for dispatching products for export—a unilateral document which the enterprise had to fulfill as an order whether it wanted to or not. But this kind of administrative-command method has outlived its time, since it did not increase the motivation of the producer himself to produce commodities for export. Therefore a changeover is now being undertaken to operation under economic agreements with enterprises and to equal, mutually advantageous partnership.

"Of course this increases industry's interest, including local industry, in exports," thinks V. Andryushin. "And associations like ours must live from commissions and money from the enterprises and not from budget funds. I think that the enterprises should pay part of the commission in currency: we need it for advertising, paying for complaints from firms, business trips, and paying for shipping cargo over the territories of other countries. In other words, in order to better fulfill our intermediary functions and help our partners better."

Closing the Ranks

Of course the process of forming a smooth-running foreign trade complex for the republic did not end with the creation of the foreign trade association, although we already have a fairly broad range of organization participating in it. These are foreign economic divisions of the republic council of ministers and Gosplan, the authorized administration of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, the Chamber of Commerce, eight foreign trade firms of enterprises that have been given the right to enter directly into the world market, and also 10 enterprises that have established direct ties with foreign

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partners. And now there is also Belorusintorg, with its three firms. But there is still a lack of coordination in the actions of these organizations. It is necessary to close the ranks.

Perhaps this entire "front" is capable of developing and implementing a comprehensive program for the development of the region's foreign economic ties. In addition to resources, finances and the organization of operations for sale and acquisition of commodities, a marketing system must also be envisioned in it—for revealing the

demand, regulating and directing the activity of commodity producers and scientific research institutes, and improving sales and advertising. Perhaps it would be worthwhile to create in the republic a unified marketing service like a republic joint stock company or marketing center.

It is time to enter the foreign market fully armed.

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Role of Trade Unions in Finnish-USSR Economic Relations

18250009 Moscow *TRUD* in Russian 10 Sep 88 p 3

[Interview with Pekka Ahmavaara, secretary of the Central Organization of Trade Unions of Finland (COTU), and Pekka Salonen, chairman of the COTU Council of Commissioners, by *TRUD* correspondent P. Volpyanskiy in Helsinki: "Finland-USSR: A Joint Quest"]

[Text] What are the future paths of development of Soviet-Finnish economic and trade relations? What can the trade unions of the two countries contribute to this? These and other important questions will be the center of attention at the 32nd Session of the Permanent Soviet-Finnish Trade Union Commission which will begin on 12 September in Murmansk, and then will shift to the territory of Finland to the small town of Saarenselk. Delegations of all four Suomi [Finnish] trade union centers will take part from the Finnish side. The largest of them is the Central Organization of Trade Unions of Finland (COTU), which unites about 30 branch trade unions and more than a million of their members. P. Volpyanskiy, our correspondent in Helsinki, talks with Pekka Ahmavaara, secretary of the COTU, and Pekka Salonen, chairman of the COTU Council of Commissioners.

[Ahmavaara] Beginning last year, Murmansk became a sort of new bench mark in the political development in the North of Europe. Speaking in this city, Soviet leader M.S. Gorbachev outlined his country's program regarding the European North. Shortly before that, Finnish President M. Koivisto advanced the idea of restricting naval activity in the seas adjacent to Northern Europe. The Soviet leader seconded this initiative and proposed beginning consultations between Warsaw Pact and NATO countries on a broad range of military and political problems of the North.

It is also very important for Finland's trade unions that the Murmansk initiatives are not limited to military security problems. New ideas of peaceful cooperation in the North and in its subpolar and polar regions have been advanced, and an invitation was made for serious talks on a broad range of issues—from military and political to economic and ecological. In particular, cooperation with the USSR in the use of the natural resources of the Kola Peninsula and Barents Sea could become a sphere of broad and long-term cooperation which would have a positive influence on the whole structure of the participating countries' economies.

An agency already exists which can and must take on the issues of coordinating efforts so that our countries' trade unions can make whatever contribution they can to implementing these mutually beneficial proposals. I have in mind the Permanent Soviet-Finnish Trade Union Commission. Its 31st Session was held in Moscow early in the year. Both we and our Soviet partners were unanimous in striving for peace and stability in the

North of Europe and for economic cooperation. Since the level of economic ties between our two countries has decreased, we must most aggressively undertake a quest for new forms of cooperation.

[Salonen] Finland's trade union movement has always considered the development of trade and economic relations with the Soviet Union a matter of paramount importance. The establishment of a special trade union Working Group for Promoting Trade and Economic Cooperation, in particular, serves as confirmation of this. Soviet orders have played an important role in stabilizing the Finnish economy in recent decades and have provided work for many people. Today, deliveries of raw materials and energy carriers from the Soviet Union have apparently reached their ceiling. The time had come to undertake very actively a quest for new forms of cooperation. We must keep up with the times. A fresh look at the prospects of our mutually beneficial relations is all the more necessary in view of those great changes which have already taken place and which continue to take place in your country in all areas of life, including in the economy.

The restructuring taking place in the Soviet Union opens new opportunities for industrial cooperation. For the time being, it holds a modest place in the total volume of our relations. But there is a base for developing this trend: approximately 40 contracts have been concluded and approximately 60 statements of intentions have been signed between organizations of the two countries. Soviet partners have developed a program up to 1990 in this area which encompasses 150 themes. The first 10 joint enterprises have emerged. Intense negotiations and exchanges of proposals being conducted on 100 different projects of a similar nature.

In order to illustrate the Finnish trade unions' approach to these issues, I want to briefly tell about one meeting. We conducted a seminar in Helsinki within the framework of the Working Group for Promoting Trade and Economic Cooperation. We invited not only management representatives of companies having the most active business ties with Soviet partners, but also trade union activists—trusted representatives of the workers and employees of these firms. A lively, interesting discussion took place. The seminar participants talked about the need to increase mutual exactingness in observing deadlines and in quality of cooperative deliveries. An interesting idea was heard on the importance of more broadly involving workers collectives in cooperation, about the need for expanding production democracy, and about the opportunity for workers and employees to participate in making decisions on concluding and fulfilling contracts. A proposal was made about exchanging worker brigades and specialists between enterprises of the two countries.

I think there will also be a fruitful exchange of opinions on all these issues at the forthcoming session of the Permanent Soviet-Finnish Trade Union Commission.

**Update on Joint Computer Venture Operation
With Italy, France**

18250031 Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in
Russian 6 Oct 88 p 2

[Interview with L. Vaynberg, chairman of the USSR Association of Joint Ventures, conducted by Moscow TASS correspondent B. Shestakov, under the rubric "Joint Ventures: Advantages and Problems": "Computers for Valuta, Services for Rubles"; first paragraph is unattributed source introduction; date and place of interview not given]

[Text] The editors receive fairly frequent letters from readers who are interested in the state of affairs at the joint ventures that have confidently entered our economic life. At the constituent congress of the USSR Association of Joint Ventures that was held in Moscow, L. Vaynberg, general director of the Soviet-French-Italian firm Interkvadro and winner of the USSR Council of Ministers' prize, was elected as chairman of the association's board. In an interview with Moscow TASS correspondent B. Shestakov, he shared some thoughts on the prospects for this new form of international cooperation for the Soviet Union, and on the business and plans of Interkvadro.

[Shestakov] Lev Iosifovich, what objectives is your firm setting for itself?

[Vaynberg] Interkvadro was established last year and is working in the field of computer technology and programming.

The founders are the State Committee on Science and Technology, the State Committee on Public Education, Aniralioteka and the Italian firm Delta Trading. The joint venture was established very fast, but afterwards we fought for three months against various bureaucratic obstacles. Now they have for the most part been removed, but at the time signatures had to be obtained from the most diverse officials. All that has already been related in MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA.

We are operating in three main areas.

In the first place, the organization of export and other operations involving computer software. These, as a rule, are packages of application software, which are the result of scientific creativity (created not by programmers but by scientists in various branches). In the USSR many computer programs are developed, but they are not, in and of themselves, sellable products. In order to sell software, you need clear-cut documentation, advertising, and a network of sales personnel. It is necessary first of all to have a stable name for a product on the market. So, we have already started to sell software to the West. In order to do that, we are preparing our own printing facility, establishing contacts with a series of

Western commercial firms, and arranging various forms of advertising. We made a successful debut at the Ship Technology Exhibition in Leningrad, where our products were sold.

Let me note that the functions of Interkvadro here are dual: we sell our programmers' products, but we also provide the services of a middleman to bring the software developed by other Soviet scientists and scientific collectives up to sellable form and sell it. In addition, on the basis of orders from enterprises and institutions, we carry out the adaptation for imported computers of Russian and Russified programs.

In the second place, we handle the servicing of computers imported into the USSR, especially the equipment of our founding firms, as well as that of other companies whose products are similar in nature. It was important for us to create a network of representatives around the country, because, for example, we have turned out to have clients in practically all the ports used by the Ministry of the Maritime Fleet. In Moscow we provide top-category service to clients, that is, we fix problems within 24 hours from the time an order is placed. Of course, it is impossible to provide that sort of service in Tiksi, but if we open up a representative's office there, we will teach the person, and the service will be good. In this connection, our firm adheres to a clear-cut rule: computers for valuta and services for rubles.

Third is the creation of complete sets of automated systems on a "turnkey" basis. This is where the joint venture's fundamental distinctiveness in comparison to associations of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations manifests itself. As a technical and commercial firm, we can carry out an assignment for the development of an automated management system. For example, if you want to equip an office with 60 networked computers to be used to manage an institution's work. We ourselves can draw up the design, buy the equipment abroad, develop or purchase the necessary software, get the system operating and provide warranty service for it for four years.

As you know, joint ventures are oriented first and foremost toward export, but also toward the delivery of import-replacement products to Soviet customers. Let us sort out how our work fits into this scheme. Say the Norilsk Mining and Metallurgical Combine has decided to create an automated management system to manage production. The necessary equipment does not exist in the Soviet market. Then it decides to use valuta that it has earned itself or, so to speak, has wrangled from above. The combine wants to obtain a system and not a bare computer. And this is where the tremendous advantages of the joint venture over a firm of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations manifest themselves. The firm would supply it with a machine, and then the combine would have to find either a Soviet or foreign software developer. In this way the hardware would be divorced from the commercial deal.

Of course, it would be possible to find a Western supplier who would provide the necessary system on a "turnkey" basis for valuta. But in our case the combine would spend less for that, since it would obtain the services for rubles. In any case, part of the valuta is gained. That means that today we can compete with Western firms in the Soviet market.

The main thing is to have a sufficient number of programmers who can do a job as good as those abroad can. And this is where Intervadro has the biggest difficulties. Although we have managed to put together a rather strong collective of programmers (28 candidates of science), there are whole areas where they cannot yet compete successfully with Western specialists; they have to be sent to study. In short, so far the basic problem is the lack of trained programmers.

And the fourth area of activity is training in work with computers. We have created our first instructional class where, for a certain fee, specialists from various enterprises, institutions or organizations that are installing computers can undergo training.

[Shestakov] What is the internal structure of Intervadro like, and what place do you occupy in the work of the founding firms?

[Vaynberg] None. In a formal sense they contribute money, and that is all. In general, joint ventures are a form of so-called venture capital. Each partner turns over money to a manager and keeps track of its movement. If things do not work out, the firm is sold. We have four owners. If there are no profits, all of them get rid of their "stocks," and the firm folds. But in actuality, the founders provide serious assistance, and that is important for us.

Now for the structure. As the general director, I have three deputies—a Russian, an Italian and a Frenchman. All the areas of activity are divided among us. Many of our foreigners have worked for a long time in the Soviet Union and speak Russian well. Intervadro is a hybrid: something has been taken from the Western firm, and something from our institutions. There are things that are hard to explain to our partners. For example, why we need three bookkeeping staff members when we have a powerful computer. We know that: one person holds a place in line at the USSR Bank for Foreign Economic Affairs starting in the morning; another holds a place in line at the State Bank. In the West, of course, that sort of thing does not exist; you phone, and the money is brought from the bank. So the structure of a joint firm comes into conflict with the structure of a Soviet enterprise.

In general, the concept of structure is agonizing for us. In order to solve transportation problems, for example, in the West the services of specialized firms are employed. But I have to maintain my own trucks, because otherwise I will not be able to get hold of any. The garage is a problem. Gasoline I can buy only at retail. In the West their employees can get something to eat at every step, and

therefore our foreign partners do not understand why I must maintain a dining hall—after all, otherwise no one will come work for me. We have to offer social benefits.

We recently rode through Moscow with Mr. Wolf, the owner of the Underwood trade network; we stopped by one establishment, and there was a line waiting at the cashier for money. He asked: "What? There's a line for that, too?" I replied: "For that, too." He said to me: "I'm a businessman. Tell me, who in your country gets valuta for working with foreigners." "The Berezka stores." "Well, then," he said, "I don't understand anything. On Sunday I was in Zagorsk, and that is the only day when a businessman can find time for such a trip. A bunch of Western tourists, but the only day when the Berezka in Zagorsk is closed is Sunday."

[Shestakov] What are the initial results of your work?

[Vaynberg] I think things are going well. When we established the company, we counted on about 20 employees and a sales volume of 600,000. We leapt past the latter index in the first month, and now we have a very large number of orders. Today the number of employees is already 110. We have set up representatives' offices in nine cities in the country.

Although there are eight similar companies in addition to us, I am not worried about competition. There is room for everyone. The most difficult part is the "turnkey" system, and here our accomplishments have been limited. We have started up our shop for writing the documentation for systems, and we figure to turn the first one of them over this October or November. Things have started off well with our software, and we have already sold \$150,000 worth of it. About 70 people have undergone training and received diplomas in our training center. We have fulfilled 100,000 valuta-rubles' worth of orders for the service and repair of computers. In short, things are moving along, bit by bit.

[Shestakov] What do you see as the prospects for Intervadro's future development?

[Vaynberg] We will develop. Our economists have made a comparison: in the best Soviet offices, earnings come to 20,000 rubles per employee, and in the system of the State Committee for Public Education—3,500 rubles per employee. In Anirariotheque this index is 105,000, and at IBM—119,000. After six months of work our best subdivision, the service department, has managed to earn 48,000 per person. That is, it has managed to double labor productivity. But that is still only one-third of what our partners achieve.

[Shestakov] But isn't it too early to sum things up?

[Vaynberg] You have to count from the very outset; otherwise there is a danger of embarking on a path of extensive development. What I fear most of all is that we will earn not through ability and not through labor

productivity, but through numbers of people. Labor productivity must be raised not by increasing the intensiveness of work, but by creating conditions that will allow people to work more efficiently. Everything must be right at hand. But our employees have to leave for two hours every afternoon to find somewhere to eat.

Nonetheless, we will have to expand: we have too many orders. But who should we hire? With us, it's like it is in a dairy: first you skim off the cream, next comes the milk, and then the whey. Our only hope is that the general level of programmers will rise.

[Shestakov] And the personnel, are they Soviet or foreign?

[Vaynberg] Foreign specialists are needed in each department—advertising, programming and the commercial service. That will pay off: after all, our people will learn a lot from them—first and foremost, to speak in the language of business. It's a kind of capital investment.

In my view the company needs about 20 foreigners. But there is nowhere to house them. That is one thing our association will fight for. If only we could pool our resources and buy housing. But in Moscow you say, "build," and everything starts from scratch. A site, building materials—everything requires valuta, although we are a Soviet juridical entity. But excuse me, that is called the investment climate in a country, a climate which in this case frightens foreign partners away. If we want to attract foreign investors, we must create favorable conditions.

[Shestakov] And finally, Lev Iosifovich, how would you define the advantages of joint companies, and what is the purpose of establishing an association?

[Vaynberg] Today there are already 100 joint ventures in our country. Their appearance is a characteristic feature of the new political thinking and radical economic reform. Through a new form of cooperation we are attracting advanced foreign technology and managerial experience, helping to saturate the domestic market more fully with goods and services, using additional material and financial resources in the interests of the USSR's national economy, and developing Soviet exports.

Joint ventures have specific problems in the legal and economic spheres, especially problems pertaining to relations with state agencies. In addition, they employ thousands of Soviet and foreign citizens whose status, working conditions and pay differ substantially from the ordinary.

That is what lead to the establishment of the association. It is intended, through qualified consultations, to help its participants and also those who are planning to establish a joint venture. We are hoping to contribute to the solution of the social problems of the personnel of joint companies. In no case do we want to be a bureaucratic body, and all of our officials will work on a volunteer basis.

Commentary on Portuguese Agrarian Reform
18070046 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 7 Oct 88 p 5

[Article by V. Reshetilov: "Debtors on the Offensive"]

[Text] "Recently I had occasion to travel on journalist business to the agricultural province of Alentejo," the TASS correspondent in Portugal begins his report for SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA. The little road, heated by the sun, powdered with dust—for the last two summer months the weather in Portugal has been unusually hot—ran south from Lisbon through fields of sunflowers and corn.

Here and there on the hills, the blades of the windmills turned rhythmically, an indispensable element of Portugal's rural landscape. Or suddenly, unexpectedly, there will come the noise of a colorful peasants market, right at the edge of a field near the road. Mountains of striped watermelons, bright yellow muskmelons, blue-black heaps of grapes, plums, peaches, great baskets of pulpy tomatoes, sweet peppers, in general, all the riches of this region are brought here for sale by the industrious peasant.

Nevertheless, all this rural idyll, observable from the car window, is just the surface, a bright roadside facade, behind which lies a very different life. It may be guessed at from the rare slogans written in crooked letters on fences, or on the walls of houses: 'Protect agrarian reform, down with the latifundists, we want cooperatives!'

Some fourteen years have passed since the April revolution, which gave land to simple farmworkers for the first time in Portuguese history, and secured it in the nation's constitution. The first post-revolutionary years were marked by stormy growth in the cooperative movement and the introduction of socio-economic changes in the countryside.

"In recent years, reaction has sharply stepped up its attack on agrarian reform," says local journalist and long-time Communist Carlos Alberto da Silva. "Now this struggle has essentially been taken over by the Social-Democratic government, which generally would like to revise the basic constitutional provisions. Social Democrats, with a majority in the Assembly of the Republic, have already succeeded in pushing through a law on the principles of agrarian reform, which restores the rights of the former landowners, undermines the economic and financial foundation of the cooperatives, and provides for the rollback of social programs in the countryside. This campaign is based on the idea that cooperatives supposedly have low productivity, use old-fashioned agricultural methods, and devote most of their attention solely to enhancing the personal prosperity of their members. But membership in the Common Market supposedly dictates the need for very rapid modernization of backward agriculture before 1992, when the privileged period of Portugal's membership in the European community will expire. Such claims have no serious foundation. We have many cooperatives that surpass

the leading farms in Western Europe in production level and labor productivity."

The words of Alberto da Silva confirm the statistical data provided by the secretary of cooperative agricultural production associations. At present, due to the policies of several recent governments, 248 cooperative and collective farms have ceased to exist, and 770.3 thousand hectares of expropriated land have been returned to former large landowners and monopolist agricultural associations. Cattle, agricultural equipment, and implements were forcibly removed from peasants, and impossible conditions for the existence of the surviving cooperatives were created—the prices they had to pay for fertilizer and implements, land rental, and electricity were raised.

The latest example of discriminatory treatment of small agricultural producers is the recent decision by the government of Cavaco Silva to create a special fund to assist agricultural companies that suffered from the bad weather conditions in the spring and summer of this year. This assistance was provided only to larger producers of agricultural goods and animal products.

At the same time, the government prefers to say no more about the 35 billion escudos that the state owes the cooperatives, and that would come in handy now as never before, after the period of continuous rains was succeeded by record heat, doing great damage to the nation's agriculture.

Another danger to agrarian reform in Portugal came from abroad, from Western European countries. Intermediary companies, which in recent years have sprung up in the country, make great profits from the sale of land parcels to Dutch, English, and West German owners. It is much more profitable for private foreign companies and farmers to grow agricultural products in Portugal, where there is much cheap labor, warm weather, and favorable credit terms, and then to export them to EEC countries, than it is to produce them in their own countries.

"Nevertheless, we don't intend to give up", says Alberto da Silva. "As long as we are united, we will be hard to beat. The struggle for agrarian reform, for the revolutionary achievements of the Portuguese people, is still not over."

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Maltese Ruling Party Delegation Visits Moscow

Received at Soviet CSCE Committee

LD0712224988 Moscow TASS in English
1530 GMT 7 Dec 88

[Text] Moscow December 7 TASS—A delegation of the Nationalist Party of the Republic of Malta, the country's ruling party, headed by the party's Secretary General A.

Gatt is staying in Moscow at the invitation of the Soviet Committee for European Security. The delegation was received at the committee today. Problems of the creation of a common European home, for the development of ties in the framework of a common European process of confidence-building and cooperation, the role of neutral and non-aligned countries in European affairs were discussed during the conversation. Much attention was given to questions of ensuring peace and security in the Mediterranean.

Meets with Supreme Soviet Presidium Secretary

PM1212161588 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
11 Dec 88 Morning Edition p4

[TASS report under general heading "Interparliamentary Ties"]

[Text] On 9 December T.N. Menteshashvili, secretary of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, had a meeting with a Maltese Nationalist Party delegation led by its general secretary, A. Gatt. The delegation is in our country at the invitation of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation.

The head of the delegation expressed deep sympathy in connection with the tragedy in Soviet Armenia.

During the conversation the sides expressed their mutual satisfaction with the state of Soviet-Maltese relations, which is reflected in regular parliamentary contacts. They confirmed their desire to develop these relations in various spheres on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence and good-neighborly cooperation.

M. Lubrano, Maltese ambassador to the Soviet Union, took part in the conversation.

Holds Press Conference

LD1212230388 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1750 GMT 12 Dec 88

[Excerpt] Moscow, 12 Dec (TASS)—"Parties with different ideologies should maintain relations as the well-being of the world is beyond all forms of ideology," Austen Gatt, a general secretary of the Nationalist Party of Malta stated here today at a press conference devoted to the results of the first visit to the USSR of a delegation of this party. It arrived in the Soviet Union 6 December at the invitation of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation. Tomorrow it returns home.

"Our visit was very productive", Austen Gatt said. "It will promote the strengthening of relations between our countries. We have managed to lay down a firm basis for further cooperation, which meets the interests of the peoples of the USSR and Malta." [passage omitted]

1956 Hungarian Uprising Explained

18070063 Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian
No 46, 12-18 Nov 88 p 2-3

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY correspondent K. Novikov interviews L. Yagodovskiy, doctor of history and deputy director of the Institute of Economics in the World Socialist System: "The Budapest Autumn of 1956"; first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] More than three decades have passed since the Hungarian events of 1956. Yet to this day, the press of the Western countries continues to debate what occurred (as they do other difficult times in the history of the socialist countries, we should note.) Our correspondent K. Novikov has asked L. Yagodovskiy to give us his perspective of the Hungarian crisis of 1956. A specialist in the field and witness to the events, Yagodovskiy is a doctor of history and deputy director of the Institute of Economics in the World Socialist System.

[Novikov] We would almost certainly be right in saying that young people, and perhaps those a little older as well, know very little about what happened in Hungary in 1956. Yet Hungary and 1956 are much more than a subject of idle curiosity. As I see it, the events there represent one of the most important periods ever in the development of world socialism.

[Yagodovskiy] Definitely. Those events, now 32 years in the past, are of vastly more than mere historical interest. They represent the first major crisis of Stalinism—a crisis which began, I might add, in 1953, and not 1956.

[Novikov] How exactly did Stalinism manifest itself in Hungary? And what caused the explosion?

[Yagodovskiy] Stalinism in Hungary meant accelerated industrialization with no regard for actual conditions. Everyone focussed on heavy industry, mining, and power production. But the resource base was inadequate for supporting an effort of this kind. For example, the 1950-54 Five-Year Plan initially called for 86 percent industrial growth. Later this became 210 percent; and machine building was to go up by a factor of three. They were imitating our plan, but the time and place were completely different.

Stalinism meant collectivization, with all the excesses of the collectivization of the 30s. The kulaks were destroyed, and along with them the stratum of farmers immediately below the kulaks.

Stalinism meant the creation of a rigidly centralized management and planning apparatus.

And finally, Stalinism meant political trials, which began with the Laszlo Rajk "case." Rajk, the minister of foreign affairs, was convicted of being a Yugoslav spy and shot along with 19 co-conspirators. This was how the anti-Tito campaign was started. Numerous other leaders

of the communist party were tried as well. In fact, Janos Kadar was in prison at this time being tortured. In other words, everything happened pretty much in accordance with the scenarios worked out much earlier by Stalin and Beria. In much the same way as here, participants in the war in Spain were persecuted.

And General Secretary Rakosi was nothing more than a mini-Stalin, with the same imperial entourage, portraits, and undisputed authority.

[Novikov] What were living conditions like? According to the Great Soviet Encyclopedia article on Hungary (published in 1951), Hungary's standard of living grew at an unprecedented rate during those years.

[Yagodovskiy] The accelerated development of heavy industry left no resources for light industry, food production, or agriculture. In fact, in 1952, the standard of living dropped precipitously, and workers' real income fell.

To summarize, I would say the Stalinist model left its mark on essentially all the socialist countries, but that Hungary suffered the most from its extremes. This was the primary reason tensions grew there.

[Novikov] What happened in the 1953-56 period?

[Yagodovskiy] At the party central committee plenum in 1953, right after the Rakosi policy was criticized, attempts were made to eliminate the most egregious elements of the Stalinist model. Imre Nagy became the prime minister, although he held the job only a short time before he was expelled from the party—once Rakosi became party leader.

This state of affairs continued until our 20th Congress. In March of 1956, a plenum of the Hungarian Workers Party Central Committee endorsed the decisions of the 20th CPSU Congress, while in July, at another plenum, Rakosi was stripped of all authority. He was replaced by Gyori, a member of the same "team." But at the same time the central committee installed some true opponents of Stalinism, including Janos Kadar.

[Novikov] Obviously, the power structure was pretty complex.

[Yagodovskiy] The key offices were held by hard-liners, followers of Rakosi. But there were also people who supported change. Their leader was Kadar. And finally there was a right wing, led by Imre Nagy, and an anti-socialist wing, consisting of former landowners and members of the bourgeoisie. They all opposed Stalin and the mistakes of the past, but were pursuing different goals.

[Novikov] What was the USSR's stance up until the October 1956 events?

[Yagodovskiy] For the most part, we were concerned with our own domestic matters; that is cleaning up after the cult of personality, rehabilitating individuals, etc. Naturally the last thing the Soviet Union wanted was a major crisis in Hungary, so we attempted to avert the explosion.

[Novikov] But it happened all the same.

[Yagodovskiy] It began with a demonstration on October 23. The political leadership felt like its power was slipping away, and wavered between permitting the demonstration and prohibiting it. The government was unable to support the demonstrators, nor could it oppose them. The day after the demonstration, Imre Nagy was once again named prime minister. A popular man, he wore the halo of the anti-Stalinists who had suffered under Rakosi.

[Novikov] What events immediately preceded the commitment of Soviet troops to Budapest. Didn't they enter the city twice: after October 23 and on November 4?

[Yagodovskiy] Yes. After the first entry of troops into Budapest, Imre Nagy requested that we withdraw them, and we did. Later, however, the White Terror escalated abruptly, anti-socialist bourgeois parties re-emerged, and Imre Nagy moved toward a union with avowedly reactionary elements. I repeat, a true campaign of terror had begun. Communists were being hanged, and stars were being carved into their flesh. Books were burned. Units of the opposition stormed the party gorkom building and threw its defenders from the top floor. Imre Nagy announced that Hungary was withdrawing from the Warsaw Pact and appealed for the support of UN troops.

Civil war was imminent. In response to the situation, Janos Kadar, heading a revolutionary workers and peasants government he had created, asked the USSR to send its troops into Budapest a second time.

[Novikov] We have been talking about the capital. But we already had troops in Hungary, as we did before 1956.

[Yagodovskiy] That's true. But the main events took place in Budapest. There were only minor disturbances in other cities. And I might add that the peasants stayed completely out of the action. Efforts to "rouse" them were unsuccessful, largely because they had received their land from the people's democracy, but also because the counter-revolutionaries made careless statements about returning lands to their former owners.

[Novikov] How well organized were the anti-socialist elements?

[Yagodovskiy] I feel there was never really any unified center that orchestrated the uprising. There were detachments scattered about the city, and occasional outbreaks

of fighting or shooting would take place. But the idea that there was a carefully planned and prepared counter-revolution is just wrong. Events picked up momentum as the overall crisis worsened.

The rebels had no tanks or aircraft, but they had modern firearms that they had obviously captured from armories or secured from the West.

[Novikov] To what extent was the West involved in the uprising?

[Yagodovskiy] First, they waged a propaganda campaign, including radio broadcasts telling people what to do. Second, people from the West poured into Hungary. Some wanted to settle old scores, others were thrill seekers, and still others pursued profit of some kind. There was no organized intervention from the West, but armed "volunteers" from Western Europe fought alongside the counter-revolutionaries.

[Novikov] You were working at the USSR Embassy in Budapest at that time, weren't you? Were there any casualties among Soviet personnel?

[Yagodovskiy] Families were evacuated. A few diplomats and embassy personnel remained behind on the embassy grounds. The embassy was not attacked. It may be that Imre Nagy felt the embassy personnel were his hostages. The building was blocked off, and while we were not attacked, we could not leave either.

There were casualties among members of the families of military personnel who were unable to be evacuated, and of course among our soldiers. Unfortunately, the casualty list was not a short one. Thousands died, both on our side and the opposition's.

[Novikov] Mr. Yagodovskiy, what do you think might have happened if our troops had not been in Budapest?

[Yagodovskiy] There is no question about it. A civil war would have erupted. Most of the people were either backers of or sympathizers with the socialists, but the party was not active in organizing them at that time. I think spontaneous demonstrations in support of socialism would have started, and that eventually the socialists would have gotten the upper hand. But the cost in human lives would have been terrible. Of course, there was always the possibility that another country would send troops into Hungary. Those were difficult times, what with the war in Egypt and the tense international situation. So the threat of a major confrontation in Europe was very real.

[Novikov] How would you assess our sending troops into Budapest?

[Yagodovskiy] Officially, it was legal, completely justified given the situation within the country and the possible international ramifications. Another argument

in support our decision is the subsequent course of events: healthy elements were quickly consolidated, mistakes were rectified, and democratization and glasnost followed. Under Kadar, the country's leaders acted decisively but flexibly, keeping retribution against the opposition to a minimum.

[Novikov] But Imre Nagy was shot. How do you feel about the clamor of appeals to rehabilitate him?

[Yagodovskiy] Well, I have heard about such appeals. I personally would limit my comments about Nagy to this: what happened was his personal tragedy. To the very end he never understood the nature of the events he was involved in. He started out opposing Rakosi, and ended up in bed with anti-socialist elements.

We can look at rehabilitating him in light of a recent event that has ended an episode in this story: Hungary has decided to offer amnesty to everyone who took part in the uprising. All convictions for uprising-related crimes have been reversed and no longer need to be indicated in applications for jobs or permission to travel abroad.

[Novikov] Have Hungary's leaders changed their political assessment of the 1956 events?

[Yagodovskiy] No, except for one minor detail. More than before, they are inclined to see Rakosi and his followers as the immediate cause of the tragedy.

[Novikov] What are the lessons these events hold for us?

[Yagodovskiy] One of the main ones is that the Stalinist model is barren; it is a dead-end street. But it has to be resolutely and irrevocably dismantled. Hungary, whose crisis started in 1953 and ended in 1956, shows us that inconsistent, half-hearted efforts at modernization are fraught with serious consequences.

Second, we need the same degree of resolution when and if a crisis does occur, but with the emphasis on constructive actions, not repression. The key task is to find a political solution to the problem. The situation in Hungary normalized so quickly because authorities undertook a realistic, comprehensive program that covered all areas of society. They reviewed their economic policy, the party's activity, the attitude toward the church, the intelligentsia, and culture, etc.

In addition, the personalities of the country's leaders contrasted sharply. In the wake of previous leaders' pomp and luxury, Kadar was well served by his modesty and candor. All the privileges of the former leadership were completely obliterated.

[Novikov] Mostly Western correspondents have persistently maintained that the events of 1956 were not the result of individual mistakes, but a manifestation of a systemic crisis.

[Yagodovskiy] I would say that it was systemic, and very grave at that. The problem was not socialism as such, but how it was decided to implement it in Hungary.

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Hungarian Delegation Studies Estonian Economic Affairs

18250076 Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 13 Jul 88 p 1

[Article by R. Amos, Estonian News Agency correspondent: "In the Name of All-Around Cooperation"]

[Text] Party and economic ties between the Estonian SSR and Szolnok area of the Hungarian People's Republic have undergone significant recent development. A significant role in this regard has been played by cooperative contacts on farm and enterprise level. A sound foundation has also been laid for the development of ties in the spheres of culture, sports and tourism.

A delegation from the Szolnok local committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (MSZMP) arrived in our republic the 12th of July. Its members included committee secretary Jozsef Simon, deputy chairman of the local council Mihaly Bugan, and trade department manager of the local council Andras Toth.

The Hungarian visitors met with second secretary of the Central Committee of the Estonian Communist Party G. Aleshin and with secretaries N. Ganyushov and A. B. Upsi.

"We are following intently and with great interest the processes underway in the economic and social life of Hungary," stated G. Aleshin. "There are no worn out paths in the socialist system. We must get practical experience, study and learn from our mistakes."

G. Aleshin then discussed the 19th All-Union Party Conference and those tasks which face the country and the republic. He elaborated in detail on the platform espoused by Estonian communists, then outlined the paths leading to its implementation.

"Our main task now is to introduce a new economic mechanism to get people interested in the results of their labor. We must transition more quickly to self-support management, self-financing, self-recovery of investments and self-management," Aleshin emphasized.

There was also discussion of the need to restructure intra-party work and make the transition from a command system of administration to ideological management methods.

Problems dealing with the cult-of-personality legacy and its effect on all aspects of life were discussed.

N. Ganyushov talked about problems in industry, construction and the social arena. He noted that, in order to insure stabilized growth of industrial production and labor productivity, it is necessary to expand authority on the republic level and adopt a system of regional self-support management. "This does not in any way entail an isolation of the republic. We are tied to other regions of the country by thousands of threads. For example, the strikes taking place in Yerevan caused a temporary cessation of deliveries from there and, as a result, three of our enterprises failed to fulfill the plan."

The question of funds and resources and their role in production of the final product was the subject of lively discussion.

A. B. Upsi dealt with questions of agriculture in the republic. Feed is being stocked and crops are ripening everywhere at this time. Predictions call for farmers to gather an average of 30 centners per hectare. J. Simon stated that this year's favorable weather in Hungary is the best in 30 years and they are hoping to gather a crop of 60 centners of grain from each hectare.

Upsi also noted that meat and milk production is satisfactory, although the last ten days of June showed a drop in milk production.

"People have gotten accustomed to the heat but the cows apparently cannot adapt," he said.

"Perhaps the cows know their milk is being sold too cheaply and have stopped trying?" joked M. Bugan.

"Agencies of the Hungarian mass media reported the course of the party conference in Moscow in good and timely fashion. We were kept informed of specific work performed by the Estonian delegation," stated J. Simon. "Studying your platform, we came to the conclusion that ties between us must become more constructive and mutually beneficial."

The Hungarian delegation visited ESSR Gosplan the same day and, in addition to problems of price-setting, finances, tax-levy and cooperatives, the question of organizing in Estonia a grand exhibition of the Szolnok area's achievements was also discussed. Hungarian officials proposed that this be not merely a show of products, but be conducted in the format of a trade fair, where contracts might be concluded on the spot as well.

Today and tomorrow the delegation of Szolnok local council officials will become acquainted with the work performed by Tallinn's Kommunar and Standard production associations, and with the Tallinn House of Furniture. A trip is planned to the Edazi kolkhoz in Pyarnuskiy Rayon and the group will spend some time in a resort city.

The Hungarian delegation is being accompanied by Comrades N. Ganyushov and A. B. Upsi.

Ukrainian-Hungarian Joint Chemical Venture
18250033 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Sep 88 p 1

[Article by IZVESTIYA correspondent N. Baklanov: "Waste Produces Valuta"]

[Text] An agreement on establishing a joint venture has been reached between the Kiev Vtorpolimermash Cooperative and a Hungarian cooperative.

The present age can rightfully be called the age of polymer. Take polyethylene. This universal material is used everywhere today. However, the mass enthusiasm for polymer also has negative consequences. The material does not decompose naturally and pollutes the environment. Taking these two factors into account—the constant need for polyethylene and its ecological dangerousness, it is not hard to understand why the demand throughout the world is so high for machines capable of recycling old plastic packaging, shampoo bottles and other polymer wastes.

The Vtorpolimermash Cooperative, established in the Ukraine's capital as part of the Kievvtorresursy [Kiev Secondary Resources] Association, has undertaken to manufacture such production lines. The equipment made by the cooperative operates highly efficiently. At one end, waste that has already been turned into granules is poured into a hopper, and finished plastic packaging with multicolored designs comes out the other. The line is serviced by just a few people, it is not difficult to operate, and its operating reliability—according to a 10-to 20-year warranty—is extremely high.

I have looked at the numerous telegrams and letters received by Vtorpolimermash from all over the country. Many enterprises that are engaged in the production of consumer goods and, naturally, need packaging materials, send representatives to Kiev in hopes of concluding a contract with the cooperative for delivery of the lines. The cooperative already has a full folder of orders for two years in advance—worth more than 10 million rubles.

Vtorpolimermash is also entering the international arena. Specialists from the Hungarian People's Republic who became acquainted with the cooperative's equipment at the Exhibition of Achievements of the USSR National Economy came to Kiev for a more detailed look at it. After that the Hungarian intermediary firm Noviki invited executives of Vtorpolimermash to Hungary for negotiations. In the opinion of the company's specialists, the machines for processing polymer waste can become a promising basis for the development of a new area in cooperative activities in Hungary, too. In this connection, they have in mind setting up the production of plumbing components.

"In general outline, the basis of our agreement is as follows," L. Lantsman, the chairman of Vtorpolimermash, said on returning: "The Soviet side manufactures

the machines and produces the semifinished products, and the Hungarian side uses them to produce products that can be sold, including to third countries. Revenues, including valuta, is divided in accordance with the contribution of each partner."

Many people are probably interested in how much people earn in such a successful cooperative. Earnings are rather high—on the average, about 600-700 rubles a month. But it is important to stress in this connection that only 100 people there—half of them hired and half of them cooperative members—successfully do work that specialists estimate would, under other conditions, take a machine-building plant employing 1,500 people to do.

And another extremely important aspect of the experience that has been gained in establishing Vtorpolimer-mash. This cooperative not only has not encountered resistance from local agencies, as frequently still happens, but has received every possible support in Kiev. For example, when the need arose for the cooperative's executives to make the business trip to Hungary, the Ukraine's Ministry of Foreign Affairs readied foreign passports for them in just one day. The Ukraine's State Committee for Material and Technical Supply has provided effective assistance.

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Hungary Opens Center to Train Managers
18250010 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 27 Oct 88 p 3

[Article by A. Melnikov, Budapest: "A Diploma for the Manager"]

[Text] A Management Training Center is beginning to operate in Hungary.

"The School of Businessmen" is what the residents of Budapest have already nicknamed the unusual educational institution which opened the other day within the ancient walls of one of the reconstructed castles of the Hungarian capital, the TASS correspondent in Hungary reports to the editorial staff of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA. You see, the Center for Training Managers, the first in the socialist countries, is planning to train high-rate specialists in the Center who could trade and collaborate on an equal basis with resourceful entrepreneurs of the Western world.

Among the founders of the new center are the Hungarian Credit Bank, the Hungarian Economic Board, and the "Sensor" enterprise. Their "companions" in this undertaking are the well-known to us Soros Fund and also the Milan Board of Trade. The common bond between such different organizations is an interest in the broadest possible development of mutually beneficial ties between East and West.

The main task of the center, which essentially is a distinctive joint enterprise, is to teach upper and middle level managers and also talented young people practical knowledge enabling them to orient themselves freely in all spheres of business life, finances and trade, to know and skillfully use the situation in foreign markets, especially in developed capitalist countries. And it is not at all accidental that they will enlist the services not only of leading scholars from Hungary and other socialist countries, but also their Western colleagues—professors at similar centers which have already proven themselves in developed capitalist countries—to teach the complicated science of management.

It must be added that, in accordance with the terms of the center's founders, students in its basic course must at least be less than 30 years old, speak English fluently, and have a college education. Three years of experience in production is also required, which, naturally, must be marked by serious progress, an innovative approach, and obvious signs of organizational talent. Upper and middle level managers will require much less time to acquire special knowledge in the super-intensive training courses—from 3-5 days to several weeks.

It is no secret that at one time you could have heard quite a few allegedly concerned voices in connection with the idea of establishing an international Center for Training Managers in Hungary, who considered this undertaking as doubtful and generally "not our" business. Today, they more frequently say: If we are seriously and for a long time going to increase mutually beneficial cooperation in the international markets, then we must prepare for it appropriately. As the Hungarian press points out, knowledge of the operating methods and psychology of Western partners is by no means a luxury for production workers and economic managers in the Hungarian People's Republic and other countries of socialism, which will also make up the main contingent of students. You see, today, without knowing the "rules of the game" in Western markets, both lost opportunities and millions in losses are unavoidable. It is a pity when they are associated "only" with inadequate knowledge of the partners' specifics, hope for "luck," and boastful moods.

It is anticipated that next year 150 specialists from Hungary and other socialist countries will receive managers' diplomas after passing a very difficult examination before an international board. If things go successfully, in the early 1990s the number of students may reach several hundred. Its founders consider the rather low tuition, which interested enterprises and institutions must pay, to be an obvious advantage of the Hungarian Center. It is half that of similar institutions in the West.

Hungary did not accidentally become the first socialist country to decide to adopt world management training methods. You see, similar courses, oriented primarily towards domestic conditions of economic management, have become widespread just in the last few years and have shown their obvious practical benefit.

At the present time, about 2,000 young specialists annually undergo training and instruction at one annually at 1 republic and 20 branch centers for training management personnel. Taking this into account and based on accumulated experience, Hungarian specialists plan not only to learn the science of managing, but also eventually to organize training of capitalist countries' managers in Hungary. They would like to believe that such an exchange of experience will help economic managers of Hungary and other socialist countries to broaden their outlook considerably and also enrich world practice by their own experience and give a useful socialist business lesson.

12567

Czechoslovak Cooperative Movement Described
18250011 Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian
No 40, 1-7 Oct 88 pp 2-3

[Article by V. Frolov, candidate of geographic sciences: "The CSSR: Cooperatives of 1,000 People"]

[Text] "There are significant controversies about cooperatives in our country. In this regard, could you publish more materials devoted to the problems of the cooperative movement in other socialist countries, where, as I have heard, much experience has already been accumulated?" A. Panteleyev, Moscow.

We asked V. Frolov, candidate of geographic sciences, to discuss certain aspects of operations of Czechoslovak cooperatives.

In our country, it can be said that the cooperative movement is taking its first steps in our country. Cooperatives' share in the production of manufactured goods and rendering of services is only several tenths of a percent. In many socialist countries, cooperatives are massive and have become an everyday phenomenon in economic and social life.

The inhabitants of Czechoslovakia, for example, learn of the existence of cooperatives practically from birth: baby's loose jackets and crawlers, toys, and children's food—all of these are products of cooperatives. If you need to get your picture taken, get a haircut, buy furniture, build an apartment, etc.—all of this is provided by manufacturing, consumer, or housing cooperatives.

Almost 5.5 million people, that is, one quarter of the country's population, are involved in the four Cooperative Unions of Czechoslovakia, united agricultural (ESKhK), housing, manufacturing, and consumer cooperatives.

Having political and financial and economic support (lower income tax rates, favorable credit, etc.), cooperatives in the CSSR have achieved major successes. Thus, the united agricultural cooperatives provide approximately two-thirds of gross agricultural output. Housing

cooperatives provide up to 70 percent of the increase in the socialist housing fund. Manufacturing cooperatives provide approximately 10 percent of domestic trade commodity funds (including 20-30 percent of fashion goods) and 40 percent of consumer services. The consumer cooperatives account for one-fourth of the retail commodity turnover and half of the public catering enterprises (less factory cafeterias).

What To Do with a Bankrupt Cooperative?

We are often asked what size a cooperative can be, can it be equal to a state enterprise, can it enter the foreign market, can it produce a wide assortment of commodities—in Czechoslovakia this was resolved practically long ago.

Manufacturing cooperatives in the CSSR are fairly major economic entities: their average number of employees reaches 400 (and the largest exceeds 1,000). Each cooperative is made up of 15-25 independent enterprises.

The production activities of cooperatives are fairly labor-intensive, since they are directed primarily at fulfilling individual orders. However, labor productivity in cooperatives is not much lower than in state enterprises. Upon joining a cooperative, an entry fee of 500 korunas (50 rubles) is paid, which give the right at the end of the year to receive, besides the bonus, a specific sum of money from profits. This sum reaches 500-1,000 korunas a year and provides an incentive to cooperatives to promote the growth of the cooperative's monetary income and the reduction of production costs.

In cooperatives, the number of janitors, shipping and receiving workers, office equipment operators, and management personnel is reduced to the bare minimum.

A system for planning production goals is also aimed at ensuring the high profitability of cooperatives. In the CSSR, cooperatives in the central system receive only two indices: the size of monetary profits and the productivity profile of work. Cooperatives independently determine the coloring items, the size of individual batches, the speed of introducing a new assortment [of goods], and prices (based on earlier established state standards).

The experience of organizing cooperatives in the Soviet Union shows that one of their restraining factors is the apprehension of state agencies of possible bankruptcy of a cooperative. In this event, who will compensate the clients, purchasers, and parts-producing factories for damage? Who will repay the bank credits taken by a cooperative? Who generally will bear responsibility?

As was already pointed out, all cooperatives in Czechoslovakia are joined in some sort of Union of Cooperatives. And this is not some sort of bureaucratic formation. Each union has its charter which determines the

rights, responsibilities, and obligations of the cooperatives and regulates their relations with state agencies. Therefore, the union acts as a guarantor of the break-even activity of a cooperative, both to society and to clients.

But let us assume that the cooperative has nevertheless ended the year with losses. What steps are taken in the CSSR in this case? There are several ways here. First of all, a general shareholders' meeting may oblige those members of the cooperative whose activities have inflicted material damage to compensate it from their shareholdings or future wages. Secondly, cooperatives have a reserve fund, which is called upon to make up for temporary losses. But if this is insufficient, then the union's management convenes a meeting of the chairmen of the related cooperatives, who evaluate: Can the cooperative be raised out of the hole? If it can, then the leading cooperatives extend monetary credit on a repayable basis to their less successful colleague and help with raw materials, other materials, etc. If not, then the cooperative is disbanded, shares are paid off to its members and, if they wish to continue operating, they are taken into other cooperatives.

Confirmed by Practice

Finally. The cooperative movement in Czechoslovakia is more than 80 years old. Rich experience has been accumulated, and traditions have been formed. What advice could be given to Soviet cooperatives and state agencies from the operational experience of their Czechoslovak colleagues?

First of all, ensuring social protection for the cooperative worker. In the CSSR, a cooperative worker has total equality of rights with workers of state enterprises: be it a pension and the principles of its surcharge, maternity allowances, payment for sick-leave, the possibility of receiving a pass to a health resort or a rest home, or the right to purchase goods on credit.

Secondly, comprehensive support in the totality of a cooperative's development. In the CSSR, cooperatives not only produce the final product, but also produce, for their own activities, the necessary semi-finished products, procure raw materials, and train personnel to be managers at special educational institutions. They sell products in their own firm's stores, have the right to sell them abroad (a cooperatives' average foreign trade turnover has reached 8.3 billion korunas) and to establish direct manufacturing ties with enterprises of socialist and capitalist countries.

Thirdly, widely develop enterprise, initiative, and a search for non-standard forms of coordinating the interests of an individual member of a cooperative, the collective as a whole and state body. Here is an example. In the CSSR, housing cooperative construction is widely developed. Here cooperatives not only come to an agreement with a construction organization about building a home and ensure normal functioning of the utilities, but also, as a rule, organize the manufacture of construction materials, metalwork construction, and other items associated with housing construction. In addition, each shareholder must work off not less than 1,000 hours in construction. If this is unskilled labor, then the shareholder will receive 15 korunas per hour for it, but if he works in a construction specialty, then pay increases to 60-80 korunas per hour.

Consequently, the shareholder, through his labor, can not only reduce the entrance fee by 15,000 korunas, but can even practically pay it off, having worked off 800-1,000 hours in a critical specialty. The cooperative itself gets workers in critical specialties or an unskilled labor force, lowers manufacturing costs, and accelerates the construction schedule.

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**Selected Articles from LATINSKAYA AMERIKA
No 8, August 1988**

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USSR-Latin American Trade Remains Low

*Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian
No 8, Aug 88 pp 11-24*

[Article by A.V. Vernikov: "The Industrial Development of the Region: Today and Tomorrow"]

[Excerpts] And finally, we come to the point where according to established tradition a phrase of the type "Economic collaboration with the USSR and the other socialist countries is a real alternative to the unjust and plunderous division of labor with imperialism" should appear. It is gratifying that it is namely the journal LATINSKAYA AMERIKA that is practically the first of our publications to move away from that stereotype. We read in its pages: "Socialism, fully revealing its economic potential, could become an effective alternative to the process of 'internationalization by MNC [multinational corporation]' Could, but has not." And further: "The MNCs were successfully assimilating the Third World zone in practice in a competition-free situation in the absence of any fundamentally different counterweight on the part of the 'most progressive economies' of real socialism..."²⁴ It is difficult not to agree with this bitter but realistic evaluation. In reality our economic ties have still not acquired a self-reproducing basis, they touch chiefly on the sphere of sales and not production. Just the first steps on the path to stable interaction, including in industry, are being taken. It is enough to state that in 1985 just 0.5 percent of finished industrial exports from Latin America went to the Soviet Union.²⁵

According to information coming from our extremely competent sources, the consistent development of trade with Latin America is impeded by an insufficient knowledge of export capabilities and import requirements, the presence of traditional suppliers and sales markets both for the USSR and the Latin American countries, and the difficult foreign-currency situation of the majority of the other contracting parties in the region.²⁶ Without denying the significance of these and many other factors

(including of a political nature), I would like to point out another two reasons that are unfortunately not often cited: the imperfect nature of our mechanism for managing foreign-trade ties and the insufficiently broad export base of the Soviet machining industry. It seems that it is at the same time more difficult and more fruitful to speak namely of these problems, and not only of the financial difficulties and stagnation of economic partners (which, by the way, does not always conform to the truth: in 1985 production in the machining industry of Brazil grew by 8.3 percent, and in 1986 by 12 percent. We should have such "stagnation"!).

As PRAVDA wrote, only 29 percent of the machine-building products produced in the USSR meet world standards, while for a number of other sectors this indicator is even worse.²⁷ It is very difficult to obtain access to complex and demanding markets (such as the Latin American ones) with products that, to put it mildly, are not of the highest quality according to world standards. An important consideration: over 90 percent of industrial products consumed in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico are provided by domestic production, as well as over 80 percent for Columbia, Peru and Uruguay.²⁸ This signifies that the given countries procure only the most progressive equipment and technology, high-quality materials and consumer goods abroad. Another export channel—the delivery of assemblies, parts and components within the framework of production cooperation—has still not been assimilated by us in practice, and after all the overwhelming portion of shipments of machine-building and chemical-industry items into the countries of the region go for such products. It is no accident that Soviet exports to Brazil consist of 60 percent fuel commodities and just 3.6 percent machinery and equipment.²⁹ Are we not threatened by the prospect of becoming a raw-materials appendage not only to the Western European and Japanese economies, but the most dynamic countries of Latin America as well?

Some forms of ties that have become a part of the obligatory "rules of the game" in collaboration with this region have been poorly or not at all activated. Soviet organizations, for example, still do not participate in a single mixed production enterprise, which sharply complicates competition with the branches of MNCs and major local firms operating in the countries of the region. It appears as if our firms to this day perceive mixed entrepreneurship in the production sphere on the territory of other countries an "exotic novelty," a tribute to fashion, and have hastened more in search of arguments in favor of a "cautious and attentive" attitude toward it.

It remains to be hoped that the economic reform being implemented in our country, the real expansion of the rights of enterprises in the foreign-economic sphere, will make it possible to remove many barriers and reinforce interaction and the industrial division of labor with the Latin American states proceeding from the realities of today, and not from outdated stereotypes.

Footnotes

24. LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, 1987, No 12, pp 54, 55-56.
25. Calculated from: UN. Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, 1987, N 5, pp 288-298.
26. See, for example, LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, 1987, No 11, p 103.
27. PRAVDA, 19 Jun 86.

28. Ibid.

29. Calculated from: Foreign Trade of the USSR in 1986. Statistical Handbook. Moscow, 1987, p 253.

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Fidel Castro Interviewed on Soviet Perestroyka
Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian
No 8, Aug 88 pp 25-39

[Interview with Fidel Castro: "Fidel Castro: We Believe in the Person!"]

[Excerpts]

[Correspondent] If the United States improves its relations with the Soviet Union even more, will you feel yourself left out?

[Castro] In no way! We will be boundlessly glad of it, since everything that serves peace indirectly serves us as well. Everything that facilitates the development of the Soviet Union and the whole socialist community indirectly serves us as well, is very useful to us, not to mention our feeling of responsibility that helps us to recognize the risk of nuclear war and the danger that existed and continues to exist. I feel that the Soviet policy of peace is useful to all of mankind. If the USSR and the socialist countries could use the funds they spend on arms for their own development and for collaboration with the countries of the Third World, the latter could only gain. I at least, however, have no trust in the concepts of the current administration. No trust! I do not trust the "opportunism" that suddenly rules American policy. It is possible that it will seek peace with the great socialist powers and wage war against the progressive and socialist states of the Third World. It is possible. A recent report by a group of Pentagon advisers speaks of improving conventional arms, of low-intensity wars and dirty wars against progressive governments.

[Correspondent] General Secretary Gorbachev has made many changes in the Soviet Union: glasnost, a more open society. How has this affected Cuba?

[Castro] Everything that happens in the Soviet Union has an effect everywhere. It is a great country. It has influence in Europe, in the United States, and moreover great influence in the Third World, in the socialist countries, also in Cuba. Do you understand? We are a country that has completed its revolution using its own forces, no one did this for us. Moreover, when this revolution began and triumphed, we were not acquainted with a single Soviet person. And our country has always taken a very independent position, adhered to a policy of using the useful experience of other revolutionary countries. We can thus blame no one else for our mistakes, they are our mistakes, just as the mistakes of the USSR are the mistakes of the Soviet people. Every revolutionary country has the right to its own mistakes and to correct them.

We respect the viewpoints of all the other revolutionary parties, all the Marxist-Leninist parties.

The Chinese did a great deal over the course of a certain time span and one day they came to the conclusion that they had made mistakes, that they had to devise a new policy and carry out transformations. We respect their viewpoints. This is not to say that we should sooner or later have done just what the Chinese did.

The same thing is happening with the Soviet Union: we should not repeat its mistakes, and at the same time, if the Soviet people have decided to begin correcting their own mistakes, we should not mechanically copy their actions.

[Correspondent] What mistakes are you talking about?

[Castro] The ones Gorbachev is talking about.

[Correspondent] But he is making society more open.

[Castro] He speaks of the problems of technological stagnation and bureaucratism; he says that a personality cult existed at one time. We have not had those sorts of problems. These are problems of the Soviet people, and they are trying to solve their own problems and correct their own mistakes. The Soviet mistakes differ from ours. Soviet history differs from ours. Soviet institutions differ from ours, although we proceed from one and the same principles. They are correcting their own mistakes, and we are correcting our own mistakes.

[Correspondent] That means there is no glasnost here.

[Castro] No, there is glasnost here and always was. There was no more self-critical party in the world than the Communist Party of Cuba. Was not and is not.

[Correspondent] But glasnost is greater openness.

[Castro] Namely, greater openness, criticism and self-criticism.

[Correspondent] And an open society!

[Castro] What is an "open society"? A society like the American one?

[Correspondent] Cuba is an open society?

[Castro] Cuba is a monolithic revolutionary society and, in certain respects, is more open than Western ones. In many respects, because we have brought to life those aspirations of the people that have not come true in Western countries.

The Soviet people are employing Soviet approaches to the solution of Soviet problems. We in Cuba are employing Cuban approaches to the solution of Cuban problems.

[Correspondent] Many say that there is no open society in Cuba, no freedom of the press, no opposition party, people do not have the opportunity of criticizing the government.

[Castro] But there is simply no opposition in Cuba. The four "pimps" egged on by the U.S. Interest Section are still not an opposition.¹

[Correspondent] You have decided not to participate in the Seoul Olympics?

[Castro] Yes.

[Correspondent] You do not regret this decision?

[Castro] Absolutely not. It is a question of principle. The Olympics in Seoul bring to mind an analogy with the naval base at Guantanamo occupied by the United States. And I ask myself, if the socialist countries did not go to Los Angeles out of security considerations, is it possible to count on greater security in Seoul than in Los Angeles? I do not think that Seoul will be safer than Los Angeles.

[Correspondent] And nothing will impel you to reconsider your decision, since after all the USSR and the countries of the communist bloc will be participating?

[Castro] We are an independent country, and we treasure very much and are very proud of our independence. And if the socialist countries feel that they should go to these Olympics, that does not mean that we should too.

I held negotiations with the socialist countries about all this, they know my point of view on this issue. If they feel they must go, I respect their position.

We are a sovereign, independent country with our own criteria. We always have been, are and will be such. Those who think that we should go to Seoul just because the USSR and other socialist countries have decided to

go there are thus in error. Those who think that way, in my opinion, have no concept of the dignity and sovereignty of our country. [passage omitted]

Footnote

1. The discussion concerns the imitators of the "Cuban Committee for Human Rights," which raised a hue and cry during the UN Conference in Geneva on the score of human-rights "violations" in Cuba (Ed. note).

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Soviet-Nicaraguan Relations Assessed
Moscow AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA in Russian
No 8, Aug 88 pp 92-98

[Article by A.P. Stroyev and O.D. Ushnurtseva under the rubric "USSR-Latin America": "USSR-Nicaragua: Problems and Prospects of Collaboration"]

[Text] Soviet-Nicaraguan relations have been developing fruitfully in the political, economic, cultural and other realms. The USSR renders firm political support to Nicaragua in its courageous struggle for freedom and independent development. M.S. Gorbachev, in the course of meetings with the president of the Republic of Nicaragua, D. Ortega, emphasized that "the Soviet leadership proceeds from the fact that in the current climate, broad international solidarity with Nicaragua is an indispensable part of the overall struggle for peace and the right of all peoples to freedom and independence."¹ Support for the just cause of the Nicaraguan people was clearly and unambiguously expressed in the Declaration of the Soviet Government of 16 Nov 86. The USSR has welcomed the results of the meeting of the heads of five Central American states that took place in August of 1987 in the city of Esquipulas (Guatemala) and declared its readiness to respect the agreements reached there and facilitate bringing to life the agreement on ways of establishing a lasting peace in Central America. The constructive position of the USSR in relation to the Guatemalan agreement is in contrast to the obstructionist position of the United States administration, which continues to support openly the armed formations of the Nicaraguan counter-revolution, threatening to undermine one of the key clauses of the peace agreement.

Political collaboration with Nicaragua also extends to such a vitally important problem for mankind as the fight against the threat of nuclear war. The parties firmly support the idea of creating nuclear-free zones in various parts of the globe and the status of nuclear-free zone in Latin America.

Nicaragua actively supports the peace initiatives of the Soviet Union and the other socialist states aimed at curbing the arms race and creating an all-encompassing system of international security. The Soviet program to

eliminate nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction by the year 2000, reinforced by concrete political steps of the USSR and the one-and-a-half-year moratorium on nuclear testing in particular, enjoys high regard among the Nicaraguan people. The minister of foreign affairs for Nicaragua, Miguel D'Escoto, declared in an interview with a TASS correspondent that "without any doubt, the program advanced by the USSR for creating a nuclear-free world has no analogue in history."² Nicaragua welcomed the conclusion of the treaty between the United States and the USSR on the elimination of medium- and short-range missiles in Europe. Both countries are collaborating actively within the framework of the UN, where their positions on the most important issues of international life are close or coincide.

The expansion of ties in the political realm is being expressed in frequent exchanges of visits by government and party delegations and regular meetings and consultations between the leaders of foreign-policy departments. A special place in Soviet-Nicaraguan relations is allotted to summit meetings. The official visit of a state delegation of Nicaragua to the USSR headed by D. Ortega in April of 1985, as well as the participation of a Nicaraguan delegation in commemorating the 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, have had great significance. Speaking at the ceremonial anniversary session of the CPSU Central Committee, USSR Supreme Soviet and RSFSR Supreme Soviet, D. Ortega emphasized that the Nicaraguan people are proud of their fraternal relations with the Soviet Union and will never reject them, notwithstanding the persistent attempts of the American administration to achieve the allocation of hundreds of millions of dollars from the U.S. Congress for the Nicaraguan counter-revolution.³

Contacts between parliamentary, trade-union, women's, youth and other public organizations are developing fruitfully. At the end of June 1985, within the framework of preparing a draft of a new constitution for Nicaragua, a delegation of the National Constituent Assembly of Nicaragua headed by assembly secretary R. Solis visited the Soviet Union. A return visit to that country was made in March of 1987 by a delegation of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The participation of the Soviet student detachments imeni N. Ostrovskiy and Korchaginets in the harvest of coffee—the principal export commodity of Nicaragua—was an expression of the solidarity of Soviet youth with the struggle of the Nicaraguan people for freedom and independence. The wages were transferred to the fund for the defense of the revolution.

* * *

Trade and economic ties are also developing at a rapid rate. Mutual trade turnover has increased from 5.6 million rubles in 1980 to 223.2 million rubles in 1987, that is, by almost 40 times (see table).

Foreign Trade of USSR and Nicaragua in 1980-87, millions of rubles⁴ %

	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987
Sales	5.6	10.4	42.5	51.9	138.5	212.9	284.1	223.2
Exports	0.1	4.7	36.6	42.4	138.0	212.6	276.4	208.1
Imports	5.5	5.7	5.9	9.5	0.5	0.3	7.7	15.1
Balance of Trade	-5.4	-1.0	30.7	32.9	137.5	212.3	268.7	193.0

An important contribution to the development of bilateral ties is being made by the Soviet-Nicaraguan intergovernmental commission on economic, trade and scientific-and-technical collaboration that was created in 1985 and holds annual sessions in Moscow and Managua. There are standing working groups within the framework of the commission on agriculture, foreign trade, raising the utilization efficiency of raw materials and improving the organization of technical support for machinery and equipment supplied by the USSR, as well as a temporary working group on the prospects for collaboration. A specialized intergovernmental commission on fishing is also at work.

The Soviet Union supplies Nicaragua with machinery and equipment (56.8 percent of 1986 exports), oil and petroleum products (24.7 percent), rolled metal (3.8 percent), fertilizers, chemicals and foodstuffs. Imports from the USSR have acquired vitally important significance for Nicaragua in connection with the imposition of a trade embargo against this country by the U.S. administration in 1985: Soviet deliveries satisfy from 70 to 100 percent of the requirements for many of the most important types of products. The re-orientation of the Nicaraguan economy toward Soviet products did not go smoothly. Brands and standards for steel, non-ferrous metals and chemicals were changed, and they had to make an expensive conversion from English to metric weights and measures. The machinery and equipment from the USSR, being simple in design overall, nonetheless required constant support and monitoring on the part of local personnel, who were not always prepared for this. The lack of repair bases, the high abrasiveness of the soil (as a consequence of its volcanic origins) and the hot and damp climate were the reasons for the premature breakdowns of agricultural equipment. There was not enough storage space to house Soviet products, in connection with which instances of spoilage of raw materials and foods, some of which fell into the black market by concealed means, were noted. Questions of raising the efficiency of the utilization of Soviet goods were included on the agenda of bilateral negotiations.

Imports to the USSR from Nicaragua are considerably lower than the volume of exports. Some of this is associated with the fact that Nicaraguan goods were earlier supplied, as a rule, to traditional purchasers—the states included in international trade agreements, commodity agreements guaranteeing higher prices compared to prices in the world markets. In 1980-83, Soviet

foreign-trade organizations procured coffee, sugar and cotton from Nicaragua, and then came a two-year hiatus. Imports began to grow again in 1986, when the USSR established incentive prices for Nicaraguan export goods.

The economic and technical assistance of the Soviet Union is making a weighty contribution to the restoration and development of the national economy of the republic. Power-engineering and polytechnical training centers (in Managua and Leon respectively) created with the assistance of the USSR have been put into operation and are operating successfully, along with a department for communications and the repair of motor vehicles at an existing training center in Managua and an agricultural mechanization center in Sebaco. A ground station for the Intersputnik satellite communications system, providing Nicaragua with direct telephone, telegraph, telex and television communications with the USSR, Cuba, the European socialist countries and a number of states in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, went into service in July of 1986. The construction of a medium-wave radio transmission station in Esteli is reaching completion. A major petroleum tank farm went into service in Piedras-Blancas in September of 1987.

In the realm of agriculture, Soviet organizations are assisting in the realization of a 36,000-hectare irrigation project in the Managua—Granada—Masaya region and the construction of two large workshops for the repair of agricultural equipment. Nicaragua up until recently processed no more than 10 percent of its own cotton and imported thread, buckles, fabric and clothing on a broad scale. The expansion of the Texnicsa mill (3,200 tons of buckles a year) with Soviet assistance will make it possible to refrain from the import of this semi-manufacture and utilize the capacity freed up in the fabric and knitting industries. The work is being conducted in collaboration with organizations from East Germany, which supplied air-conditioning installations.

Pre-planning research and planning operations are being accomplished and specialists are making trips based on the intergovernmental agreements of the USSR. The general construction work is being done by the Nicaraguan side, which is encountering considerable difficulties caused by the shortage of funds, construction materials and skilled manpower. Fixed wage scales for the

construction workers under the conditions of hyperinflation provide no incentive for high labor productivity, which in a number of cases has led to labor conflicts. The solution of these problems can be found via a unification of efforts of the parties, and especially the delivery of light prefabricated and removable construction structural elements, building materials and the sending of some of the funds obtained from the sale of commodities coming in as free aid for the financing of collaborative facilities. The creative application of the team contract method could do good service in organizing the labor of the construction workers. The point is to overcome the stereotypes that have taken shape in construction practices.

Both countries, along with the expansion of bilateral relations, impart great significance to the emergence and improvement of multilateral forms of collaboration along the lines of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. An agreement for the collaboration of CEMA and the Republic of Nicaragua was signed in September of 1983. In accordance with this agreement, the USSR is taking part in the construction of large economic facilities on Nicaraguan territory—a textile combine in Esteli, a deepwater port in El-Blaff on the Atlantic coast and a dairy complex at Muy-Muy-Matiguas—as well as performing the function of coordinating country for the aforementioned irrigation plan in the Managua—Masaya—Granada region.

Multilateral collaboration, like bilateral collaboration, is encountering a series of problems. Being an international economic organization, CEMA cannot render international assistance in its own name (with the exception of the Scholarship Fund), but only coordinate the efforts of the interested countries that are part of it. Coordination is a very difficult affair, taking into account the differences in the economic capabilities, operational economic mechanisms and sector specializations of the member countries. In the construction of multilateral facilities, the coordinating country, as a rule, does only the planning work; further collaboration is set up on a bilateral basis under the specific conditions of each country, which creates a series of problems. There is as yet no long-term program of multilateral collaboration that makes use of the possibilities of the Special Fund of the CEMA International Investment Bank to finance construction from a unified source. All of these problems are being discussed constructively at the annual sessions of the CEMA-Nicaragua Joint Commission and its working groups in agriculture, the food industry and fishing, industry, geologic survey and power engineering, foreign trade and the transport of goods, and the training of national personnel.

The social sphere is a priority direction for international ties. A Soviet field hospital is operating in Nicaragua that has won a high reputation not only in Nicaragua, but in

neighboring countries as well. There are plans to construct a major permanent treatment institution on the basis of it. A detachment of Soviet physicians is working in the hospitals of Managua, and in essential cases patients are sent to the USSR for treatment. Soviet teachers are working in the higher educational institutions of Nicaragua, and over 1,700 undergraduates, graduate students and interns are completing training in the Soviet Union.

Contacts are developing actively and fruitfully in the areas of science, culture and sports. The third broad-scale program of cultural collaboration is already being realized. Soviet teachers of the Russian language, music and the circus arts are working in Nicaragua. Soviet trainers are preparing national teams for shooting and track and field. An exhibition and sale of Soviet books was held in Managua in August of 1984 on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the victory of the Sandinista revolution. A Soviet Union Day, dedicated to the 40th anniversary of the victory over fascist Germany, was also a success.

Professional and amateur artists demonstrated their art to Nicaraguans. They were especially successful in the northern reaches of the country that are in the zone of combat operations against the contras. Concerts in the military hospital at Jinotega and appearances before the peasants and workers of Matagalpa spilled over into genuine manifestations of Soviet-Nicaraguan friendship. Many Nicaraguans said during the course of such meetings that the heroic deeds of the Soviet people in the years of the Great Patriotic War serve as an inspiring example for the Sandinista revolution opposing the aggression of the United States.

Such creative collectives famous in our country as the Azerbaijani Kenul song and dance ensemble and the Republic Puppet Theater of Kirghizia have toured Nicaragua. Leading artists of Soviet ballet and circus are taking part in an international arts festival in Managua devoted to the 25th anniversary of the creation of the SFNO [Sandinista National Liberation Front].

Over the nine years that have passed since the victory of the Sandinista popular revolution, Soviet-Nicaraguan collaboration has taken on a dynamic nature and become an appreciable phenomenon in international life.

Footnotes

1. PRAVDA, 30 Apr 85.
2. IZVESTIYA, 17 Jan 87.
3. PRAVDA, 4 Nov 87.
4. Foreign Trade of the USSR. Statistical Handbook. Moscow, 1981, p 268; 1982, pp 269-70; 1983, 269-70; 1984, pp 267-68; 1985, pp 266-67; 1987, pp 263-64.

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1989 Publishing Plans
Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian
No 8, Aug 88 pp 24, 124

[Text] Political Literature Publishing House

Latin America: Handbook. (Editor-in-chief V.V. Volskiy).—25 sheets.

V.V. Listov. The Volcanos Are Still Silent: Notes of a Journalist on the Countries of Central America.—18 sheets.

Nauka Publishing House

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Ye.A. Larin. Cuba at the End of the 18th to the First Half of the 20th Centuries.—20 sheets.

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Latin America in Numbers. (Handbook). (Editor-in-chief V.M. Davydov).—17 sheets.

Marxism-Leninism and Revolutionary Liberation Processes in Latin America. (Editor-in-chief A.F. Shulgovsky).—Volume 1—17 sheets; Volume 2—17 sheets.

M.A. Oborotova. The United States: The Struggle with the Liberation Movement in Central America.—9 sheets.

The Sandinista Revolution: Experience and Problems. (Editor-in-chief A.D. Bekarevich).—15 sheets.

USSR—Latin America: Paths and Prospects for Collaboration. (Editor-in-chief L.L. Klochovskiy).—20 sheets.

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V.V. Sbruyev. The Appearance and Development of the Progressive Press in South America. (Argentina, Uruguay, Chile).—12 sheets.

Knizhnaya Palata Publishing House

The Countries of South America. Annotated Bibliographic Handbook.

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International Symposium on Crisis of Capitalism in Latin America

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian
No 8, Aug 88 pp 142-144

[Article by P.P. Yakovlev, Buenos Aires, under the rubric "Academic Life": "The Crisis of Capitalism in Latin America (International Symposium in Buenos Aires)"]

[Text] At the end of March 1988, a delegation of the ILA [Latin America Institute] of the USSR Academy of Sciences consisting of institute Deputy Director Doctor of Economic Sciences N.G. Zaytsev, department chief Doctor of Economic Sciences L.L. Klochovskiy, department chief Doctor of Historical Sciences B.M. Merin, department chief Candidate of Economic Sciences P.P. Boyko, section chief Candidate of Economic Sciences V.M. Davydov and the author of these lines took part in the international academic symposium "The Crisis of Capitalism in Latin America," organized in Buenos Aires by the Argentine Foundation for Social and Political Research (FSPR). Researchers from Brazil, East Germany, Cuba, Paraguay, Uruguay and Chile took part in the work of the symposium along with the representatives of Argentina and the USSR, and they discussed a wide circle of topical problems of the contemporary situation in Latin America and in the international arena overall.

At the center of attention of the discussion, which was of quite a sharp nature, were such cardinal questions as the paths of revolution in Latin America, the correlation of the struggle for peace with the struggle for the social reconstruction of society and the influence of the process of restructuring in the USSR on the situation in the Latin American region. Over 100 papers were read and presentations made at the symposium. Work was done in three thematic sections: "Specific Features and the Prospects of the Socio-Economic and Political Situation in Latin America," "A Program for a Way Out of the Crisis" and "New Features of the Ideological Struggle." The overall results of the discussion were summed up at a concluding plenary session.

The participants in the discussion in the first commission agreed with the fact that the majority of the Latin American countries are encountering enormous economic difficulties brought about by both domestic and foreign factors. The profound economic crisis that gripped the region in the first half of the 1980s has not been completely surmounted. As one of the speakers noted, "it has proven much easier to get into the crisis situation than to get out of it." Using the concrete examples of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay and other countries, the agonizing process of the region's descent into the quagmire of the crisis, accompanied by unprecedented growth in foreign indebtedness, a weakening of the positions of the Latin American states on the world market and the appearance of dead-end situations in the social realm in a true sense, was shown.

The financial bleeding of Latin America continues. As Argentine scholar Jaime Fuchs noted, over the last four years alone—1984 through 1987—Argentina has paid over 13 billion dollars in interest on foreign debt to foreign banks, while its indebtedness grew from 46.9 to 54.1 billion dollars over that same period. An analogous situation is also typical of many other countries in the region. A clear strengthening of pressure on Latin America on the part of the IMF, creditor banks and the multinational corporations [MNCs] is transpiring under these conditions, and they are striving—and sometimes not without success—to have a decisive influence on the formation of economic policy by the Latin American governments. Among those talking about this at the symposium were Mauricio Lebedinski (the director of the FSPR), Manuel Resko (Chile), Jorge Beynstein and Felix Marcos (Argentina) and Miguel Carrio (Uruguay) among others.

One consequence of the increased pressure of the IMF and the MNCs, many of the symposium participants emphasized, was the offensive against the positions of the state sector that has been observed in a number of countries overall, the ever more persistent attempts materially to limit the participation of the state in the economy and to give complete freedom of action to private foreign and local capital. The rule of the financial

oligarchy closely linked with the foreign banks, emphasized Argentine researcher Alejandro Roldan, is becoming a characteristic feature of the current situation in Argentina, Uruguay and other countries of the region. This rule has taken on extreme forms in Chile. A sharp strengthening of the exploitation of the working class and the contradiction between labor and capital, worsening to the limit, has occurred, as was shown in a number of the papers of the Chilean participants, in particular David McConnell and Adolfo Areta.

The significance of the external factor for the fate of economic development in Latin America is growing under the crisis conditions, the symposium noted. The papers of Soviet participants N.G. Zaytsev and V.M. Davydov, as well as the presentations of a number of Latin American scholars, emphasized the vital necessity of restructuring the system of international economic ties among the countries of the region, materially advancing economic collaboration among them and expanding and improving their relations with the socialist community, which are up to now of a comparatively modest scope. Attention was devoted in this context to the especial topicality of the practical incarnation of the concept of international economic security that has been advanced by the Soviet leadership.

Problems in overcoming the enormous economic and socio-political difficulties that have been created in the region proved to be the focus of attention of the second commission. In the opinion of the majority of those who spoke, not a single program for a way out of the crisis that has been adopted by the bourgeois governments of the Latin American countries will ensure the solution of urgent problems. This brings onto the agenda the task of devising alternative plans for social development and the fight for their realization. Papers on this topic were prepared by Pablo Castro, Oscar Carnota and Marcelo Isakovich (Argentina), Reynaldo Saes and Roberto Payva (Chile), L.L. Klochkovskiy and P.N. Boyko as well as other scholars.

It was emphasized that success in the struggle against imperialism and the defense of the economic and political interests of the Latin American countries cannot be ensured by a policy of compromises and endless concessions to the IMF and multinational capital or by measures to privatize the enterprises of the state sector and stimulate private capital. As Chilean researchers showed using the example of their own country, a broad set of concrete steps to accelerate the process of industrialization, limit the influence of the MNCs, dispose and utilize productive forces more efficiently and protect natural resources and the environment is essential. It was noted at the same time that progressive forces in the countries of the region far from always have at their disposal an alternative program for getting out of the crisis that is worked out in detail, attractive to the masses and actually realizable. The immediate development of such programs is a most important theoretical and practical task.

Problems in reviving the current socio-economic situation in Latin America, accelerating economic development and reinforcing the international positions of the countries in the region are the subject of sharp political and ideological struggle. The discussion in the third commission of the symposium, where a particular focus was placed on international political issues, was about this in detail. Luis Suarez Salazar (Cuba), Luis Corvalan and Jorge Vera Castillo (Chile), Jose Maria Lanao, Irene Munoz, Daniel Campioni, Alberto Cohen and Sylvia Hass (Argentina) and other researchers taking part in the discussion addressed the material changes that have transpired in the international climate in the 1980s and have proved to have a powerful effect on the situation in Latin America. The changes mentioned included the rising aggressiveness of U.S. policy in the region, the appearance of "hot spots" and sharp local conflicts here, the aspiration of the Latin American countries to come out together in the interests of ensuring international peace and settling disputed issues via negotiations that is making its way forward, the more and more significant influence of new Soviet foreign-policy theory and practice on the whole system of ties among states etc.

It was especially emphasized that the issue of practical ties between the antiwar activity of progressive forces and the struggle for the revolutionary reconstruction of society has especial significance under contemporary conditions. The paper of B.M. Merin in particular noted the vital necessity of making the forms and methods of the liberation struggle commensurate with the global problems of the survival of mankind.

The detailed exchange of opinion that took place at the symposium, according to the general conviction of the participants, aided the investigation of the new realities of the modern world and the economic and socio-political situation in Latin America. The symposium showed at the same time that it is essential to continue the discussion and seek new arguments and proof on a whole series of problems.

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Solution to Brazilian Debt Problem Related to International Economic Security
18070048 Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 9, Sep 88 pp 27-32

[Article by M. P. Korolkov: "Brazil: A Difficult Search for Alternatives (in the Country's Financial Situation)"]

[Text] The connection between the domestic and foreign aspects of economic development is becoming more and more inseparable and strong. As applied to Brazil, this unity is probably displayed most clearly in the crisis of foreign indebtedness—the most important factor which determines the country's political and economic life to a large extent. The foreign debt crisis has passed through certain stages in its development, reflecting the movement of real life. After it began with a deep crisis in liquidity, it appeared to lose its critical nature in the mid-1980s. To a certain extent, researchers' interest in this problem declined as well. After the surge of economic growth and nontraditional forms of economic policy, the fact that the crisis is long-term in nature somehow faded into the background.

The evolution of the indicators of foreign debt in recent months has demonstrated the inaccuracy of the optimistic forecasts. By the end of 1986, the factors which had predetermined the temporary financial and economic stabilization had reached the limit of their resources. The moratorium on interest payments declared in February 1987 once again attracted the attention of the world public to the debt problem. In the opinion of specialists, this step by the Brazilian Government really signified the beginning of a new stage in the crisis' development. The moratorium clearly demonstrated the uselessness of traditional methods to solve the problem that are based on prolongation of the payment periods for credits and the attraction of new loans.

The relatively favorable economic situation and the good weather conditions in 1987 contributed to substantial growth in the export and agricultural sectors after the failures in 1986. This growth neutralized the trend toward recession in the basic areas of the economy to a certain extent, but attempts to bring the country up to growth rates close to what they were in the past ended in failure. The new price "explosion" razed the structure of the economic policy conducted within the framework of the "Cruzado" plan in 2 months. In January 1987, the monthly consumer price index jumped up to 15 percent, and in February and March, according to official estimates, it was up to 20 percent.

"Cruzado-2," which was adopted in November 1986 and remained in effect right up to the second quarter of 1987,

differed from the first one by more than the number added to its name. After the success of the government coalition in elections to the Constituent Assembly, both the form and direction and the socioeconomic content of the policy of state regulations were abruptly changed. The government actually abandoned the social reform elements of the first plan, which were particular and not comprehensive in nature, aimed basically at raising the workers' standard of living by measures to reduce inflation, but which had practically no effect on the taxation system and the agrarian sector. In particular, the investment activity of the state sector was significantly reduced in accordance with the "Cruzado-2" plan, although unlike the management machinery, it was not subjected to cutbacks.

After the government adopted "economy measures" for the country, members of the Club of Paris in the latter half of January 1987 agreed to shift the period for Brazil to pay off its debts for 1985 to the first half of 1987 without concluding a preliminary agreement with the IMF. This would have been perceived as a success in previous years, inasmuch as the agreement signified large-scale refinancing of the bulk of the foreign debt under preferential conditions with retention of an independent economic policy. But at the beginning of 1987 the solution of the problem in accordance with "the Mexican alternative" was already obviously inadequate.

By abandoning elements of social manipulation and attempts to restrict the private monopoly sector somewhat, it was inevitable that the Brazilian state would have to oppose other really unproductive expenditures—primarily the interest payments on the debts, which would have made it possible to free an additional 8 to 10 billion dollars.

In February 1987, the government adopted an important decision which marked the beginning of a new stage in the process of settling the debt situation: a 90-day moratorium was announced in the payment of interest totaling 5.6 billion dollars to private international banks. It was extended later for an indefinite period—until concessions are made by the creditors. The moratorium did not affect payments on short-term credits, and—up until mid-1987—the debt to government organizations of the Club of Paris member countries. At the same time the worsening export positions unquestionably became an incentive for the severe measures so uncharacteristic of Brazilian diplomats. In our view, the main reason is more profound: the sharp disparity between the previous financial policy and the interests of the country's economic development. Brazil was unable, without seriously damaging its national interests, to transfer abroad as interest the many billions which it lacked to cover the growing state budget deficit, to implement the inverse the worsening export positions unquestionably became an incentive for the severe measures so uncharacteristic of Brazilian diplomats. In our view, the main reason is more profound: the sharp disparity between the previous

financial policy and the interests of the country's economic development. Brazil was unable, without seriously damaging its national interests, to transfer abroad as interest the many billions which it lacked to cover the growing state budget deficit, to implement the investment programs that had been planned, to expand imports of the capital goods needed, and so forth.¹

The Brazilian leaders' calculations were based on the fact that, despite the general decline in the transnational banks' interest in operations in developing countries, a number of American private banks were acquiring a substantial proportion of their profits there as in the past. Thus, Citicorp's annual report for 1985 reveals that it was precisely in the Latin American region that it acquired about 25 percent of its profits (245 out of 998 million dollars), and about 180 million dollars of this came from Brazil alone; three of the other largest North American transnational banks—Morgan Guaranty Trust, Bank of America and Manufacturers Hanover—each received from 80 to 120 million dollars.²

The moratorium proved to be ineffective as a means of pressuring the creditors: the increase in reserves and the dispersal of credit risks enabled the TNB's to avoid the threat of losing the Brazilian debts and to increase pressure on the debtor. However, the Brazilian leaders continued to search for alternatives. Two of them, suggested in the summer and fall of 1987, were based on a combination of elements in the traditional approach to refinancing with attempts to bring about a decrease in both the absolute dimensions of the foreign debt as well as the size of the payments to service it by converting the greater part of it into long-term state bonds at stable and lower interest.

These proposals were backed by adoption of the "Bresser Plan" (named after the person who inspired it, the third minister of finance in the civilian government, L. C. Bresser Pereira). The IMF formulas were distinctively interwoven in it with the basic concepts of the "Cruzado" plan on freezing prices as an effective means of combating inflation. The next price freeze on goods and services and workers' wages, put into effect in June 1987 for a 3-month period, was accompanied by the traditional attempts to reduce the balance of payments deficit by a one-time increase in the prices and charges for the products of enterprises in the state sector and by reducing state expenditures. It was proposed to reduce budget allocations by 6.7 billion dollars by a freeze on the construction of new economic projects and elimination of state grain subsidies.

Along with this last measure, which made the workers' situation considerably worse, the system of wage indexing was changed. While wages were automatically increased under 20-percent inflation before, the nominal wage level now was adjusted in conformity with the average monthly level of inflation for the quarter, which

meant a drop in real incomes under the conditions of intensified inflationary processes. In fact, the trend toward an increase in real wages which began in 1985-1986 was cut short again.

On the whole, the stabilizing "Bresser Plan" was received with restraint by the IMF. It recommended that the government toughen the measures already adopted to reduce the state budget deficit down to 2.2 percent of GNP as opposed to the 3.5 percent that had been planned. As far as the Brazilian leaders were concerned, they evidently realized that the "Bresser Plan" was a half measure and that it was generally impossible to reach the goal that had been set with stabilization programs of this kind. This was nothing but a concession to the international banking community, the next attempt to delay the start of substantial socioeconomic reforms.

As expected, prices jumped up sharply when the freeze period expired. Attempts to control their increase led to a new decline in economic activity. The trends of stagnation in development were intensified. Even with the absence of debt payments the negative balance of the state budget reached from 5 to 6 percent of GNP, according to various estimates.

A radical tax reform could be a practical means of solving the problem. The proportion of a direct income tax in state revenues is significantly lower in Brazil than in developed capitalist countries. The amount of progression depending on size of income is small as well. In particular, that is why such a concentration of income held by a narrow section of the population when there is mass poverty does not exist in one developed capitalist country.

However, the first step in the direction of reform proposed in the fall of 1987 by Bresser Pereira was given a hostile reception by the entire establishment and even by the machinery of the ruling PMDB [Brazilian Democratic Movement Party], in which the leftist bourgeois wing is quite strong. The conclusion may be drawn from this that at present, the reformist plans which even the economists of conservative persuasion consider to be necessary do not have the political support of the ruling class.

Inasmuch as the alternatives proposed by the government to settle the debt were received rather coolly by the creditors in spite of the important concessions in "the autumn alternative,"³ the leadership was compelled to revert to solution of the immediate tasks—more expeditious refinancing of most of the debt in accordance with "the Mexican model."

Within the framework of this policy, Brazil agreed to pay the bulk of the interest for 1987 (about 4.5 of the 7.6 billion dollars) and two-thirds of the sum indicated through short-term credits from transnational banks. However, this was symbolic in nature: by the end of the

year Brazil had paid only 0.5 billion dollars with a positive trade balance (according to preliminary estimates) of about 10 billion dollars.

Protracted negotiations produced a result only by the middle of 1988. The agreement reached on refinancing the greater part of the debt corresponds to the conditions of the agreements concluded with the TNB's by Mexico (1986) and Argentina (1987). The reduction of the interest rate to 0.8125 percent above the fixed rate (LIBOR) [expansion unknown] and extension of the refinancing period attest to a certain shift in the transnational banks' attitude toward the region's largest debtor. However, the questions remain: will this measure, along with the additional credits to cover interest payments, provide the country with foreign financial stability in the coming years? How far will the new leadership of the Ministry of Finance go in making concessions to the IMF with respect to reducing state expenditures, selling shares of stock in state enterprises, and liberalizing foreign trade conditions and treatment of foreign capital as a whole?

In any case, it is too early to draw even preliminary conclusions from the process of settling "the debt drama": basic solutions capable of radically changing the situation and new extensions are also possible here. On the whole, the prospects for more radical reforms in the near future appear doubtful. On the threshold of the presidential elections set for 1989, it is not likely that the extremely heterogeneous coalition will decide to take important steps which it will not be able to see through in the time remaining. It is more likely that the past policy of delaying urgent decisions will be maintained.

Inasmuch as the current stage in the economic crisis which began in 1987 will probably be prolonged (in any case, the process of restoring fixed capital has not begun yet) and a salutary increase in agricultural production and expansion of the export sector are not expected, the prospects for the country's social and economic development are not favorable. It is unlikely that the "microelectronics and information science" complex of the sectors which are showing high growth rates will be able to meet the requirements for structural (technological) restructuring of the economy in a brief period of time; they are capable of yielding a proper return only in the long term. It is most likely that even at best the Brazilian economy will not be able to reach the planned growth rate of 4 percent in the GNP, although it is possible that the country may succeed in avoiding an uncontrolled economic recession and defer solution of the most critical problems until more auspicious times.

It is evident that the model for development in the 1970s has already become obsolete and results only in stagnant trends, as the experience in 1987 showed. The domestic and foreign sectors of the economy are on the threshold of reforms which open opportunities for the country's association with a new stage of development in the MKKh [presumably: world capitalist economy]. This is an extremely important period. Does this involve a

distinctive springboard which makes it possible to have a breakthrough or will the "shaky catwalk" of the 1980s, rolling with crisis shocks over and over again, not allow the strategic reference points for development to be reached?

Nevertheless, it is already clear that in its new turn Brazil will not only not succeed in catching up with the centers of the MKKh, but in occupying a place to which the leading countries of Southeast Asia aspire, together with the centers which are making the transition to a new technological level. But on the other hand, in the next stage of "the Kondratyev cycle," Brazil cannot be an objective desired by foreign capital for expansion. Its future breakaway from the basic group of countries on the periphery of world capitalism has been predetermined as well.

Radical changes have been about to happen for a long time in the area of international economic relations. The fate of Brazil and other countries in the developing world will depend on how profound they will be and how soon they will take place. There are no grounds for maintaining that a solution to the crisis in relationships between the centers and the periphery of the world capitalist economy is as unachievable under current conditions as in the early 1980s. But now, in our view, the process of finding a way out is taking place in a reactionary form, in the interests of conservative circles in the West and the forces which exploit stagnation in the developing world like parasites.

However, there are influential forces in the centers of the world capitalist economy which are not organizing either the nature or the pace of settling the debt situation in the leading debtor countries. As a consequence, there is a mutual inclination to search for the political solutions which would link these countries more closely with the new system of MKRT [presumably: international capitalist division of labor] which is taking shape. Not only the private interest of specific groups in the developed capitalist countries is behind this process; it is one of the objective requirements for development of the world capitalist economy.

It is difficult to predict how consistently and extensively this trend will be developed; after all, it is carving its way under the conditions of a bitter struggle. Settlement of the developing countries' debt situation is an immutable condition for establishing a system of international economic security and one of the necessary steps toward normalization of international economic relationships. The new political thinking which is gaining momentum is contributing to an awareness of this truth not only by those who have been looking for a way out of the crisis for a number of years, but those on whom a mutually acceptable solution of the problem depends in practice.

Footnotes

1. According to D. Funaro's assessment, in order to maintain a growth rate of 5 to 6 percent in the GNP, the

annual investments should come to 55 to 60 billion dollars (23 to 24 percent of GNP), whereas in actuality it did not exceed 45 billion (19 percent of GNP).

2. THE ECONOMIST, London, 1987, No 7487, p 90.

3. In particular, this refers to the conversion of debt commitments into state bonds for a 25-year period at the rate of 70 dollars in bonds for 100 dollars in debt commitments, compared with a lower market quotation of 30 dollars for 100 dollars.

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Left Radicals' Revolutionary Path in Latin America Examined

18070048 Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 9, Sep 88 pp 33-48

[Article by A. V. Kharlamenko under the "Discussions and Debates" rubric: "The Leftist Radicals: The Path to Revolution"]

[Text] We often encounter the most diverse, even mutually exclusive assessments of the role of organizations which are usually called radical left and ultraleftist. It is becoming apparent that science has turned out to be indebted to public practice. The strata from a time "when new processes and phenomena were not evaluated in a timely manner, and when there was a lag in the theoretical comprehension of their objectives..."¹ are still strong.

Until recently, no clear-cut social and political criteria had been singled out to make it possible to distinguish the radical left and ultraleftist political tendencies from other ones. The rather vague terms "left radicals" and "ultraleftists" were often used as synonyms, or else they were replaced by abusive nicknames and insulting labels—such as "leftists [levaki]," "extremists," "pseudorevolutionaries," and the like. General stereotypes and ready inferences which applied to other eras and regions were often transferred automatically to Latin America. Left radical and ultraleftist movements have been classified indiscriminately as varieties of a petty bourgeois revolutionary character or as exponents of the sentiments of declasse elements. Attempts are still being made to squeeze Latin American left radical organizations into the Procrustean bed of "Trotskyism and anarchism" or to associate them with terrorist groupings of the "Red Brigades" type.²

The fact is that anarchism left the political arena in Latin America a long time ago and the Trotskyist organizations are small sects. A significantly larger ideological and political role is played by the left radical movement on a continental scale, which has deep roots in Latin American history and reality itself.³ Major revolutionary organizations—from the "26 July Movement" and the

Sandinist National Liberation Front to many detachments of the liberation movement in El Salvador, Guatemala, Chile and other countries have belonged and continue to belong to it. These organizations have never been oriented toward terror as a specific tactical line, and in principle are not intended for mass struggle. On the contrary, organizations of this type have a popular base and lead a sizable number of the workers. Their ability to reestablish their ranks after the most severe repressions and defeats, to make use of different forms of struggle, and most importantly, their leading role in both of the people's revolutions which have been victorious in the second half of the 20th century attest to this.

It has not proved to be easy to interpret theoretically and explain these actual facts. We have seen either a negation of the basic tenets of the teaching of K. Marx, F. Engels and V. I. Lenin or historical accidents and local and short-term deviations from the general trend in them for too long. Meanwhile, the number of "exceptions" has required that the compass of Marxist theory be utilized to search for new governing laws for a long time now.

The Bugaboo of "Petty Bourgeois Revolutionary Character"

"We Latin American communists have not had a consistent and systematic policy for unifying all leftist forces, including the armed left, for a long time."⁴ This was admitted by S. J. Handal, general secretary of the Salvadoran Communist Party Central Committee. The lack of a "consistent and systematic policy" gave rise to attempts to resolve the problem by a frontal ideological and political struggle against "ultraleftism." A bitter and difficult experience was necessary for it to become clear: such a line leads not to the "victory" of one left-wing organization over the other ones, but to their common defeat. "This scheme failed in Latin America; it led not to the disappearance of 'leftist' organizations and not to the unity of revolutionary forces, but to opposition between the communist parties and the other revolutionary organizations, it strengthened reformist trends among the communists' ranks, and did not help the party itself to find maturity, if by maturity we mean not age but understanding of the life around us, the social and political reality in which we find ourselves, and the capability of changing it,"⁵ wrote (Schafik) J. Handal. Now many detachments of the communist movement on the continent consider it necessary for left radical organizations to take part in shaping the political vanguard of revolution.

The line of strategic unity of the leftist revolutionary forces lies at the foundation of the new political course set by the Argentine Communist Party in 1985. The Central Committee report to the 16th PCA [Argentine Communist Party] Congress in November 1986 stresses: "Among the anti-imperialist forces—and first of all among the revolutionary forces which emerged over the

past decades and followed a path which provided valuable experience with achievements and mistakes, successes and failures—our party's change has created an atmosphere of anticipation; they see a definite possibility of overcoming the disunity which is not only our weakness, but a source of strength for our enemies and opponents.”⁶

It is significant that this course by the PCA obviously troubled the bourgeois forces, which made haste to accuse the party of “ultraleftism.” Essentially the same positions are held by the opportunists on the right, whose views are characterized by M. J. (Grabivker), member of the PCA Central Committee: “...The doctrinairism which nourished the reformist deviation has led to the point that not only has the leftist forces' unity not been acknowledged and a struggle has not been waged to achieve it, but those revolutionary circles with which we have had legitimate differences on political and ideological matters have been added to the forces acting in the service of our principal opponent.”⁷ Accusations of “bourgeois nationalism” or “Trotskyism” were substituted for a specific analysis of the left radical forces' political role in this case.

The course of unity among the revolutionaries also meets with opposition from the sectarian and dogmatic groups which identify with the movement of the proletariat, but which regard any differences of opinion with them as a petty bourgeois deviation. This has repeatedly led to tragic consequences. It is enough to recall the downfall of (Roque) Dalton, Melida Anaya Montez and Maurice Bishop.

Recently materials supposedly from the plenum of the central committee of the Peruvian “Sendero Luminoso” organization were published in the Latin American press. It was alleged that they were seized by the military in Lima prisons. It is difficult to say if these documents were genuine or the results of a provocation. But it is significant that they are full of vehement hostility toward all left radical movements in Peru and other countries as well as toward the “senderists” who advocate dialogue with them. Among the accusations they made, sympathies with “Soviet and Cuban revisionism” appear along with “Guevarism” and (“Marielism”), as if they had come from the pen of the other critics of “ultraleftism.”⁸

The portrayal of left radicals as typically “petty bourgeois revolutionaries” is an obstacle that is no less important. The reasoning of those who espouse this concept is as follows. It is maintained that ultraleftist and left radical organizations take shape not on the basis of the working class' struggle against the upper bourgeoisie, but on the basis of struggle (armed, as a rule) for a revolutionary “assault against the authorities,” right up to arranging all the signs of a classic revolutionary situation. This characteristic is identified with the “petty bourgeois revolutionism” which was opposed by K. Marx, F. Engels and V. I. Lenin. It is maintained that overemphasis of the subjective factor of revolution,

which is characteristic of the “petty bourgeois revolutionism” theoreticians, leads in practice to defeats of the leftist forces and replacement of a bourgeois democratic system by reactionary dictatorships and the onset of regional conflicts. The ultraleftist deviation is portrayed as the principal danger for revolutionaries in Latin America. Reinforcing the ideological struggle against “petty bourgeois revolutionism,” which should ensure the ideological and political victory of scientific socialism, is seen as a solution to the problem.

Such an approach alerts us right away with its abstract generalities and the complete lack of specific analysis. The basic question of who in fact leads the masses' struggle is passed over. Followers of this approach are convinced that the role of vanguard of the revolution was nearly not guaranteed to the workers movement in the form in which it took shape before the revolutionary situation. All the other participants in the revolutionary movement of the masses are at best tactical allies and adherents of petty bourgeois, left-leaning, reformist, and other tendencies of this sort. The movement of the masses itself—the scale, forms and orientation of it—is the creative product of a separate class (but in practice, it is the product of a separate party or group, if not an individual ideologist). The mass movement is viewed as a purely subjective factor, and its vanguard is viewed as preordained by objective conditions (basically economic).

The adherents of such views usually consider themselves perfectly consistent Marxist-Leninists. But in actuality they are disregarding a most important Leninist requirement: making a distinction between the role of leftist forces in the evolutionary stages of historical development (in modern Western Europe, for example) and during the age of revolutionary battles, such as the one which began in Latin America in the 1950s and is still far from being completed. The concept of what is objective and what is subjective may differ in content, depending on the role of the masses in the political struggle.

V. I. Lenin viewed the activity of the masses as an objective indication of the revolutionary situation, in which the subjective factor appears in a completely new way—as the degree of organization and consciousness of the mass movement which enables (or does not enable) it to resolve the problem of power in its favor.⁹

If the masses have been driven to despair by the tyranny of a ruling oligarchy, the crimes of “death squads” and other horrors of the old “order,” it is inevitable that organizations which meet force with force will emerge. When such organizations grow rapidly and new ones take the place of those that have been defeated, this in itself attests not only to an overall national crisis situation, but to the mass character of the revolutionary movement. Under these conditions, a decisive clash between the forces of revolution and counterrevolution is about to take place regardless of the will of the

individual parties.¹⁰ The old political system will inevitably be replaced by the new one, if not from below, from above, and if not from the left, from the right. This is an "if" and it is determined by the subjective factor of the revolution. The most important aspect of it—particularly in Latin America—is the unity of action of the revolutionary forces. F. Castro correctly stresses: "...Unity is not only a quantitative factor, but a qualitative factor in revolution; it is not measured by whether other parties have 10 or 15 percent of the forces... If the principle of unity does not prevail, not only are you separated from other parties, but there is dissension within your own organization as well..."¹¹ It is high time that conclusions be drawn from the difficult lessons of history and that mass social movements be treated as an objective reality which must be studied closely and whose actions must be soberly taken into account.

The Social Context

In order to reveal the real social and political character of the mass left radical movements, we must abandon the label of "petty bourgeois revolutionism" first of all. The classics of Marxism-Leninism have used this concept only as applied to the countries in Europe where the antagonism of the working class and the upper bourgeoisie became the axis for the entire social and political struggle. A situation such as this takes shape in far from all countries where the capitalist method of production prevails. The antagonism of classes is an integral part of exploitative relationships, but there may be various social manifestations.¹² This depends not only on the level but the type of capitalism's development, as well as on political and cultural factors and traditions.

In order for a class to be molded as a social force, it must be organized for the conscious defense of its interests, including in struggle for political power.¹³ Only after reaching this level does the workers' struggle become a true class struggle and a basic landmark in social progress. This means that other leftist forces either shift to the positions of the proletariat or gradually acquire petty bourgeois characteristics, that is, they are imbued with the attitude of a small-proprietor environment even if they are supported by the lower strata, not the middle strata, of a capitalist society.

Under different historical conditions Marxism "recognizes the petty bourgeois movement as a distinctive initial form of a proletarian, communist movement."¹⁴ It represents the interests and attitudes of entire social blocs or conglomerations which carry out or are able to carry out political struggle in a given stage: nations, "the plebeians," or the people.

The nation takes shape as a social force in the struggle for an independent centralized state, against colonialism and (or) medieval disintegration. This problem was resolved 120 to 180 years ago in most Latin American countries.

The *plebeians*, in our view, are the conglomeration of working people and those who are exploited that is formed in the struggle to create "the prerequisites of civilization"¹⁵ for them—the minimum level of well-being and culture that is necessary, without which there can be no discussion of the masses' systematic participation in political life.

The *people* were viewed by K. Marx, F. Engels and V. I. Lenin as the social bloc which is formed because of capitalist "civilization" out of the classes and strata oppressed by the bourgeois military-bureaucratic machine and which is capable of crushing its repressive apparatus.¹⁶ The concept of a "people" has been filled with new social content in "Third World" countries in recent decades. In "modern anti-imperialist revolutions the category of 'the people' means the community of forces which is objectively capable of fighting for overall democratic and anti-imperialist goals, and in subsequent stages for socialist goals as well..."¹⁷ This was precisely the substance of the concept of "the people" in the Cuban revolution's political program.¹⁸

The bloc of the people makes up the heart of the democratic movement, but the latter is much broader in composition. The democratic movement includes all the social forces opposing the uncontrolled absolute power of the bourgeois state machinery and violation of elementary human rights and freedoms. It is purely a political movement which, because of its heterogeneity, is less stable than the blocs of the plebeians and the people, which are social communities of long duration.

The proletariat and semiproletariat predominate as the blocs of the plebeians and the people in most Latin American countries. As S. J. Handal stresses, new detachments of the working class in which those from the peasantry and provincial petty bourgeoisie predominate, not those who were craftsmen by birth as before, have been formed in the process of industrialization over the past decades. As a result of the expansion of the secondary and higher education system, mass detachments of employees hired for nonphysical labor have made their appearance, and the size of this work force is not in line with the opportunities for its employment under the existing socioeconomic system. "The agricultural proletariat and semiproletariat, who are keenly aware of the consequences of their recent proletarianization and are very explosive for that reason, and the vast marginal strata in the cities which developed as the result of the mass exodus from the countryside caused by the development of capitalism in agriculture..."¹⁹ have increased rapidly.

All these strata are workers and are being exploited, they do not own the means of production, and they live more or less by the regular sale of their labor. However, their political awakening takes place basically within the framework of the people's or plebeian movement, in which part of the middle strata and the peasantry takes part as well.

The national, plebeian and people's movements are antagonistically opposed primarily to rule by the oligarchy, especially its repressive organs. Moreover, the plebeian and people's blocs are formed by the struggle against an oppressive regime and do not act as united social forces outside of this struggle. For this reason, for the political organizations which developed from a plebeian and a people's movement, but not a class movement, the orientation toward an "assault on the authorities" is a condition for their existence which is reflected in their ideological and theoretical views, their organizational structure, and their strategy and tactics. On the surface, this feature easily appears to be the sum of objective errors (adventurism, voluntarism, and so forth), but in reality it has deep objective social roots.

The classics of Marxism-Leninism have repeatedly mentioned the continuity between national, plebeian and people's movements and the class movement of the proletariat which cannot be formed in any country outside and apart from its predecessors. There is always a proletarian trend within the plebeian, and especially the people's movements. The criterion of a proletarian class position is not support for workers' struggle against individual capitalists, but revolutionary consistency in resolving national, "common labor" problems, and problems common to all the people. For this reason, the attempts by bourgeois politicians to hide the concept of a revolution of all the people in the workers' consciousness with the idea of a narrowly interpreted class struggle are not accidental.²⁰

Simplified notions of the proletarian class movement often stem from identification of the proletariat with its factory and plant nucleus. Meanwhile, V. I. Lenin differentiated especially between the concept of "workers" and "the proletariat."²¹ In speaking of the hegemony or dictatorship of the proletariat, he was referring not to the party guided by certain workers, and especially not to the mythical "workers state," but to the leading role of the working class in the movement—and later in the system of power—of the entire proletariat. The social base of this movement and this power is not made up of the working class alone in the traditional sense, but consists of most of the workers hired for nonphysical labor: the educational systems, banking and office institutions, the service fields, and so forth. This movement is formed in the course of the people's common struggle for democracy. It is often preceded by a movement of the huge masses of those who are "former peasants," the proletarianized and pauperized poor of backward countries or regions, and it is sometimes interwoven with it. V. I. Lenin also referred to them as the proletariat in the broad sense of the word—in accordance with the basic objective trend of development under the conditions of capitalism.²² To the extent that they remain workers, the bourgeois class is their principal exploiter. Being cut off from ownership of the means of production already, they make up the backbone of the "plebeian" movements, but they take part in all the antibourgeois actions later. But this social stratum is poorly equipped for the common

democratic struggle, since it is not prepared in accordance with its overall position in life to take advantage of democratic institutions in an organized struggle for its interests.

An approach such as this helps not only to comprehend the social nature of the left radical and ultraleftist movements in contemporary Latin America, but to bring out the real differences between them as well.

The Plebeian Movement and the "Peasants War"

In the true sense of the word, ultraleftists may be considered the organizations for which socialist goals mean primarily the sum total of equalizing measures in the social and economic area, which isolates them naturally from the main nucleus of leftist forces. Mass ultraleftist movements are most typical of Asia and Africa in the modern era. In Latin America the largest movement of this type is the "Sendero Luminoso" in Peru.

With all the diversity of national and regional conditions, a common trend is traced in the social base of ultraleftist organizations. While they are not small sects, they invariably are linked with the plebeian movement, which is recognized by its participants as a struggle by the starving poor against the rich who are bathing in luxury.

The ultraleftist trends are nearly always related to the trends, situations or traditions of the "peasants war." The classics of Marxism have noted that this form of struggle is adequate for the plebeian movement.²³ The majority of "peasants wars" were movements not so much of the classic peasantry as they were of the rural and urban lower classes who were "former peasants," the marginal groups that became *declassé* in part.

The "peasants wars" most often take place as a struggle against national oppression, not under nationalist, but equalizing slogans. The poor masses struggle to crush their immediate exploiters and save themselves from starvation. It is precisely this section of "the proletariat in the broad sense" that truly does not have a motherland, whereas the working class is far from indifferent with respect to the political conditions for its struggle which exist in a given state. The only "integrated" objective which has made it possible to unite the struggle of the poor masses with the movement of the working class and the oppressed peoples has always been an assault against the power of the oligarchy. The absence of such an alliance has led to ultraleftist trends both in the camp of the "peasants wars" and among the "enclaved" groups of workers which are employed in production sectors that are directly dependent on world market conditions. The specific nature of their immediate economic interests and conditions of their daily life makes the "enclaved proletariat" a special social group. It has often interpreted the "peasants war" as a threat to its

own interests, which has played a decisive role in shaping the ultraleftist organizations of an "anti-peasant" orientation (Mexico, Bolivia).

The "enclaved" detachments of the proletariat, as well as the early proletarian rural strata, formed the social basis for communist parties in many countries (Mexico, El Salvador, and Colombia in the 1920s and 1930s). It is not surprising that for a long time ultraleftist parties were developed chiefly within the communist movement and later on usually speak in the name of "true communism." The militant sectarianism of many ultraleftists reflects primarily the objective isolation of their social base from other detachments of working people. K. Marx, F. Engels and V. I. Lenin have repeatedly stressed that any national crisis results in a "peasants war" in countries where there are social grounds for it. Under these conditions, the classics of Marxism-Leninism advocated an alliance between the workers movement and the "peasants war," for otherwise it is impossible to either reduce its negative aspects to a minimum or to win a victory over reaction. It should not be forgotten that the alliance between the communists and ultraleftists was a reality in Russia in 1917, Spain in 1936-1937, and Indochina in 1965-1975. Although the position of most ultraleftists was very offensive and presented a considerable amount of danger to the revolution, a split between the mass revolutionary organizations on the eve of decisive battles could only make the situation worse.

With all the drawbacks inherent in the ultraleftists' ideology and practice, this trend as a whole belongs to the left part of the political spectrum in accordance with the long-term trend of development in contemporary Latin America. Assertions about the danger of a "dictatorship of the Pol Pot type"²⁵ are unjustified because of the fundamental difference in the historical situations. Unlike the more backward countries in Asia and Africa, the problem in Latin America relates not to insufficient "prerequisites for civilization" but to the fact that the masses of poor have been deprived of these prerequisites because of crying social injustice. In Latin America, the objective prerequisites for forming a people's bloc have reached a high degree of maturity. Rural and urban lower classes support the ultraleftists in those cases when the other leftist forces do not appear as a practical alternative because of their weakness and dissociation (and these are nearly synonymous in Latin America). On the other hand, the more popular a movement that began as ultraleftist becomes, the sooner the logic of the struggle demands that it have political maturity, flexibility, and unity with all revolutionary forces. The experience of the world liberation movement exerts influence in the same direction. It is impossible to win in the name of militant sectarianism now.

What is the Radicalism of the "Left Radicals?"

The left radical trend which is predominant in Latin America is not ultraleftist. As already noted, the parties and organizations which are in the mainstream of the

revolutionary movement in their countries belong to it. "Scientific socialism is the ideology of most of these movements. Although not all aspects of Marxist-Leninist theory have been mastered equally by the leaders of these movements and utopian, ultraleftist, or less frequently, nationalist (or "Eurocommunist") elements sometimes appear in their interpretation of Marxism-Leninism, scientific socialism is or is becoming the basis of their world outlook, and the other influences do not determine the nature of their historical action."²⁶

It was by no means the petty bourgeois revolutionaries, but the activists in the workers movement that V. I. Lenin called the "left radical elements": the supporters of R. Luxemburg who opposed the opportunism of leaders at the Second International.²⁷ The term "left radicals" is not too appropriate under modern conditions, inasmuch as the organizations being considered have no relationship to the radical parties in France, Argentina, Chile and other countries. It is more accurate to call them people's revolutionary organizations. Their radicalism is displayed not in equalizing slogans of a social and economic nature, but in the question of political power. The focus on an assault against the oligarchic state which is typical of national and plebeian movements is developed the most in people's revolutionary organizations. They form the basic nucleus of all social movements which precede and prepare the movements of a class nature. The traditions of the national liberation struggle and the plebeian actions create a favorable basis for the people's revolutionary movement and bring the masses to it.

The people's revolutionary organizations are oriented toward socialist goals, but they do not emerge on the basis of the struggle between the factory and plant proletariat and the upper bourgeoisie. The mass support of these organizations is provided by the people's bloc, which includes all those active political forces which are being suppressed by an oligarchic state. New (modern) detachments of the proletariat often form part of this bloc. The number of employees hired for nonphysical labor, who often play a leading role in the left radical movement, has increased significantly in recent decades.²⁸ The people's bloc often includes detachments of the working class, the peasantry and the middle strata which previously were part of revolutionary democratic movements (Mexico), populist movements (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and other countries), constitutional movements (Dominican Republic) or revolutionary nationalist movements (Peru). The marginal strata play an important part in the people's bloc. In most Latin American countries, the marginal groups are not the mass of "former peasants" driven out of the precapitalist structure by bourgeois "civilization," but a social community which took shape because of dependent capitalist development as a special form of the reserve army of labor—if not within the framework of a given country, on the scale of the world capitalist economy. Under these conditions, the ultraleftist trends are losing their previous popular base (although the ultraleftist political tradition, which is periodically revived by market factors, has

been maintained for a long period of time). Social changes, along with the accumulation of political experience, contribute to a shift by many organizations which were previously ultraleftist (El Salvador, Argentina, Colombia) to the people's revolutionary positions.

The people's revolutionary organizations have the maximum amount of influence during the period of crisis in the era of capitalism that has been moderately developed. Experience in many countries indicates that they may not only join the ranks of the vanguard of the anticapitalist revolutionary movement, but play a leading role in its formation as well. Narciso Isa Conde, general secretary of the Dominican Communist Party, came to the conclusion, based on experience in his country, Cuba, Nicaragua and El Salvador, that the people's revolutionary consciousness is a necessary transitional stage from populist or reformist consciousness to socialist consciousness.²⁹

A number of objective factors favor the version cited (the "Cuban" version) for shaping the workers' social consciousness and make progress difficult on the classic ("European") path.

In the dependent development of capitalism the role of the exploiting state is qualitatively different than with the "classic" capitalist development. The power of the state not only protects the supremacy of the bourgeois oligarchy, but it also serves as the most important lever in molding and reproducing this oligarchy. Experience in Latin America indicates that such a situation reinforces the oppressive nature of the bourgeois state, regardless of the paternalist clothing it wears. In those countries where bourgeois-democratic freedoms have existed, they have actually been extended only to a minority of the working people. Even today, direct force against the masses far exceeds what is "average" for capitalism in its scale, its systematic nature and brutality.

The conflict between the oligarchy and the people turns out to be the principal sociopolitical manifestation of the deep-seated antagonism between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. For this reason, the people's bloc becomes the main subject of revolutionary struggle in its initial stages, but in the long term it gravitates toward conversion into a social and political coalition headed by the working class.

Latin American Marxists are realizing more and more that this path of political awakening for the masses is the principal direction of struggle for the foreseeable future. Thus, M. Lebedinski, member of the Argentine Communist Party Central Committee, points out: "...There are two opposing poles today—the people and the rulers—and this is the main conflict that must be resolved."³⁰ N. Isa Conde also puts the conflict "between the bloc of people's forces and the bloc of the national and proimperialist bourgeoisie and landowners who have created organs of political, ideological and military coercion"³¹ in the forefront.

Such dynamics of social conflict work toward political organizations of the people's revolutionary type. The regional social and political atmosphere exerts a powerful influence even on those countries where the internal distribution of class forces has more "European" features (Chile, Uruguay). The people's revolutionary organizations (the MIR in Chile and the MLN—"Tupamaros" in Uruguay) act together with the mass communist parties here as well.

But the most important objective factor acting in favor of the people's revolutionary organizations is in the nature of a historical stage. Most of the countries in Latin America are going through the structural crisis of dependent, partly developed capitalism. As world experience attests, this stage is fraught with revolutions more than any other stage. In a revolutionary situation, power does not exist the way the well-intentioned petty bourgeoisie attempt to portray it: "democracy (the bourgeoisie) or dictatorship (left or right)." History puts the question in another way: either the dictatorship of a bloody counterrevolution against the people or the victory of the people over the machinery of counterrevolutionary violence. This machinery has acquired unprecedented influence in Latin America in recent decades, and its criminal activity is supported by all the might of the reactionary circles of world imperialism. Winning a victory over the monstrous machinery of repression is immeasurably more complicated now than in the past. In this connection, the increasing role of the people's revolutionary organizations, which subordinate their entire political life to this objective, is understandable. The political tactlessness and harm of such an approach when what is probably the main reason for the defeats of revolutionary forces is perceived in their actions are no less apparent. This not only draws attention away from the crimes of the counterrevolution, but feeds the unjustified hopes that peaceful forms of struggle—as opposed to armed struggle—may guarantee success. V. I. Lenin had to face such an argument with respect to the fact that "a partisan war brings the conscious proletariat closer to the drunkards and tramps." Noting that this is not ruled out if a given form of struggle erroneously considers itself to be unified and does not coordinate with the others, especially if it is not elevated by the "enlightened and organizing influence of socialism," V. I. Lenin stressed: "Without this *latter* condition, *everything*, absolutely all the means of struggle in a bourgeois society bring the proletariat closer to the various nonproletarian strata above or below it and by being left to the natural course of events, they are worn out, misinterpreted and prostituted."³² Strike, parliamentary and propaganda activity are no less subject to this than armed struggle by any means.

This is how matters stood in Europe at the start of the 20th century, when the lines dividing the classes were relatively clear-cut and the proletariat's class consciousness had already been shaped. In spite of this, the unilateral orientation toward socioeconomic and daily political struggle with disregard for the prospects of the

struggle for power too often led to the regrettably familiar formula: "Make the economic struggle itself political in nature." This turn of events did not meet the interests of the bourgeoisie so much as it did the interests of the reactionary bureaucracy.³³ Under the conditions in Latin America, orienting the working class in this way made it possible for the bourgeois oligarchy to easily subordinate it to its control and to prevent the proletariat's consolidation as an independent social force. This can be resisted only by mobilizing the conscious public in the struggle for real power, not just a scrap from "the lord's table."

The importance of people's revolutionary organizations is also increasing because of their role in the struggle between the forces of progress and reaction in the modern world. The people's revolutionary organizations historically have developed extensive contacts with influential political forces in Western Europe and the United States—with the Socialist International; with many religious organizations, particularly Catholic ones; with liberal and bourgeois-radical circles in a number of countries; with the movement for real equal rights of racial minorities in the United States; and with the Irish Republican movement, which in turn has had political ties on both sides of the Atlantic for a long time. The people's revolutionary organizations in Latin America are often perceived by these circles as natural allies in the struggle against extreme reaction. The same thing may be said of relationships between the people's revolutionary forces and the national liberation movements in the Middle East. In addition to an objective similarity or historic continuity in the social base, the subjective prerequisites of these political alliances play an important role. They are not impeded by the powerful psychological barrier which separates the nationalists, reformists and bourgeois radicals from the communist movement for historical reasons, including the tremendous inertia of the anticommunist prejudices of the petty bourgeois masses.

This system of political alliances has served for several decades as the main support for democratic institutions in international relations and within individual capitalist countries. The initiators of the "crusade" against so-called international terrorism, for which they slanderously accuse the national liberation and people's revolutionary movements, seek to destroy it. The true organizers of state terrorism would like to politically smash and morally compromise not only the leftist forces, but that section of the bourgeoisie in their countries which object to social revenge and the export of counterrevolution for certain reasons. Implementation of these plans by reaction, even in part, would make the political atmosphere in the United States and Western Europe take an abrupt turn for the worse and could reinforce the real power of the extreme right circles for a long time. Under these conditions, defense of the revolutionary achievements of the people of Nicaragua and the struggle by people's revolutionary forces in El Salvador, Guatemala, Chile and other countries in Latin America is of tremendous

international importance. This struggle cannot be considered a source of international tension—on the contrary, it strengthens the positions of all those political forces which are standing up for peace and the democratic and social achievements of the working people on other continents.

Thus the people's revolutionary organizations in Latin America are fundamentally different not only from the petty bourgeois revolutionary elements in Europe, but from ultraleftists in the current sense as well. The latter express the revolutionary protest of those strata which exist as a popular force only at a specific, relatively low level of capitalist development. On the other hand, the social base of the people's revolutionary organizations is associated with the very nature of capitalism in the form in which it is possible in developing countries in the second half of the 20th century: with international division of labor between the imperialist centers and the dependent capitalist periphery. For this reason, it is natural that the people's revolutionary forces are playing an important role in the struggle for a progressive outcome of the crisis in the social development of Latin American countries. The shift by ultraleftists to the people's revolutionary positions prevails over the processes moving backward for the same reason. Assessment of individual political organizations must not be based on their past role, but on their role today and their possible role tomorrow in the struggle for social progress.

Latin American Marxist thinking is becoming more and more conscious of the fact that left radical and ultraleftist forces have "their own social support among the strata which constitute the majority in a dependent capitalist society."³⁴ The prospects of these forces as mass organizations may be related only to the revolutionary struggle against an exploitative system. Any other path leads to political death—the loss of a popular base right down its degeneration into worthless sects. This governing law fundamentally distinguishes the revolutionary nature of specific social communities which are shaped in the course of dependent capitalist development from the revolutionary nature of a petty bourgeois type.

This historical fact not only does not conflict with Marxism; on the contrary, it brilliantly reaffirms a number of its theses which have been underestimated for a long time. As correctly noted in the meeting between leaders of the CPSU and the Argentine Communist Party, the time has come to decisively overcome the stereotypes which have developed with respect to the shortcomings and weaknesses in a number of parts of the communist movement.³⁵

The principal danger for leftist forces in Latin America is not "ultraleftist deviation" but substitution of the strategic unity of leftist tactical alliances with bourgeois forces, which dooms the separate leftist parties to the role of "followers" in politics.³⁶

The participation by people's revolutionary ("left radical") organizations in shaping the vanguard of the liberation movement, as well as the shift by ultraleftists to the people's revolutionary positions—these are natural processes which have profound social causes. Lasting unity of the leftist forces in Latin America may be achieved not by the victory of one organization or movement or another over other ones, but on the basis of their collaboration with equal rights and by their rapprochement and amalgamation in the strategic long term.

Footnotes

1. Meeting between M. S. Gorbachev and (Athos Fava), PRAVDA, 4 March 1987.
2. See: S. A. Efirov, "Pokusheniye na budushchee" [Encroachment on the Future], Moscow, 1984, pp 113, 117; V. V. Vityuk, "Pod chuzhimi znamenami" [Under Foreign Colors], Moscow, 1985, pp 17-28; K. G. Myalo, "Two Stories About the Fate of 'Leftist' Terrorism," VOPROSY FILOSOFII, 1986, No 7, pp 163, 175, 166; and V. V. Vityuk and S. A. Efirov, "Levyy terrorizm na Zapade: istoriya i sovremenność" ["Leftist" Terrorism in the West: History and the Present], Moscow, 1987, pp 105-130.
3. See K. L. Maydanik, "The Problem of the Plurality and Unity of Leftist Forces," LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, No 6, 1988.
4. S. J. Handal, "The Power, Character and Path of the Revolution and the Unity of the Left," FUNDAMENTOS Y PERSPECTIVAS, El Salvador, 1982, No 4, p 37.
5. Ibid, p 40.
6. "Frente y acci"n de masas por la patria liberada y el socialismo. Informe del Comit Central del Partido Comunista al XVI Congreso" [The Front and Mass Action for a Free Country and Socialism. Report of the [Argentine] Communist Party Central Committee to the 16th Congress], Buenos Aires, 1986, p 10.
7. NUEVA ERA, Buenos Aires, No 2, 1986, p 16.
8. PROCESO, Mexico, No 540, 1987, pp 44-45.
9. See V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Works], Vol 26, pp 218-219.
10. Ibid, Vol 12, p 343.
11. "Fidel y la religi"n" [Fidel and Religion], Havana, 1985, p 236.
12. See V. I. Lenin, op. cit., Vol 1, pp 138-139.
13. See K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], Vol 8, p 208; V. I. Lenin, op. cit., Vol 4, pp 187-188; ibid, Vol 23, p 239.
14. V. I. Lenin, op. cit., Vol 10, p 59.
15. See V. I. Lenin, op. cit., Vol 45, pp 380-381.
16. Ibid, Vol 11, pp 45-46; Vol 33, pp 39-40.
17. "Razvivayushchiyesya strany v sovremennom mire. Puti revolyutsionnogo protsessa" [Developing Countries in the Modern World. Paths of the Revolutionary Process], Moscow, 1986, p 345.
18. F. Castro, "La historia me absolver" [History Will Absolve Me], Havana, 1973, pp 59-61; "Fidel and Religion," p 165.
19. S. J. Handal, op. cit., p 39.
20. See V. I. Lenin, op. cit., Vol 11, p 111.
21. Ibid, Vol 1, p 312.
22. Ibid, Vol 1, p 199.
23. See K. Marx and F. Engels, op. cit., Vol 7, pp 335-356.
24. V. I. Lenin, op. cit., Vol 45, p 380.
25. See LATINSKAYA AMERIKA No 5, 1987, p 26; V. L. Sheynis, "Developing Countries and the New Political Thinking," RABOCHIY KLASS I SOVREMENNYY MIR, No 4, 1987, p 88.
26. "Razvivayushchiyesya strany v sovremennom mire..." op. cit., p 126.
27. V. I. Lenin, op. cit., Vol 30, pp 1, 55.
28. FUNDAMENTOS Y PERSPECTIVAS, No 4, 1981, p 39.
29. See LATINSKAYA AMERIKA No 7, 1986, p 15.
30. NUEVA ERA No 12, 1986, p 13.
31. LATINSKAYA AMERIKA No 7, 1986, p 11.
32. V. I. Lenin, op. cit., Vol 14, pp 9-10.
33. Ibid, Vol 6, p 368.
34. S. J. Handal, op. cit., p 40.
35. PRAVDA, 4 March 1987.
36. NUEVA ERA, No 12, 1986, p 16.

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**Panamanian People's Party General Secretary
Interviewed**

*18070048 Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in
Russian No 9, Sep 88 pp 49-52*

[Interview with Ruben Dario Sousa, general secretary of the Panamanian People's Party Central Committee, under the "Contacts and Interviews" rubric: "This is the Will of the Panamanian People"; interview held in Panama City in April, but interviewer unidentified]

[Text] [Question] Comrade general secretary, what are the basic reasons for the crisis that the country is going through?

[Dario Sousa] The political nature of the crisis provoked by the United States in June 1987 amounts to a crisis of authority. At a certain point the United States decided to replace the current government which came to power in 1984 with another one—a puppet government.

Why did they decide to replace the government which they themselves had supported previously? Because the changes which were taking place in the world and in Latin America, especially the Central American conflict, and the emergence of revolutionary Nicaragua side by side with Cuba prompted the United States to undertake efforts to maintain its presence in Panama after the year 2000. The government formed in 1984 was the result of a compromise between the nationally inclined military and oligarchic circles: the latter were inclined toward an agreement with the United States, but their actions were restricted by the military, the supporters of strict implementation of the Torrijos-Carter agreement.

The United States decided to replace the present government with one that is more obedient, and to rid the armed forces of officers who were Torrijos followers and who are now headed by General Noriega. They unleashed a campaign against Noriega for this purpose, even bringing criminal charges against him. This was actually a trick, a pretext, to remove the officers that are nationally inclined and to form a government which would help in reaching the objectives set by the United States.

The United States needed internal political support to achieve them. They found them in the Panamanian oligarchy, which was prepared to carry out this role in exchange for acquiring absolute power and the economic wealth from the transfer of the canal zone to the Panamanian state and from the money which the United States could pay to extend its military presence. So after forgetting about the national interests, the oligarchy was prepared to play the role of the Panamanian agent of neocolonialism in the service of the United States. In order to destabilize the government of which Noriega is a part, a number of economic steps were taken which, in

the final analysis, delivered a blow to the capitalist system which they themselves had established here, including the International Financial Center. However, they did not take into account the fact that the problem is not with Noriega, but the national consciousness, and realization of this gives Noriega strength which enables him to withstand all the attacks of the oligarchy. And as the oligarchy has lost strength in this struggle, the face of the true culprit in the crisis, which is the U. S. Government, and the State Department in particular, has been revealed more and more clearly. They have not been able to achieve their goals yet. They have resorted to measures which have seriously damaged the economic system. Hence a whole range of problems are emerging which in turn complicate solution of the country's political crisis.

[Question] The United States says that it is not opposed to the Torrijos-Carter agreement and that it requires only General Noriega's departure.

[Dario Sousa] By their nature, the problems which Panama is experiencing do not have domestic causes, although they are also linked with the life of our country. This involves a situation stemming from the relationships between a superpower, the United States, and a small and dependent country such as Panama.

The United States wants to tie Panama to its globalist plans, that is, to use us as an instrument to achieve its goals. Noriega is an obstacle to our country's adaptation to the United States' requirements. So a problem has developed here. It may be stated that it will not disappear by any means with Noriega's removal; this is the will of the Panamanian people which Noriega expresses. The role of Panamanian nationalism is increasing, and General Noriega is the spokesman of this nationalism. So Noriega's departure could harm Panamanian nationalism even more. But this harm would be temporary, for the independent will of the Panamanian people will remain immutable. This will conflicts with the United States' interests, and the conflict will remain with or without Noriega.

[Question] What is your party's position with respect to the government of Manuel Solis Palma? How does the Panamanian People's Party assess the steps taken by this government to overcome the crisis?

[Dario Sousa] We believe that the assumption of power of Solis Palma's government was the answer to the U. S. attempts to remove General Noriega from his position with the help of former President Delvalle, who failed in his own political declarations, gave in to pressure from the State Department, and attempted to turn his government into a puppet regime.

The primary task facing the Solis Palma government at present is normalization of the situation in Panama. But the system has been given such a severe blow that normalization appears to be impossible with the same steps that were taken before the crisis.

The country cannot remain as it was. In our view, the consequences of the crisis have been of such magnitude that the government simply has not managed to begin solving the basic problems. It still has not been able to set a plan of actions, for the economic aggression has forced us to think first of all about our own survival.

Nevertheless, we believe that the government needs to form a clear view of the situation that has taken shape first and look not only for a way out of the state of emergency we have been in as the result of economic and military aggression, but ways of rebuilding the country which meet the demands of today. Time will be required for this. But we think that the government headed by Sol's Palma has taken a firm position toward the United States' dictates and the economic and military aggression. For this reason, while the government continues to maintain this position we will support it.

We also believe that reorganization of the cabinet is necessary to resolve the major problems and to ensure that the country moves forward on the path of national liberation.

[Question] How is the correlation of internal and external forces developing at this time?

[Dario Sousa] It is becoming clear that as imperialism has been forced to show its cards and its true intention—to remain in Panama, there has been a regrouping of internal forces with an obvious change in the nature of the problem which formed the dividing line between these forces. While the question in June 1987 concerned the struggle of civilian forces against militarism, it now concerns the nation's opposition to the United States' colonial claims. This struggle is intensifying as the American pressure increases. At the same time, the national consciousness of the Panamanian people is intensifying and the correlation of forces is changing more and more in favor of national interests and against the U. S. plans to remain here and use us for its neoglobalist aims.

The world public is also beginning to realize that the charges against Noriega are a pretext, that the United States is not disturbed by the moral aspect of the matter, and that it is pursuing purely material objectives, the goals of world domination by the largest imperialist power.

The world public is becoming more and more aware of what really is being set in motion by the United States in its aggression against such a small country, and the correlation of forces in the international arena is also changing in our favor for this reason.

[Question] The current crisis is one more landmark in the historical process of conflicts between the Panamanian nation and American imperialism. The previous clashes left deep impressions in Panamanian society and influenced the nature of the country's domestic and foreign policy, especially in the affirmation of national

dignity. In your view, how will the current crisis influence the future development of Panamanian society?

[Dario Sousa] The struggle being waged in Panama is an anticolonial struggle. Its goals are the establishment of an independent national state which fully exercises its sovereign rights and jurisdiction over all its territory and decides its own destiny independently and within the framework of generally accepted principles, a state whose right of self-determination is acknowledged.

On this basis, it becomes obvious that we are now breaching the gap in our colonial dependence on the United States. We do not expect to completely resolve the problem of dependence at the present historic moment. Nevertheless, we are freeing ourselves from a decisive factor such as colonial dependence in our national life, which in turn will improve the prospects for further development.

The objective of the anticolonial struggle in Panama is as follows: to consolidate an independent national state and to make it democratic in nature, with the broad participation of the people and a social policy which has nothing in common with monetarist concepts.

These are the communists' objectives and proposals.

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U. S. Nicaraguan Policy Criticized
18070048 Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 9, Sep 88 pp 58-68

[Article by P. P. Syutkin under the "Reports" rubric: "Esquipulas-II in the Mirror of American Propaganda"]

[Text] The Guatemala agreements signed in August 1987 were an important impetus in the effort to settle the tense situation in Central America. Sandinist Nicaragua was the first to set about implementing the peace plan. The success of regional agreements depends to a considerable extent on the direction in which events develop in this country. For many years the situation in Nicaragua and surrounding it has continued to be the subject of sharp ideological disputes, which is explained by the unique nature of the Sandinist revolution on both a theoretical and a practical plane. Conclusion of the Guatemala agreements became a distinctive development of the existing revolutionary pattern, amplifying it with new forms of relations with the opposition.

The peace plan proposed by Costa Rican President Oscar Arias received broad international support. Not wishing to remain in isolation, the United States formally approved it. However, the administration made it clear here that it did not intend to give up its support for the contras and would make every effort to push through the basic provisions of its own regional plan.¹ They

realized in Washington that the position taken by the White House might exert considerable influence on the fate of the signed agreements. For this reason, in order to refrain from public criticism of the Arias plan, the American tactic was to impose their interpretation of its points in the course of future talks and consultations, making them unacceptable to Managua.

This is why the initial negative reaction to the Guatemala agreements began to be actively utilized by Washington in its propaganda later on. And it directed its main reproaches for nonobservance of the plan precisely at the Sandinists.² The American mass media most often disregarded or devoted extremely little attention to the flagrant violations of the agreement in El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala. This bias is easily explainable.

Washington's strategic objective stands out more and more clearly today—to make use of the plan put forth by the Costa Rican president as a means of weakening Nicaragua.³ And the United States does not have to pay with the inevitable political damage, unlike the alternative with direct military intervention.

These same objectives were pursued by many statements in the American mass media. Thus, an analysis of the agreement's implementation over the first 3 months made in THE NEW YORK TIMES corresponded exactly with the press releases of the U. S. State Department's Office of Public Diplomacy [sic]. In a review on 8 November, correspondent J. (Lemoyne) does not mention either the policy of the United States or its Central American allies. All the attention was devoted to one matter: the Sandinists' decision to begin talks with the contras through the mediation of Cardinal Obando y Bravo. This step, the newspaper points out, is an important victory for the United States, since their proteges thereby acquire the status of a "legitimate belligerent force." The conclusion drawn by the author is that "the pressure is bearing fruit, and we should continue to exert it."⁴

THE WASHINGTON POST left a page for (W. Brannigan) for a similar commentary. He expressed satisfaction with "the progress made" in Nicaragua, where President Ortega "agreed to hold direct talks with the contras," thereby making it apparent that "the Sandinists evidently have decided to carry out the basic provisions of the agreements." But "of course there is a long road ahead" to implementation of the agreements, inasmuch as "the Sandinists still have not declared a general amnesty and have not ended the state of emergency."⁵ Apart from the reproaches against Nicaragua that have been mentioned, (W. Brannigan) sees no other problems that were brought to light during that period. And not a word about the U. S. actions to undermine the agreements, the violation of their basic provisions by El Salvador and Honduras, and the problem of American military aid to the contras. It was not reported on the pages of THE NEW YORK TIMES that Nicaragua had

offered a long time ago to deport foreign military advisers and come to an agreement on verifiable security guarantees—actions which were successfully blocked by Washington.

The examples cited characterize the approach by some of the U. S. mass media to the problem of a regional settlement quite clearly. Following this, propaganda materials accent the events which blend with the American conception of the Guatemala agreement and on the other hand, carefully avoid everything that conflicts with it to the slightest extent.

Recently Washington has been provoking the Sandinists in every possible way to aggravate relations for precisely this purpose. The administration sent Secretary of Education William Bennett, Jeane Kirkpatrick and a number of other contra supporters (David (Horowitz), Ronald (Redosh) and others) to Nicaragua, where they publicly condemned the Sandinists and praised the counterrevolutionaries. Their statements were widely interpreted in LA PRENSA as well. "It is impossible to explain to many Nicaraguans," the newspaper BARRICADA wrote in this connection, "why these persons speak about the lack of freedom in a country where they are able to express such fantasies about its social system in complete freedom."⁶

At a time when the Nicaraguan Government seeks to establish conditions to bring about peace in the region, the policy of the U. S. Administration is aimed at securing springboards for counterrevolution within the country. And this is being done on the basis of the freedoms granted in conformity with the Guatemala agreements. The opponents of a settlement are acting right away in several directions: they are disseminating assurances that the peace plan will not be implemented by Managua, and at the same time they are exerting pressure on Central American countries with the aid of propaganda methods for the purpose of wrecking these agreements.

As a pretext for the new propaganda offensive, the United States has been using statements by Roger Miranda, a former officer in the Sandinist People's Army who fled Nicaragua, concerning a plan allegedly worked out by his country for an attack against Costa Rica. The deserter's testimony gave the State Department the opportunity to draw the conclusion that "the Sandinists are extremely cynical in their approach to implementation of the Guatemala agreements."⁷

Referring to statements by Nicaraguan Minister of Defense H. Ortega, reports appeared in the American press that the republic intends to bring the strength of the regular army, the reserve and the militia up to 600,000 men by 1995. This thesis has been actively utilized in speeches by many representatives of the administration and the military. Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega resolutely refuted this information in an interview with THE WASHINGTON POST. "We are speaking about

all our people learning how to hold a weapon in their hands to defend the country, not about creating an army of 600,000, since there is no point to it,"⁸ he stressed.

American propaganda is spreading quite a few fabrications about "the Soviet military presence" in Nicaragua as well. The U. S. mass media and officials have repeatedly made statements about "the possibility of an increase in the Soviet military presence in Nicaragua." The MIAMI HERALD published an interview with the deputy assistant secretary of defense for inter-American affairs, Robert Pastorino, who stated: "Moscow yearns to obtain access to objectives in Nicaragua and is waiting only for the moment when it believes that the United States will not begin reacting energetically and firmly."⁹ At the same time, the entire tone of the material has made it clear that very specific actions by the United States are implied by such reaction—a kind of new variation of the "Libyan" affair.

The Soviet Union's position on this question is clear: "The USSR has no military or political plans with respect to this region," M. S. Gorbachev stressed during his meeting with Uruguayan President J. M. Sanguinetti, "and this topic has never come up in our relations with the Nicaraguan leaders."¹⁰

Then what was the purpose of the many reports from journalists and administration officials? It seems that there were several reasons for the publication of such materials.

First of all, American journalists have been taking part, deliberately or not, in a distinctive sounding of public opinion on the most critical foreign policy questions. The bulk of the articles devoted to analysis of the military aspects of the situation in the region have been based on "leaks" of information from official circles. It is worth mentioning that such "leaks" may have been organized especially to inspire the appearance of an article or a broadcast on a given topic. The reaction of public opinion to a possible government move is thereby brought to light and arguments in favor of it are "smoothed out" and finally polished.

Secondly, materials of this type help in many respects in getting the American public to subconsciously consent to U. S. participation in attempts to destroy the achievements of the Sandinist revolution. The reports systematically appearing in the mass media about the administration's plans in Central America force the average American to resign himself to the fact that a given course of events is unavoidable and has already been predetermined. The repetition of subjects on this theme again and again helps to make the population accustomed to the possibility of American intervention.

In a similar context, the likelihood of a leak of false information as part of a well-thought-out propaganda system is not ruled out, either. There have been many examples of that in the past. Material published in the

MIAMI HERALD in 1986 concerning an alleged foreign air observation center in Nicaragua, which was categorically denied by this country's official representatives, blends well within the framework of such a campaign.¹¹

The propagandist methods cited are being actively utilized by newspapers, radio and television in the United States. But after conclusion of the Guatemala agreements, the accent is not being put on them, all the same. The American mass media's main attention is directed at analyzing the Sandinist Government's implementation of points in the peace plan and the commitments made on democratization of the country.

One of the main accusations by U. S. propaganda with respect to the lack of democracy in Nicaragua was the ban on publication of the newspaper LA PRENSA. Many fabrications on its fate appeared repeatedly in the press. Though it painstakingly avoided mentioning that LA PRENSA was closed on 26 June 1986, the day after the U. S. Congress passed an appropriation of 100 million dollars in military aid to the contras.

The American Administration unquestionably hoped to bring about the censorship of LA PRENSA. In the misinformation campaign aimed against the Sandinists, there was probably no other one element which could exert such a strong influence on the American public, the press, and the legislators. Realizing how valuable a propaganda weapon that LA PRENSA was, the White House saw to it that the newspaper openly received funds after Congress banned—or intended to ban—covert operations against Nicaragua.

At the same time, the fact that from January 1985 until it was closed LA PRENSA received money from the National Fund to Support Democracy, a U. S. Government organization which provides assistance to "democratic institutions" in other states,¹² was passed over in silence, naturally. Essentially, the U. S. Government was controlling the opposition press organ in a country against which it was conducting an undeclared war.

The newspaper was practically openly financing the counterrevolution and supported its attacks on the Sandinist regime. The very fact that it was allowed to operate was unprecedented. It is being issued once again now, and its antigovernment policy is being maintained as before. Nicaragua has neutralized one of the United States' important propaganda trump cards. As (Bayardo) Arce, a member of the national leadership of the FSLN [Sandinist National Liberation Front], stated, "LA PRENSA's publication of statements by leaders of the counterrevolution are a violation of the republic's laws. And if they are not applied to it, it is only because we want to bring about a positive reaction from the opposition."¹³

In order to assess the significance of this step by the Nicaraguan authorities, we also have to take into account the coordination of efforts between LA

PRENSA and the activity of foreign radio and television broadcasting to the country. Moreover, the "Católica" radio station, the mouthpiece for the most conservative views of the church leadership, resumed its broadcasts on 2 October 1987.

Another situation involving freedom of the press has taken shape in the Central American states that are allies of Washington. Thus, the independent newspapers LA CRONICA and EL INDEPENDIENTE existed at one time in El Salvador. They were not financed from abroad and they did not openly espouse antigovernment positions. However, one of them was closed after a series of raids on its premises and attempts to kill an employee. The editor of the other newspaper and his assistant were killed by agents of the security service. Do the Salvadoran authorities intend to resume publication of these organs? Of course not, but most of the attention in the propaganda campaign is devoted precisely to LA PRENSA. Meanwhile, the U. S. government's propaganda is assuring world public opinion that Duarte "has given the rebels free access to the press" and that "America's support for the elected government of El Salvador has been crowned with success."¹⁴

The granting of amnesty for opponents of the regime was a point of no less importance in the Guatemala agreements. The question of whether Nicaragua will agree to release all the so-called "political prisoners," including former soldiers in Somoza's National Guard, has assumed particular importance—this has become a leading topic in the American press.

Nicaragua has adopted a decree on amnesty which is close to the conditions formulated in the agreements, with the exception of the state of siege which has remained in force temporarily. It was announced that it will be maintained until subversive actions against the republic are discontinued. This position was recognized as legitimate by the International Commission to Verify and Monitor Implementation of the Guatemala Agreements. Such a conclusion was disadvantageous for propaganda purposes, however. Accordingly, the American press devoted no attention to it and played down the significance of this report in every way possible. And the commission itself was disbanded altogether soon afterward under U. S. pressure.¹⁵

Meanwhile, the Nicaraguan amnesty declared in early 1987 was expanded after an agreement was signed. The American mass media speak of 8,000 to 10,000 "political prisoners." However, the public organization "Americas Watch" pointed out in a recent detailed survey that these figures were largely fabricated.¹⁶

According to a statement by T. Borge, the amnesty was extended to all those who were convicted of the charge of violating the law on civil security. But the minister stressed that it does not apply to roughly 2,000 members of the disbanded National Guard who were arrested after

the revolution in 1979.¹⁷ However, as dialogue with the opposition is developed, amnesty will be extended to this category of individuals as well.

As far as the other countries which signed the peace plan in Guatemala are concerned, implementation of this point is far from complete. In El Salvador, the Duarte government declared an amnesty which THE NEW YORK TIMES praised as "a most specific step toward observance of a regional peace agreement," since Duarte now had "released nearly all political prisoners." The newspaper compared this step with the Sandinists' refusal to observe the agreement, except for adopting "experimental and reluctant measures."¹⁸ But the Salvadoran amnesty, which was resolutely opposed by legal protection organizations, trade unions and the church, removed even the remote possibility that persons guilty of the assassination and torture of opposition figures would be punished. In Guatemala, the authorities also used the amnesty to release many soldiers involved in human rights violations. But after all, the Arias plan provided for the adoption of decrees on amnesty "which outline the steps to guarantee the inviolability of all aspects of the people's lives and freedom, material welfare, and security."

An important place in the settlement process was to have been played by the commissions for national reconciliation. In Nicaragua, this commission, formed in August 1987, was headed by Cardinal Obando y Bravo, one of the regime's most frank and prominent critics. In El Salvador, Alvaro (Magaña), a conservative banker who was a presidential candidate in 1982, became the head of the commission. It is worth mentioning that this is far from the best candidate for a dialogue with the revolutionary democratic opposition. Perhaps this is why the American press passed over this fact in silence, as well as Honduras' failure to assign even a symbolic reconciliation commission. After protests in the country, President José Azcona finally named a commission 2 days before the end of the period, 3 November 1987, but it was reported soon afterward that it would serve "only to meet the requirements of the agreements."¹⁹

The American mass media's widespread campaign against Nicaragua brought certain results. The country's leadership was forced to go far beyond the limits of the agreement after rejecting the condition of simultaneous action—the basis of a peaceful settlement. "The genius of the Arias plan," THE NEW YORK TIMES stressed, "is that it offers a means for Nicaragua to make up with its neighbors without giving the impression that it is submitting to Washington,"²⁰ but not the requirement for simultaneous action, which had been so noisily publicized as the "brilliant feature" of this plan before it began to be undermined.

At the same time, the attempt by some of the U. S. mass media to portray the FSLN's realistic policy as a line of concessions and the Guatemala agreements themselves as a certain "trap" for the Sandinists is groundless. Many

facts indicate that the Sandinist front is not afraid to extend democracy or intensify the ideological struggle. The committee for national reconciliation has functioning in the country for several months now. The revolutionary government is holding talks with the contra leaders. However, as Nicaraguan Vice President Sergio Ramírez stressed in his speech, the ultrarightist forces are taking advantage of the political freedom to unleash "ideological terrorism" in the country.²¹

One of the most critical problems, which aroused bitter disputes, was discussion of the United States' support for the Nicaraguan contras. And conclusion of the Guatemala agreements gave this problem new political and ideological shadings. Thus the U. S. Administration evidently was not interested in having the debates on providing assistance to the counterrevolutionaries locked within the framework of juridical argumentation about whether the Sandinists had carried out all the provisions of the peace plan. Instead of this, the U. S. representatives spoke in support of maintaining the contras as an effective fighting force, which would supposedly guarantee the "permanent nature" of reforms in Nicaragua.

The purpose of this propaganda direction is to "adapt" articles of the peace agreement to their plans. The fact that information on the increased number of cargo flights for the contras has been hushed up practically completely is significant in this sense; they undermine what the agreement called an "integral element" in the peace: namely, the discontinuation of support in any form for "irregular formations."²²

A survey of the major mass media in the United States indicates that they have examined these facts only in a few phrases. THE NEW YORK TIMES, which did not say a word about such an important matter for 3 months, quoted statements by D. Ortega and A. Calero on 12 November 1987 with respect to the delivery of air cargo for the contras. The newspaper reports mentioned only "flights for observation purposes," which, although a violation of international law, were supposedly much less serious.²³

Aspects such as this which are disadvantageous for the administration are hushed up because they demonstrate the United States' real role, first of all. In the second place, because they disprove the fabrications about a certain "symmetry" between the contras in Nicaragua and the rebels in El Salvador. As a result, American propaganda's basic objective during this period was to attribute all violations of the agreement to the Sandinists and give the U. S. allies the opportunity not to observe its basic provisions.

Regrouping in the rebel leadership also contributed to this to a large extent. The object of this was to reduce criticism of support for the contras and to bring to the

forefront as civilian leaders those rebels and representatives of the bourgeois opposition who were less compromised by collaboration with Somoza.²⁴ From the viewpoint of American propaganda, the contras appear completely different now. After the resignations in recent months, they supposedly cannot be accused by anyone of being a band of former Somoza guardsmen. On the contrary, the directorate includes such figures as Adolfo Robelo (who, together with D. Ortega and S. Ramírez, was part of the first Nicaraguan Government formed after the dictatorship was overthrown); Pedro Joaquín Chamorro, Jr (the son and heir of the former manager of the newspaper LA PRENSA); Violetta Barrios de Chamorro, who also was part of the government after the revolution; and (Asusena) Ferr, a member of the Social Christian Party who lived in Managua until May 1987 and collaborated with the legal opposition.²⁵

But the bands of Somozists supported by the United States, who are conducting a war not so much against the government as against their own people, are hiding beyond the field of vision of those who oppose the Sandinists as before. Their activity is being actively utilized in Washington's propaganda pressure on Managua. So if the contras obstruct negotiations with the government once and for all at U. S. insistence, this will confirm the "obstinacy" of the Sandinists. If Nicaragua attempts to prevent the American authorities from openly financing the reactionary press, this will be presented as proof of unlawful action. The government's measures to restore the economy destroyed as the result of military actions and the economic blockade may also be regarded in the same way. Essentially, Nicaragua may be accused of any feature which makes it different from the "image" pleasing to Washington.

By declaring Nicaragua's efforts aimed at neutralizing the many actions to undermine the republic to be a violation of promises, proving that "the Sandinists cannot be trusted," the United States is preparing the ground for new attempts to impose its conditions for a regional settlement.

The objective of the extensive propaganda campaigns by the White House is to frustrate implementation of the Guatemala agreements or at least to significantly weaken the effectiveness of the agreements, thereby justifying implementation of its own policy in Central America.

Footnotes

1. THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, New York, 28 September 1987.
2. LE MONDE, Paris, 26 January 1988.
3. Ibid.
4. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 8 September 1987.
5. THE WASHINGTON POST, 18 January 1988.

6. BARRICADA, Managua, 20 September 1987.
7. BARRICADA, 13 December 1987.
8. THE WASHINGTON POST, December 1987.
9. MIAMI HERALD, 8 November 1987.
10. PRAVDA, 23 March 1988.
11. MIAMI HERALD, 16 June 1986.
12. See San Francisco BAY GUARDIAN, 20 May 1987.
13. BARRICADA, 19 December 1987.
14. THE WASHINGTON POST, 7 February 1988.
15. THE NEW STATESMAN, London, 18 February 1988.
16. ZETA, Boston, No 1, 1988.
17. BARRICADA, 11 December 1987.
18. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 6 November 1987.
19. ZETA, No 1, 1988.
20. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 31 January 1988.
21. BARRICADA, 2 March 1988.
22. BARRICADA, 6 November 1987.
23. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 12 November 1987.
24. L'ESPRESSO, Rome, 30 August 1987; see also: I. M. Bulichev, "The Contras: The War of the Doomed," LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, No 1, 1988.
25. L'ESPRESSO, 30 August 1987.

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IMEMO Book on Neocolonialism Reviewed
18070048 Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 9, Sep 88 pp 124-126

[Review by L. L. Klochkovskiy of book "Neokolonializm—sushchnost, formy, metody" [Neocolonialism: Its Essential Nature, Forms and Methods] by unidentified specialists of the IMEMO AN SSSR [World Economics and International Relations Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences], Moscow, "Nauka," 1987, 272 pages]

[Text] One of the current objectives of Marxist researchers is to study relationships between the centers of

capitalism and its periphery and analyze the evolution of imperialism's policy in the developing world. A thorough examination of neocolonialism as a system of inequitable economic, political, military and other relationships imposed on developing countries by the states of developed capitalism is particularly important. A monograph prepared by a group of specialists who are staff members of the IMEMO AN SSSR makes an important contribution to the study of this problem.

The authors set a twofold objective for themselves: to generalize the features of neocolonialism, as well as to bring to light and analyze the new phenomena in this complex and contradictory combination of international relationships. The work's main emphasis is on revealing the essential economic nature of neocolonialism, and particular attention is devoted to matters which have not received the necessary interpretation thus far—neocolonialism's influence on intensification of the conflicts in the world capitalist economy and on the reproduction process and evolution of the socioeconomic structure of countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

The authors unquestionably deserve credit for elaborating the features of the basic categories of the capitalist production method which make up the whole complex of neocolonialism's economic relationships. The theoretical generalizations concerning the neocolonial relationships of ownership, the basic features of the neocolonialist division of labor, and the specific nature of neocolonialist distribution and exchange make it possible to better understand the complex reproductive mechanism which links the centers and the periphery of the world capitalist economy.

The work throws light on the strategy of international monopoly capital aimed at keeping the developing countries within the world capitalist system and intensifying their economic exploitation. The authors note that these objectives are achieved by spreading and stimulating capitalist production relationships (in the form of dependent capitalism) and by modernizing the economic structure and public relationships. Neocolonialism develops its own social support in developing countries—the national private business circles closely linked with international capital, as well as the bureaucratic bourgeoisie. By orienting themselves toward a lasting alliance with imperialism and identifying themselves with the strategy of neocolonialism, these circles often exert a decisive influence on the economic policy of developing countries' governments and push them toward concessions and compromises which conflict with their national interests.

Although no chapters in the book have been devoted to the specific nature of economic neocolonialism in individual regions of the developing world, the authors provide a great deal of interesting factual material which characterizes the situation in a number of countries and regions. Considerable attention is devoted to Latin America, where the methods of economic neocolonialism are utilized most extensively.

The monograph devotes considerable space to a description of the positions held by TNK's [transnational corporations] in the Latin American region; more than half of all the direct investments by international monopolies in the developing world are made there and over 40 percent of all their branches are located there. An analysis of the evolution of methods used by the TNK's to exploit the natural resources and manpower of Latin America is of considerable interest. In particular, according to estimates provided in the work, up to 30 percent of all industrial workers in the major Latin American countries are employed at enterprises of the TNK's. As a rule, the international monopolies concentrate their best people at their enterprises, which allows for higher wages, opportunities to increase skills, and prestige considerations. There are many negative aspects to the other side of this policy of the TNK's—the working class is split and its privileged leaders are isolated, the positions of the economy's national sector are undermined, the sectorial structure is deformed, and opportunities to resolve problems associated with strengthening economic independence are limited.

The work devotes an important place to the effect of the latest neocolonialist means for interfering in the development of "Third World" countries, primarily the lever of debt. Latin American states, which are among the largest debtors in the developing world, are the objects of their harshest pressure. The authors provide a generalized analysis of the stabilizing programs imposed on the Latin American debtors by the IMF. The latter, by being an intermediary in negotiations to refinance the foreign debt, seeks to have countries in the region, like many other developing states, reduce budget expenditures for their economic and social needs, cut back the state sector, grant additional preferences and concessions to foreign capital, devalue their national currency, abolish state control over domestic prices, and so forth.

The current stage of development is characterized by imperialism's attempts to shift to a counteroffensive against the important gains made by the peoples of developing states in their persistent struggle for economic freedom. This is manifested primarily in the intensification of all forms of neocolonialist exploitation. At the same time, the authors draw attention to objective factors which attest to the fact that neocolonialism is an obstacle to economic and social progress not only on the periphery of the world capitalist economy, but in its centers as well. The gaps in the levels of development and the continuing neocolonial exploitation prevent the developing countries from being included in the world capitalist system, which is necessary to achieve stability in international production relationships and to expand the world capitalist market. Accordingly, the acceleration of economic growth and the formation of a system of productive forces in developing countries which meets the interests of capitalism become an internal requirement for development of the world capitalist economy. These important conclusions are in keeping with the way the fundamental question is

put in recent party documents: whether it is possible for the capitalist system to manage without neocolonialism, without unequal exchange with the "Third World." They can serve as the basis for further scientific, theoretical and practical study of this problem.

As with any major work, the monograph being reviewed is not without its individual shortcomings. Certain theses, especially those involving analysis of the latest trends, need more extensive argumentation and substantiation. Not all of the authors' conclusions are indisputable, particularly the conclusion that the West had managed to completely solve the problem of energy resources for its economy by the mid-1980s (p 213). Nevertheless, the monograph will become an important basis for further study of the problems of modern neocolonialism.

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**Soviet Committee for Solidarity With Latin American Peoples Sponsors Latin America Day
18070048 Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 9, Sep 88 pp 131-136**

[Report by T. L. Panteleyeva under the rubric "In the Solidarity Committee": "Latin America Day in Moscow"]

[Excerpt] Work has been in full swing in the park since morning. Sombreros embroidered with gold, snow-white cottons, and the bright shades of sarapes have been flashing against the background of the first greenery of spring in Moscow. In a few hours, "the favorite resting place for Muscovites and visitors to the capital," as the guidebooks call the Central Park of Culture and Rest imeni M. Gorkiy, was to be transformed into a small piece of Latin America. It was decided to hold the day of friendship and solidarity with the peoples of the continent on 15 May—it was not cold, and the students' term had not yet begun. But after all, it was the intent of the holiday's organizers that the main participants would be the youth, the ones who are fascinated by the romance of the remote continent and want to know more about it, and those who can describe their native lands as no others can—the Latin American students.

But first, about the holiday's organizers. They gathered in the chilly days of the waning winter in the Soviet Committee for Solidarity with Latin American Peoples (SKSNLA)—representatives of the AUCCTU and the Committee of Youth Organizations, the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and the Latin America Institute, the All-Union Council on Foreign Students Affairs and managers of the TsPKiO [Central Park of Culture and Rest], workers of the Oktyabrskiy Rayon committee of the party, representatives of the press, and members of the "Grenada" musical ensemble.

Latin America Day—a wide-ranging, lively and unusual holiday—is to be held for the first time in our country! Without exception, everyone was fascinated by the idea—after all, the interest and sincere sympathies for the peoples of Latin American countries are not just words for Soviet people. How many students are working during their summer vacations in the Nicaragua relief fund! How many schoolchildren enthusiastically prepare their "solidarity fairs," and how many young workers are wearing badges with Che Guevara's picture on their work clothes! How many Soviet people turn up their television a little louder when the outlines of the vast Andes, the contours of the Amazon and Tierra del Fuego, the pyramids in Mexico or the Argentine pampas appear on the screen! The locations of clubs of international friendship which bear the names of the heroes, public figures and thinkers of Latin America are widespread: Gomel, Izhevsk, Moscow, Saratov...

So the idea of a holiday where the friends of Latin America could meet and Latin Americans could feel at home literally was in the air. But the path of an idea from "being in the air" to its realization can be a very long one. And how many wonderful ideas have died altogether because of sluggishness, bureaucratism, and simply the lack of desire to work among the employees of different departments! But what is characteristic of this day is that a great deal that appeared to be impracticable yesterday is now becoming work that is lively and interesting. Restructuring, which has touched all aspects of Soviet life, has affected the activity of public organizations as well. At the recent plenum of the Soviet Committee for Solidarity with the Latin American Peoples, words expressing the need to make our work more active, search for new forms of it, and reach out to the broad masses of society were heard. Words? But on the next day preparations were begun for the first holiday for Latin America in our country, in which the solidarity committee became the "pioneer." [passage omitted]

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Growing Ties of West European Social Democrats in Region Viewed

18070176c Moscow RABOCHIY KLASS I

SOVREMENNYY MIR in Russian

No 3, May-Jun 88 (signed to press 30 May 88) pp 28-40

[Article by Emil Surenovich Dabagyan, candidate of historical sciences, leading scientific associate of the USSR Academy of Sciences Latin America Institute: "Latin American Social Democracy and the Socialist International: New Stage of Relations"]

[Text] An important period in relations between European and Latin American parties of a social democratic persuasion culminated in 1986. The process of mutual rapprochement which had shown through in the mid-1960s attained its high point.

Since the time the Socialist International was founded (1951) these relations have undergone three stages in their development. Each of them has its own specific features, of course.

The first stage (1951-1966) was an extremely low level of relations. The Socialist International paid practically no in any way significant attention to Latin American countries and was oriented exclusively toward a small group of noninfluential organizations (the socialist parties of Argentina and Uruguay), which were attempting mechanically, without regard for the specific-historical conditions, to introduce social democratic theories and concepts in Latin America. Latin American parties were present at Socialist International congresses mainly as guests and observers.

The second stage (1966-1976) was a significant expansion and intensification of mutual contacts and relations brought about by two main factors. On the one hand a process of the social democratization of mass and influential national-reformist parties of the Latin American continent (the Democratic Action Party [Venezuela], the Dominican Revolutionary Party, the National Liberation Party [Costa Rica], the Peruvian Aprista Party) was under way. Endeavoring to adapt to the socioeconomic and political changes, they began to display great interest in the theory and practice of European social democracy, adopted its fundamental ideological and political concepts and attempted to find support for their activity outside of the Western Hemisphere. Under the changed conditions the ideologists of national reformism, urging continuation of the reformist policy, referred not only to the specifics of Latin America, as had been the case in the past, but appealed also to the experience of the European states in which social democratic parties had implemented a number of social reforms.¹ At the 10th congress of the Socialist International in 1966 some Latin American parties were admitted to it with observer status.

On the other hand, a painful process of a reassessment of values and reorientation was under way at the heart of the Socialist International, and a tendency to move beyond the framework of the "old" continent, surmount a kind of "Eurocentrism" complex and turn its gaze to the "third world" had emerged.

The third stage (1976-1986) was the conversion of Latin American parties into an organic part of international social democracy and their complete integration within the Socialist International framework. Affiliated with it also were parties and movements which had taken shape in the middle-latter half of the 1970s and which had immediately declared their devotion to the ideals of social democracy: the Democratic Socialist Party of Guatemala, the National Revolutionary Movement (El Salvador), the Democratic Left Party (Ecuador), the Democratic Trabalhista Party (Brazil) and the Working People's Alliance (Guyana). Simultaneously with W.

Brandt's assumption of the leadership in 1976 the Socialist International turned its face decisively toward the "third world"; a new strategic policy in respect of the developing states was formulated and came to be implemented for the purpose of incorporating them in the orbit of its influence and ultimately exerting an influence on the ideological and political processes unfolding in the countries of Latin America, Africa and Asia. The culmination of this stage was a Socialist International congress (17th) held for the first time in Latin America. It took place in the Peruvian capital of Lima in 1966.

Ideological and Political Foundations of the New Strategy

The growth of the role of the developing countries in the modern world has confronted today's leaders of the Socialist International with the need to formulate a new strategic course and revise the conceptual bases of the approach to these countries.

At the present time, as distinct from the recent past, the ideologists of the Socialist International see the developing countries—or, as they prefer to call them, "third world" countries—as an inalienable component of the world capitalist system, within whose framework the Socialist International parties operate. The present leaders of this international organization recognize that the developing countries occupy a subordinate position and are an object of exploitation. This position, they believe, cannot be considered normal and serves as a source of tension and could lead to the destabilization of the capitalist system.

A most important task of the Socialist International is helping "third world" countries achieve an equal position within the framework of the capitalist system. For this purpose the West should agree to a partial revision of relations with the "third world," satisfy the developing countries' just demands and even forgo some of their immediate interests in the name of the "harmonious" functioning of the entire system.

The present leaders of the Socialist International are attempting to transfer the social democratic model of relations between exploiters and exploited within individual capitalist countries to the sphere of interstate relations. W. Brandt wrote: "If the peoples of the 'third world' are treated the same way as hard-headed capitalists in the past treated the workers, a confrontation between the hungry and the satisfied nations, which could ultimately lead to war, will be inevitable" (source 2, 12 December 1977, p 8).

In the opinion of ideologists of the Socialist International, the conflict between the two groups of countries is moving to the forefront compared with class antagonisms within individual states, is distinguished by great seriousness and demands immediate solution. "Today," M. Soares said, "there is also something more important than the division into classes within a country: the

division into exploiter countries and the third and fourth world countries, which are the exploited countries" (source 3, 1980, No 48, p 115).

The Socialist International has actively supported the demand put forward by the developing countries for the establishment of a new international economic order, and this demand has been incorporated in fundamental documents of the Socialist International and the decisions and resolutions of congresses and conferences held under the aegis thereof.

At the same time it would be a mistake to think that the problem of the relations of these two groups of states disturbs the leaders of the Socialist International independently of other processes of a world scale. It is essentially a question of preventing the possible transition of these countries to a noncapitalist development path. French socialist leader F. Mitterrand has spoken candidly in this connection: "To keep the poor unstable countries from ending up in the Soviet camp," he said, "we must help them, and not isolate and ignore them" (source 2, 10 August 1981, p 25).

The Socialist International assigns Latin America an important place in its global strategy, regarding this continent as the most promising for the spread and introduction of the ideas of "democratic socialism". In the opinion of Socialist International ideologists, Latin America is by virtue of an aggregate of heterogeneous factors—economic, political, social, cultural and so forth—prepared to a greater extent than Asia and Africa for the perception of social democratic concepts.

The main features of the Socialist International's new approach to Latin America amount to the following: first, the center of gravity in the orientation toward Latin American parties has shifted—mass national-reformist parties with strong roots and considerable influence in a whole number of countries have become its main support; second, mutual relations with Latin American parties are not conditioned by ideological features, and an interest in cooperation with any parties prepared to enter into contact on a most limited range of issues even is being demonstrated; third, the peculiar dualism and eclecticism in the ideological doctrines and political practice of Latin American parties, that is, the combination of social democratic theories and "third world" concepts, is being encouraged in every possible way, and there is an endeavor, the originality of the reformist parties being preserved, at the same time to make them the conduits of social democratic ideas; fourth, a policy aimed at rapprochement with parties whose ideological positions are far from social democratic is being pursued and an endeavor to pull left, revolutionary-democratic parties into its orbit is being manifested.

In appealing to leaders of political parties and organizations and broad Latin American public circles the leaders of the Socialist International invariably emphasize the particular features of the new strategic course. W.

Brandt said at the start of the 1980s: the mere fact that the Socialist International adheres to certain ideological and political principles "should not prevent a strengthening of relations with parties and movements in any part of the world which could and would like to go a good part of the way with us" (source 3, 1981, No 53, p 176). Developing this idea, B. Kreisky observed: "There are in Asian, African and Latin American countries popular movements and parties which could support contacts with European social democrats without the need for strict subordination to the International's charter" (source 3, 1981, No 53, p 176).

The elaboration and realization in practice of the new policy of the Socialist International have contributed to a considerable extent to the growth of its authority and influence in this part of the world. The majority of Latin American political leaders of a reformist persuasion linked the change in the Socialist International's policy with the assumption of the leadership thereof of such figures as W. Brandt, B. Kreisky, O. Palme and others. Particularly high in Latin America is the prestige of W. Brandt, many people being impressed by his antifascist past, personal contribution to the elaboration of the FRG's new Ostpolitik and so forth.

Thus was the aggregate of objective and subjective factors which predetermined the ideological and organizational-political rapprochement of the Socialist International and European social democracy and many parties of the Latin American continent created.

From Caracas to Lima

A most important landmark in the process of the development of relations between European and Latin American social democracy was the conference of socialist, social democratic and related parties of Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean convened in May 1976 in Caracas at the initiative of the Venezuelan Democratic Action Party and the SPD.

This was an exceptional forum of its kind in which the representatives of 24 parties from 22 countries participated. They included W. Brandt, B. Kreisky and M. Soares and also leading figures of Socialist International parties from France, Sweden, Britain, Spain and a number of other European states. The representation of Latin American countries was very extensive also: delegations of 15 parties from 13 countries arrived for the conference.

"For International Democratic Solidarity"—such was the slogan of the conference. Its participants confirmed their devotion to "democratic socialism". The resolutions and the speeches condemned the military-dictatorial regimes in Latin America and spoke of the need for an intensification of the struggle against such regimes and the adoption of effective measures to isolate them in the international arena.

Reflecting on the significance of this conference in the history of the development of contacts between European and Latin American parties, W. Brandt wrote some time later: "For the first time political leaders of European democratic socialism met with representatives of democratic forces who have for decades in Latin America been struggling for freedom, democracy and social progress.... We discussed what unites us and what our common political goals could be.... In fact we may speak of the start of a new phase of friendly relations between kindred parties, regardless of the national and religious differences which exist" (source 4, p 245).

Latin American parties' relations with European social democracy began to expand and intensify markedly following the Caracas conference. The 13th Socialist International Congress (1976) paid considerable attention to Latin America. D. Oduber, leader of the National Liberation Party (Costa Rica), was elected vice president of the Socialist International. In October 1977 the Socialist International Bureau supported the creation of a special committee for Latin America and the Caribs.

In 1978 a Socialist International mission headed by M. Soares visited Mexico, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Costa Rica and Venezuela. It maintained in its report that "after Europe Latin America is the region with which the Socialist International has the most contacts" (source 5, 1978, No 3, p 62).

An important step forward en route to the further integration of Latin American reformist parties in the world social democratic movement was the 1978 Lisbon Conference. Representatives of 33 parties from Europe, Latin America and Africa gathered at the conference. Socialist International President W. Brandt participated and delivered a speech. The Lisbon Conference was seen as a logical continuation of the Caracas Conference. This was the first such meeting held by the Socialist International in Europe. It was held under the "Democratization Processes in the Iberian Peninsula and in Latin America" slogan. The conferees emphasized the importance for Latin America of the changes which had occurred in Spain and Portugal as a result of the fall of the Franco and Salazar regimes. They noted that these countries were a kind of bridge, as it were, between Europe and Latin America and urged a strengthening of multilateral mutual relations between the countries and parties of the two continents.

Latin American parties were represented very broadly at the 14th and 15th Socialist International congresses. The emissaries of 20 parties and organizations from 13 Latin American countries, including a Sandinista National Liberation Front (Nicaragua) delegation, took part in the 14th congress. The election at the 14th congress (1978) of four vice presidents from parties of the region testified to the growing interest in and attention to Latin America.

A Latin American regional Socialist International conference was held in Santo Domingo in March 1980 and the Committee for Latin America and the Caribs was set up. The Latin American parties which are a part of this organization, which enjoys a certain degree of autonomy, acquired the right to convene regular meetings and formulate "Socialist International strategy for the continent" (source 4, p 272). As B. Carlsson, secretary general of the Socialist International at that time, declared, "the creation of the regional organization should be seen not as an offensive by West European parties in this zone of the world but as a consequence of the increased influence of Latin American parties within the International" (source 4, p 272). J.F. Pena Gomez, secretary general of the Dominican Revolutionary Party, was elected committee chairman and continues in this office today also.

Finally, in October 1984 the Socialist International conducted in Rio de Janeiro an enlarged bureau session. This was the most representative of all the sessions held outside of the European continent. The meeting was conducted under the slogan "Peace and Democracy in Countries of Latin America and the Caribbean," and more than 50 delegations participated. As the speakers observed, the holding of the session in Brazil was possible thanks to the democratization process, which had led to the dismantling of military-dictatorial regimes in countries of the Southern Cone. The meeting in Rio de Janeiro had one further, purely Brazilian, aspect. Leading circles of the Socialist International recognize that the creation of a strong and capable party of a social democratic persuasion in the biggest country of Latin America could play an important part in a strengthening of the Socialist International's positions and the spread of social democratic ideas in the region. For this reason the leaders of European social democracy took advantage of their stay in Brazil to establish contacts with all influential political organizations.

Undoubted testimony to the Socialist International's attention to Latin America is the fact that in the last 10 years there has been practically no bureau session at which problems of the region have not been discussed in this form or the other.

In putting its strategic policy into practice the Socialist International relies extensively on the financial assistance and support of the West German Friedrich Ebert Foundation. Thus the journal NUEVA SOCIEDAD, which has become a kind of tribune of Latin American parties of a social democratic persuasion, has been published since 1974 with the direct participation of the foundation.

The Center for Study of Democracy in Latin America (CEDAL) was founded on the foundation's resources in Costa Rica. Functionaries of Latin American social democratic parties regularly undergo improvement training here. Another purpose is providing theoretical backing for the regularities of the spread of social democratic ideology on the content and finding ways and

adapting and fitting fundamental doctrines to regional and national activity. The CEDAL conducts seminars and symposiums in which prominent figures of Latin American and European social democracy participate.

Research centers with the same name—Latin American Social Studies Institute (ILDIS)—have been founded by the Frierich Ebert Foundation in Quito, Bogota, La Paz and Caracas. They develop recommendations for parties and unions of a social democratic persuasion. The ILDIS is a kind of generator of ideas which are subsequently tested in parties of a social democratic persuasion. All the above establishments, financed by the foundation, are working under the leadership of West German specialists in social democracy and experienced SPD functionaries.

The joint ideological-theoretical and political-organizational activity of European and Latin American social democracy in countries of the region has contributed to an intensification of the process of Latin American parties' perception of the fundamental postulates of social democracy, a growth in the number of parties adhering to such an orientation and a strengthening of relations between parties of the two continents.

The objective and subjective prerequisites for a higher level of interaction of European and Latin American parties and for the convening of a Socialist International congress in a Latin American country thereby took shape. Speaking at the opening of the Socialist International Bureau session in Rio de Janeiro, W. Brandt emphasized: "The Socialist International cannot today conceive of itself without Latin America." And, further: "I can say without hesitation that Latin America has become the second sphere of activity for the International in terms of significance" (source 3, 1984, No 74, p 146).

Indeed, the Socialist International now includes 20 parties from Latin America (including 10 with a voice, but no vote),* and from Europe, 22 parties. Of the 28 vice presidents of the Socialist International, 7 represent Latin American parties. M. Manley, leader of Jamaica's People's National Party, heads the Socialist International Economic Committee, and L. Ayala, former secretary for international relations of Chile's Radical Party, is deputy secretary general of the Socialist International. Delegations from 10 parties attended the Lima congress from Latin America as guests and observers (source 5, 1986, No 1, p 27; No 3, pp 28, 32-33).

In Focus—Latin America

As might have been expected, the Socialist International congress held for the first time on the Latin American continent paid considerable attention to the problems of this region.** In concentrated form the position of the Socialist International was formulated in a special resolution on Latin America and the Caribbean. Its preamble observes that the dismantling of military-dictatorial

regimes in countries of the Southern Cone has changed the political situation in the region appreciably and that the struggle of the peoples of Chile and Paraguay, strengthening with every succeeding day, is a harbinger of the end of the two remaining dictatorships on the continent.

Under present conditions, the resolution observes, two related tasks are of paramount importance: the strengthening of democratic institutions and the creation of the prerequisites for the economic and social development of the peoples. It is emphasized here that economic and social democracy is a guarantee of political democracy. The unsolved nature of basic problems affecting the interests of the vast majority of the Latin American population, the document points out, is explained by an aggregate of internal and external factors. On the one hand the existence of powerful oligarchical economic groupings defending their mercenary interests, on the other, unjust international economic relations. The congress once again advocated a new international economic order, the establishment of which is, as the resolution observes, an imperative of our time.

Of course, the participants in the congress did not lose sight of such a burning problem for Latin America and all developing countries as that of the foreign debt. The Socialist International has yet to formulate a final position on the said question, nonetheless its contours show through clearly enough. The debt crisis is viewed not as an isolated phenomenon but in the context of the problems affecting the world capitalist economy. This has been stated with all certainty by the leaders of the Socialist International repeatedly. Thus W. Brandt said in 1984 in Rio de Janeiro: "The existence of a global financial debt crisis, which is threatening the future of countries and continents and the entire international financial system, is a reality. I know that the debt crisis has hit Latin America particularly hard, but at the same time it threatens all of us" (source 3, 1986, No 74, p 150). W. Brandt accused many Western governments of not recognizing the importance of the problem, believing that the crisis may be overcome by way of bilateral negotiations between the creditor banks and the debtor countries.

In the opinion of the leader of the Socialist International, a solution to the debt crisis may be found in the course of multilateral negotiations, given certain concessions on the part of the creditors and the writing off of some of the debt. The social democrats propose, *inter alia*: extending to 30 years the term debt service payments; the establishment of upper limits on the interest rate on loans and credit; the writing off in full of the debts accruing to the least developed "third world" countries; the establishment for the other states of annual debt payment ceilings not exceeding 20 percent of export proceeds. The set of the said measures, the leaders of the Socialist International believe, would contribute not only to an easing of the economic and social crisis of the developing world but also an improvement in economic conditions in the

developed countries and lead, as a whole, to a lessening of tension between North and South, which is fraught with unpredictable consequences. The congress delegates expressed solidarity with the position adopted by the government of Peru, which was the first, in 1985, to unilaterally adopt a decision on the limitation of foreign debt payments to 10 percent of export proceeds.

In evaluating the prospects of the Socialist International's plans in this field at least two important circumstances should be borne in mind. First, the Socialist International includes many parties from West European countries whose ruling circles are by no means disposed to forgo their interests and make concessions and, second, even the governments of a number of "third world" countries do not consider for themselves acceptable the position adopted by this international organization. Thus, for example, Venezuela, in which a social democratic administration is in office, has conducted negotiations with creditor banks on debt refinancing unilaterally, virtually ignoring the Socialist International's recommendations. All this testifies to the serious difficulties which attend realization of the Socialist International's project.

Great attention was also paid at the Lima congress to the Central America crisis, which has both international and purely Latin American aspects. As the leaders of the Socialist International rightly believe, this crisis is not only an obstacle to political stability and social progress in the "subregion but represents a threat to peace and international security" (source 3, 1986, No 85, p 68). The leadership of the Socialist International has invariably been of the opinion that the causes of the Central America crisis are rooted in the internal socioeconomic and political conditions of these countries, conditions born of most acute social and class conflicts. The situation has been complicated by the open interference of the Reagan administration. The majority of leaders of the Socialist International has always rejected the proposition advanced by the U.S. Government that the tension in Central America is a consequence of the interference of the USSR and Cuba in the internal affairs of states of the subregion.

The "Resolution on Latin America and the Caribbean" adopted by the congress confirmed once again adherence to a peaceful political settlement of the Central America conflict by way of negotiations and expressed complete support for the Contadora process. The resolution observed that the proposals of these countries' foreign ministers providing for a solution of the problem by Latin Americans themselves without outside interference, the withdrawal of foreign forces and military advisers, renunciation of support for subversive elements, respect for territorial integrity, observance of the principles of political pluralism and respect for human rights are constructive and pave the way toward peace. The document points out also that the plan put forward by O. Arias, present president of Costa Rica, is a most important factor contributing to the search for a way out

of the crisis on the paths of negotiations. Even earlier, at the start of 1986, a special mission headed by a vice president of the Socialist International, former Venezuelan President C.A. Perez, was dispatched to Central America. Its purpose was to once again demonstrate support for the efforts of the Contadora Group. The delegation visited Caracas, San Jose, Managua, Guatemala City and Mexico City (it was received at the highest level in these capitals) and Washington, where it met with State Department representatives.

There is no doubt that the Socialist International, occupying a precise and unambiguous position and exerting active influence via the social democratic parties which are a part of the government of Contadora Group members (Venezuela, Panama) and also Costa Rica, did quite a bit toward the achievement of the Guatemala accords.

At the same time, however, the demand that the Reagan administration and the U.S. Congress contribute to a constructive solution of the problem contained in the Lima Congress resolution would seem highly pertinent today also. The document emphasizes once again that the achievement of lasting peace in the subregion remains a priority task of the community (source 3, 1986, No 85, p 69). Its accomplishment, the leaders of the Socialist International rightly believe, will largely depend on a settlement of the situation in El Salvador also. The Socialist International has, as is known, supported from the very outset the armed struggle which developed in the country under the leadership of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) and the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR), which incorporates the National Revolutionary Movement. The Socialist International was among the first organizations to raise the question of recognition of the FMLN-FDR as a "representative political force" with the right to speak on behalf of part of the Salvadorean people. This approach was recorded in a number of Socialist International documents and also in the 1981 Franco-Mexican declaration, which had extensive international repercussions (source 3, 1981, No 55, p 155). This position meant on the one hand a kind of institutionalization at the international level of the support and assistance rendered the revolutionaries and, on the other, recognition also of the right of the junta headed by N. Duarte to speak on behalf of certain social and political groups. Whence the idea of the possibility of negotiations on a peaceful political settlement of the conflict with regard for the interests of broad strata of the Salvadorean people.

Subsequently the Socialist International plan, with certain modifications, became an integral part of a broader plan for a political solution of the Central America crisis. The resolution approved at the Lima Congress confirmed the Socialist International's position on the said question, expressed support for the FMLN-FDR and contained an appeal to the Duarte government to sit down at the negotiating table for the purpose of a halt to

the armed conflict, which has dramatic consequences for the people's masses, and also an appeal to the Reagan administration to abandon its intention of viewing the events occurring in El Salvador through the prism of East-West confrontation (source 3, 1986, No 85, p 69).

In most recent years the Socialist International has once again begun to pay more attention to Panama. It is rendering its support in its efforts to secure the unconditional fulfillment of the Torrijos-Carter treaties, whose realization is in danger of being thwarted owing to the position occupied by the present U.S. Administration, and condemning the U.S. Government's attempts to destabilize the domestic situation in Panama and have the Democratic Revolutionary Party, which had strengthened its contacts with the Socialist International and was admitted to this organization at the Lima Congress, removed from power. The resolution of the 17th congress expressed solidarity with the struggle of the Panamanian people and the Democratic Revolutionary Party for the establishment of Panama's full sovereignty over the canal and condemned the United States' intentions to maintain control over the interocean waterway and its military presence in the canal zone (source 3, 1986, No 85, p 69). The situation in Panama was also discussed at a special session of the Socialist International Committee for Latin America and the Caribs with the participation of the leaders of European parties held in September 1986 in Panama City (source 5, 1986, No 3, p 30).

The United States' aggression against Grenada in October 1983 evoked, as is known, an angry reaction from broad circles of the international community. Immediately following this criminal U.S. action the Socialist International issued a statement which sharply condemned the Reagan administration's actions flouting elementary international standards and the inalienable right to choice of independent development path. The invasion of Grenada, the Lima Congress resolution noted, in turn, sets a dangerous precedent, which must not be repeated. At the same time the document expressed concern at the growing militarization of the subregion and a desire for its conversion into a zone of peace.

Assessing the situation taking shape in Paraguay, the congress delegates noted the increasing resistance to the continent's oldest dictatorial regime portending its imminent end. The resolution confirmed once again solidarity with the Febrerista Revolutionary Party, which is a part of the Socialist International, and spoke of the intention to send a mission to the country to study the situation on the spot and establish contacts with all opposition forces.

The Socialist International's interest in and attention to Chile have been invariable since the start of the 1970s. The assumption of office of Unidad Popular awoke in ideologists of the Socialist International hope of the possibility of the development of events in this country

along the path of "democratic socialism". The said circumstance predetermined the highly benevolent position, as a whole, in respect of the S. Allende government, although it had no intention of implementing the Socialist International plan. Evidence of the Socialist International's interest in the events taking place in Chile was its bureau session in February 1973—the first on Latin American territory. Following the reactionary coup and the ouster of Unidad Popular on 11 September, a policy of isolating the Pinochet junta on the international scene and rendering the resistance, specifically the Radical Party, which is a member of the Socialist International, the utmost support was adopted. This line was recorded in a document prepared by a mission headed by Socialist International Secretary General H. Janicek which visited Chile a month after the 1973 coup. The mission's report to the governments of West European countries recommended nonrecognition of the new regime and a suspension of all relations with it (source 4, p 234).

Using the channels at its disposal, the Socialist International has granted and continues to grant the Chilean patriots considerable assistance. Many of them have found refuge in the European and Latin American countries (Sweden, Finland and Venezuela particularly) in which social democrats were or are in office.

It should be emphasized also that the social democrats—both European and Latin American—are operating actively in the ranks of the broad international movement of solidarity with the Chilean patriots. Thus for a number of years the International Commission To Investigate the Crimes of the Military Junta in Chile has been headed by J. Soderman, member of the leadership of Finland's Social Democratic Party, and C.A. Perez is head of the Latin American Human Rights Association, an important sphere of whose activity is solidarity with the Chilean resistance. A recent joint action of the two organizations was the symposium in the Ecuadorean capital of Quito (September 1987) "In Defense of Democracy and Human Rights in Chile," which approved a program of further development of the solidarity movement.⁶

The resolution of the Lima Congress observed that Pinochet is endeavoring with the aid of violence to put down the growing protests of the people's masses demanding the immediate restoration of political freedoms and an end to the systematic human rights violations. The document confirmed invariable solidarity with the struggle of all the country's democratic forces to oust the dictatorship (source 3, 1986, No 85, p 68).

The Socialist International's position in respect of the revolutionary process in Nicaragua merits special mention. The events in this country have been a kind of test of the Socialist International's strategic and tactical policy in Latin America. On the one hand the Socialist International's solidarity with the struggle against the Somoza dictatorship was natural and comprehensible. On the other, its adherence to "nonviolent action" is well

known. For this reason the decision to support methods of armed struggle is indisputable testimony to the practical realization of this new policy; an important component of which is, as pointed out earlier, an endeavor to extend its influence thanks to the incorporation in its orbit of a wider circle of parties, movements of the left primarily. This predetermined the diverse moral and material assistance rendered the Sandinista National Liberation Front by the Socialist International and the parties therein, including the transfer of monetary resources, arms supplies and the dispatch of volunteers. It may be said without exaggeration that the position of social democracy was objectively a serious factor contributing to the victory of the Nicaraguan people.

The policy of support for the Nicaraguan revolution and its vanguard, the FSLN, remains invariable, as a whole, at the present time also. The 15th Socialist International Congress adopted a decision on the creation of the International Committee for Defense of the Nicaraguan Revolution.

The resolution of the Lima Congress emphatically condemned the Reagan administration's policy in respect of a destabilization of the situation in Nicaragua, the establishment of an economic blockade and military assistance to the contras, whose operations are aimed at undermining the country's independence and sovereignty. Such a policy, the document emphasizes, is increasing the threat of a general armed conflict in the region and is contrary to a peaceful political settlement of the Central America crisis by way of negotiations (source 3, 1986, No 85, p 69).

In supporting the revolutionary process and the FSLN the Socialist International emphasizes in every possible way that the position which it occupies is not hedged with any ideological and political conditions. In reality, however, the assistance and support conceal far-reaching plans. Initially there was an attempt to fill the ideological vacuum which had come about, from the Socialist International's viewpoint, within the FSLN in connection with the existence right up until 1979 of three currents and thereby influence the final formulation of its ideological and political platform. Many Socialist International leaders would still like Nicaragua to develop on the basis of a "mixed economy" and "political and ideological pluralism". We should continue to assist Nicaragua to prevent its slide toward totalitarianism—this was how C. (Canache) Mata, a leader of the Democratic Action Party, formulated the viewpoint in respect of this country. (source 7)

Recently the Socialist International has been attempting to put pressure on Nicaragua and the FSLN leadership for the purpose of seeing certain changes made in domestic policy. A particularly tough position in respect of the Sandinistas has been occupied for a number of years by certain leaders of the Costa Rican ruling National Liberation Party, specifically by the country's former president L.A. Monge. The Socialist International's

approach to Nicaragua was formulated in more balanced form in the resolution of the Lima Congress. It said that the goals proclaimed by the Sandinista revolution—nonalignment, pluralism and a mixed economy—had not yet been achieved (source 3, 1986, No 85, p 69).

At the same time, however, despite certain disagreements, today also there are in the Socialist International forces which are emphatic supporters of the Nicaraguan revolution and which firmly condemn the interventionist plans of the Reagan administration. Thus A. Garcia, leader of Peru's Aprista Party and the country's president, has repeatedly declared invariable solidarity with the struggle of the Nicaraguan people.

In turn, the FSLN leadership regards cooperation with social democracy as an inalienable part of the policy of broad alliances pursued internationally. The Sandinista leaders have always emphasized here that none of this in any imposes on them any obligations of either an ideological-theoretical or political nature. The position in respect of the Socialist International was expressed in concentrated form by T. Borge, member of the FSLN National Directorate. Answering a question concerning the FSLN's relations with the Socialist International, he said: "They have been our friends, and we are their friends, although we are not social democrats."⁸

A detailed analysis of the resolution on Latin America and the Caribs—one of the principal documents approved by the Lima Congress—shows that it mirrors, as it were, the Socialist International's approach to the basic problems of the region. The document expresses in synthetic form the common viewpoint of the European and Latin American parties attesting a concurrence of positions on the key questions on the agenda of the socioeconomic and political life of present-day Latin America.

This approach is distinguished by realism and a constructive nature, corresponds, as a whole, to the national interests of countries of the region, promotes mutual trust between broad circles of the Latin American community and the Socialist International as an international organization, creates conditions conducive to their rapprochement and ultimately contributes to a strengthening of its authority in Latin America.

All this predetermined the Socialist International's certain success in the achievement of the goals which were set when it was elaborating its new strategic policy. The joint ideological-theoretical and political-organizational activity of European and Latin American social democracy in the countries of the continent has resulted in an extension of the process of Latin American parties' perception of the fundamental postulates of social democracy, the consolidation of the wide spectrum of reformist parties on a social democratic platform, an extension of the list of parties adhering to a social democratic orientation and a strengthening of relations between parties of the two continents.

Summing up the development of the relations of European and Latin American parties of a social democratic persuasion in the period between the Socialist International Caracas Conference and Lima Congress (1976-1986), a number of conclusions may be drawn.

In the past 10 years both parties have gone a considerable way toward accommodating one another. It is thus a question not of a unilateral movement, from Europe to Latin America, for example, as many political scientists believe, but of mutual convergence.

This formulation of the question is, we believe, of fundamental procedural significance and makes it possible to surmount the one-sidedness typical of certain scholars when evaluating such a complex dialectical phenomenon as the spread of social democratic ideology and political practice in Latin American countries and see it in the form of a multifaceted and uniform process.

A roughly similar viewpoint is held by the Argentine scholar A. Boron. He reasonably observes in the work "European Social Democracy and Democratic Change in Latin America" that the assertion of the "offensive of European social democracy" type by no means clarifies but, on the contrary, draws a veil over the problem. The distorted picture of Latin American parties being merely passive objects and not consciously operating subjects is created. The Europeans are undoubtedly, the author writes, blazing trails into the "third world," into Latin America in particular, but it is also true that the parties of the continent have been much preoccupied in a search for ties and international support. For this reason, A. Boron concludes, it is legitimate to speak of "a meeting half-way".⁹

The Mexican expert F. Williams holds virtually identical standpoints. The author points out in the monograph "The Socialist International and Latin America. A Critical View" that a factor which predetermined the rapprochement was the attraction of the European and Latin American parties for one another (source 4, p 243).

It is important to emphasize one further circumstance. The spread of social democratic ideas and practice in Latin America and the rapprochement of the Latin American and European parties are not a chance phenomenon and not a consequence of the intrigues of some outside forces but a result of the interaction of an aggregate of internal and external and objective and subjective factors. This is a manifestation of the process of internationalization, which is affecting all spheres of the socioeconomic and political life of the Latin America of the 1980s.

Concerning the prospects of the development of parties' mutual relations at the new stage, which began in 1986, the following assumptions may be expressed. The relative significance and influence of the Latin American parties within the framework of the Socialist International will grow and their impact on the formulation of

base documents, particularly those which concern the developing countries—the foreign debt, the establishment of a new world economic, political and information order and so forth—will increase. Representatives of Latin America will undoubtedly play their part in the preparation of the new Declaration of Principles, the bases of which are contained in the document entitled "Lima Mandate". It is anticipated approving the full text of the declaration at the next congress. There could be an increase in coming years in the number of Latin American social democratic parties in power. The Socialist International will continue the realization of its strategic course of the further expansion and intensification of contacts with Latin American parties, contribute in every way possible to the consolidation of their positions in the political structure of the corresponding countries and actively enlist the parties of the region in the solution of cardinal questions of the activity of the Socialist International, which is endeavoring to become an international organization of a universal nature.

All this has to be taken into consideration by Latin America's Marxist-Leninists when adjusting their strategic and tactical line with reference to the present stage of the liberation anti-imperialist movement.

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9. A. Boron, "La Socialdemocracia y la transicion democratica de America Latina," S.I., 1985, p 20.

Footnotes

* Full members: the Barbados Labor Party, Democratic Action (Venezuela), the Guatemala Democratic Socialist Party, the Dominican Revolutionary Party, the National Liberation Party (Costa Rica), the Febrero Revolutionary Party (Paraguay), the National Revolutionary Movement (El Salvador), the Chilean Radical Party, the Democratic Left Party (Ecuador) and the People's National Party (Jamaica); with a voice, but no vote: the People's Electoral Movement (Aruba), the Leftist Revolutionary Movement (Bolivia), the Democratic Trabahista Party (Brazil), the People's Electoral Movement (Venezuela), the Working People's Alliance, the New Antilles Movement (Curacao), the Democratic Revolutionary Party (Panama), the Peruvian Aprista Party, the Puerto Rican Independence Party and the Progressive Labour Party (St Lucia) (source 5, 1986 No 3, p 4).

** We deliberately do not dwell on an analysis of the Socialist International's approach to global problems of the present day inasmuch as this goes beyond the framework of the subject.

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Broadcast to Southeast Asia Assails Japanese 'Military Buildup'

OW1512104088 Moscow in Mandarin to Southeast Asia 1200 GMT 8 Dec 88

[By military observer (Jialilin)]

[Text] The Japanese Defense Agency is to prepare a new medium-term plan for military buildup soon. In relation to this, (Jialilin), a military observer at this station, writes the following:

The new military plan will take the 5 years after 1990 into consideration. It is aimed at establishing the principal direction Japan should follow in developing its armed forces up to the end of this century. The plan calls for paying equal attention to the Army's combat capability, according to data released by Japanese newspapers. This is different from the current plan, which gives priority to the development of the Air Force and the Navy.

The transfer of the focus of Japan's military buildup cannot but arouse our alarm. The Japanese Army's firepower greatly exceeds that of the Japanese Imperial Army in World War II, according to a Japanese military expert. In my opinion, there is no need to explain what such military potential means to Asian people who suffered in the previous world war. It has obviously exceeded the need for defense. A West German military expert estimated that [words indistinct] even if its 13 existing army divisions are completely abolished, Japan still has considerable defense capability. Therefore,

Japan's military plan is not for defending its territory; rather it is for pursuing other purposes. It is by no means a coincidence that, while transferring its focus to the development of the Army, the Japanese military clique is also prepared to actively strengthen its Air Force and Navy. For example, it will equip its Air Force with new-generation fighter aircraft, tankers, and giant transports, and will purchase U.S.-made surface-to-air guided missile destroyers for its Navy. In addition, Japan has not given up a plan to build its own aircraft carriers. These will greatly improve the Japanese Armed Forces' offensive capability and enable them to take more effective action beyond their own territory.

Tokyo has justified its plan by citing the need to confront the so-called Soviet threat. This is merely an attempt to conceal its ulterior purposes. A statement by a figure in Japan's military authorities in the 1960's merits our attention. He openly said: We are required to make appropriate preparations to (?appease) Laos, Vietnam, South Korea, and other nations. This is not merely lip service. I would like to point out that some of the former Japanese Imperial Army troops were sent to Korea during the Korean War in 1950-1953, and Japan itself also became a strategic and rear base for U.S. military actions. Many Japanese officers were assigned to the U.S. forces in Vietnam as trainees during the Vietnam War in 1965-1975, and Japanese armament plants also delivered so-called special goods to the Pentagon. In view of this, we cannot but regard Japan's new military plan as a step in a dangerous direction. Implementation of the plan would lead to increasing military threats to the Asia-Pacific region.

Growing Influence of Islamic Resurgence Among Arab Youth Seen

*18070176d Moscow RABOCHIY KLASS I
SOVREMENNYY MIR in Russian
No 3, May-Jun 88 (signed to press 30 May 88) pp 122-131*

[Article by Dina Borisovna Malyshova, candidate of historical sciences, senior researcher of the USSR Academy of Sciences World Economics and International Relations Institute: "The Youth and Islam in Arab Countries"]

[Text] As of the 1970s and, particularly, following the victory in Iran of the "Islamic revolution" a kind of "Islamic boom" has been observed in countries of the Muslim East. There is a growing number of participants in religious festivals and pilgrims to "holy" places, and more places of worship are being built than before. Movements campaigning for a return to Islamic standards in politics, economics and culture are endeavoring to occupy influential positions in social life. Spiritual and political leaders are making increasingly active use of religious ideology for influencing the population.

The social and class essence with which the Islamic slogans are invested has the most diverse variations, and for this reason the upsurge of "political Islam," and the role of this religion in the political life of developing societies itself, cannot be evaluated unequivocally, "left-right" criteria being barely applicable to this phenomenon.

The supporters of "political Islam," as a rule, present "renewed," "resurgent" Islam as some alternative to both the capitalist and socialist orientations and a new, "third," way of development.

"Political Islam" reflects various trends and phenomena, and this current represents the entire spectrum of interpretations of Islam. The search for a so-called Islamic alternative is being conducted by groupings operating together with democratic forces for social and political reforms like, for example, the Islamic Tendency Movement and the "Islamic progressives" in Tunisia; and terrorist, extremist associations resorting to violence for the purpose of "rectifying" the current political system, the biggest of them being Al-takfir Waal-Hijrah (repentance for past errors [repudiation] and aloofness and renunciation [hijrah] of the modern rotten world), each member of which, as Sa'd al-Din Ibrahim, professor of sociology at the American University in Cairo, maintains, "represents a delayed-action bomb primed to explode at any moment" (source 1, 19 October 1981, p 24).

Determining with sufficient accuracy the numbers of the participants in Muslim political associations and their social affiliation, goals and program principles does not seem possible owing to the limited nature of the information inasmuch as there is an atmosphere of higher-than-usual secrecy in these organizations. The official

mass media, which endeavor to conceal the existence of an opposition in the country, try not to call attention to them, except for instances when a religious-political grouping is implicated in the perpetration of a terrorist act. Opinion polls and specific-sociological studies are conducted extremely seldom and predominantly among the student youth. The authors of the polls are more often than not Western researchers, less often, scholars from developing countries. Their works largely bear the imprint of Western outlines and ideas concerning youth problems.^a

A specific demographic situation has taken shape in countries of the Arab East: the younger generation^b accounts for more than half the population here (source 2, 1987, No 1358, p 19), in Jordan 50 percent of the population is 15 years of age and younger (source 1, 2 February 1987, p 19) and in Tunisia 60 percent is 20 years of age and under (source 2, 1987, No 1371, p 32). The "rejuvenation" of society is exacerbating social problems considerably: education, employment, accommodation and so forth. This frequently becomes nutrient soil for the appearance of extremism, religious included.

According to the American researcher Adela Dawisha, two social groups: townspeople—recent migrants from the country—on the one hand and students and the professional classes on the other participate mainly in the religious-political movement. And the two are brought together, he believes, by a revulsion for "the spirit of consumerism reigning among the wealthy urban 'effendi' and the dubious sources of income of the latter, as a result of which both social groups are ripe for the revolutionary option."³ Obviously, the bulk of the Muslim political groupings operating in the Arab world (the American scholar R.H. Dekmejian counts 91 groupings, 30 of them based in Egypt)⁴ may be considered purely youth associations.

How is such a phenomenon explained? For what reasons is the youth's political protest in countries of the traditional prevalence of Islam acquiring a religious coloration and assuming the form of sectarian exclusiveness? Why are educated young people becoming devotees of "political Islam" and activists of Muslim extremist organizations, counterposing to "official" Islam "militant," "revolutionary" Islam? Answering these questions is not that simple.

The fact of the distinctive religious upsurge among the youth conflicts with the viewpoint expressed by certain experts earlier according to which with the development of education and introduction of the peoples of the developing world to progressive modern technology and in line with the modernization of formerly backward societies religious values would lose their followers and religious forms of consciousness would, if not wither away conclusively, at least be supplanted by secular forms. It would be highly tempting to explain the comparatively extensive participation of the youth in the Muslim political movement by the fact that in terms of

its social affiliation this part of young people represents the petty bourgeoisie, and its appeal to Islam "expresses in illusory, religious form the fear of the petty proprietor—the representative of the traditional sector in town and country—for his existence".⁵ But, first, the ideas of "political Islam" are hardly localized in one social class or social stratum, they permeate all groups of Muslim society. Second, aside from social and class factors, no less significance is attached to political, psychological and, finally, "youth" factors. It can only be a question, consequently, of their totality.

The age singularities of the youth⁶ (disposition to "rebellion," youthful romanticism and lack of scope for realization of pent-up energy) play a part of considerable importance in its social behavior, prompting association with a political movement under the flag of Islam. Membership of a secret religious-political organization is associated for some with an escape from the depressing uniformity of everyday life, for others, with a refusal to assume "adult" rights and duties, for yet others, with an attempt "to find the meaning of life". As the Egyptian writer Fathi Ghanim, who has studied secret religious-extremist associations, observes, "clandestine activity satisfies its—youth's—aspiration to adventure and makes reality young people's dream of heroism and danger."⁷ An atmosphere of increased secrecy, the detachment of the members of a secret Muslim association from the rest of society, cultivation of a feeling of "moral superiority to the crowd," an atmosphere of "brotherhood" frequently cemented by blood—all this surrounds the activity of such an organization in the eyes of its devotees with an aura of mystery and romanticism. Young people are attracted by "religious extremism and national chauvinism, the philosophy of the Islamic call with hidden meaning, asceticism of the soul and the right to shed blood" (source 8, p 196).

The youth, more precisely, part of it, is seeking in Islam an answer to the complex problems of the present day and using religion as a political weapon by virtue of the particular role which it performs in Arab society. Although under the impact of modern progress the force of traditions is gradually weakening, Islam is revealing striking adaptability to the new conditions, secular institutions and changing behavioral stereotypes, and its doctrine affords extensive opportunities for the use of this religion by the most varied social currents and representatives of various social circles.

The youth, as a social group, is no exception in this respect. As in the past, when during the decades of European domination Islam performed the functions of defense of national culture and traditions against alien civilization principles imposed by the colonialists, so in our day also this religion makes it possible to preserve a feeling of national dignity and counterpose to the West, "wallowing in materialism," the "transcendent" spiritual values of the East. Significant in this connection is the statement of a young Tunisian "Islamicist" quoted by the Arab sociologist Muhammad Kharmasi on the

reasons for his having joined a Muslim political association: "Everyone aspires to imitate what is being done in France or America. But this is your culture, not mine. I had to find my place" (source 9, 1986, vol 40, No 4, p 667). Islam, consequently, is seen by a certain section of Arab youth as a powerful socio-cultural tradition. Far from the least part in the preservation of this stability of religious ideological form has been played by the orientation of public education, which has changed in the majority of Arab countries in the period of independence, when considerably more time than in the colonial period has come to be given to study of the national language and traditions and, together with them, Islam as part of national culture.

Today Islam is penetrating more vigorously than in the preceding decades of independent development politics, ideology and government spheres. The "ordinary man" expresses his discontent with social, political and cultural living conditions, as is customary in the East, in the form of religious dogma directing the forces of "good" against the forces of "evil" and promising justice to the "downtrodden and abused".

The return of interest in the "Islamic alternative" is associated with the fact that the population of Arab countries—the younger generation particularly—is discontented with the results of the social and economic development of the 1970s-1980s. The attempts to establish in countries proceeding along a capitalist path various models of the "consumer society" have proven bankrupt from all viewpoints: economic, social and cultural-psychological. In a society divided into a rich, prosperous elite and the indigent masses the invasion of bourgeois ideas and values has merely intensified the social and psychological aspects of inequality. The spirit of consumerism and cupidity rooted in the process of the expansion of private enterprise, the ineffectiveness of government measures in the social field and the growth of unemployment have undermined the prestige of secular authority and trust in it in a number of Arab countries. The young people are turning to Islam, which they see as embodying social justice, and are continuing, at the call of religious advocates, to seek a revolutionary charge in its ideology and traditions.

As far as Arab countries of a socialist orientation are concerned, here also, in some of them at least, according to the Soviet expert G.I. Mirskiy, "there has been a recoil or degeneration" and a "pronounced latent growth of capitalist production relations in town and country."¹⁰ Islamic "activists" have not been slow to avail themselves of this, having begun an offensive from the standpoints of fundamentalism. In Algeria, for example, the Muslim Brotherhood, the Values movement and other Muslim associations have initiated among the urban youth a propaganda campaign to expose bourgeois ethics and morality and the social evil being implanted by the technocratic, "soulless civilization of the West". Simultaneously they are attacking the Algerian regime for the fact that it is attempting "to transform Algerian society

into a Marxist and materialist society" (source 2, 1985, No 1291, p 42). The agitation of religious figures has led to the point where, as of 1981, there have in a number of Algerian universities been periodic outbreaks of antigovernment protests, whose participants have been demanding stricter compliance with the prescriptions of orthodox Islam.

The spread among the youth of religious, extremist sentiments is associated not only with the overall deterioration in the economic situation but also with the growth of social instability in the cities. After Latin America the Arab East is the most urbanized part of the developing world. More than one-third of the population is concentrated in big cities here. As a result of the mass "exodus" of the peasants from the countryside the cities are crowded with migrants, among whom the youth is predominant. The millions of unemployed and semi-unemployed, inspired by the teaching of "militant Islam," are material for social explosions.

Torn apart from their families and their customary surroundings and having lost their bearings in the unfamiliar conditions of a big city, these young people, yesterday's rural inhabitants, receive tremendous emotional and moral support from associations formed on a religious-political basis, sects and organizations. Such corporate associations embellish for this section of the youth the grim day-to-day reality, afford an opportunity for equal communication with those like them and assist their inclusion in political life. A certain balance in relations with the outside world is maintained with the help of Muslim symbolism and religious-moral principles. Religion thereby helps in the acquisition of social equilibrium and stability and performs a most important function—compensates for the imperfection and wretchedness of social existence. Capitalism in countries of the Arab East has led to the alienation of huge masses of the population from the means of production, and Islam has become for them, as the Tunisian writer and public figure Habib Boulares put it, a "natural refuge" and "hope".¹¹

Nor is it surprising that the present-day advocates of "elementary" Islam are finding supporters not only among the backward and illiterate, the workers and the unemployed but among schoolchildren and students also. This is connected also to a considerable extent with the fact that the structure of higher education of Arab countries, as of the whole developing world, incidentally, is inadequately correlated with the vital requirements of the state. Thanks to a certain democratization of the educational system, the number of students here has grown sharply. In Algeria, for example, 5 million children and adolescents are encompassed by school education, and 200,000 young people are studying in the higher school (source 2, 1987, No 1358, p 37). In Morocco, according to the latest population census, which was conducted in 1982, students and graduates of secondary educational institutions constitute merely 5

percent of the population (985,000 and 82,000 respectively) (source 9, p 269), but compared with preceding years their numbers have risen considerably (approximately 35,000 by the start of the 1960's).¹² At the same time both the rural youth which has completed several high school grades and has left for the city in search of work and urban youth—from needy homes—are failing to find an application for even their elementary educational skills. As a result they are reinforcing the numbers of persons prepared to apprehend the ideas of Muslim extremism.

As far as university graduates are concerned, disenchantment awaits many of them also: the lot of average-income government officials is prepared for them at best, at worst, they switch to the position of "professionally qualified" unemployed and semi-unemployed.^c The most popular slogan of Tunisian students, M. Kharmasi attests, is: "Educated or Not, You Have No Future!" (source 13, p 56) Social status, more precisely, its uncertainty or absence, serves as a source of the "personal conflict" of this section of young people with society, a conflict prompting them to seek an escape in religion.

Analyzing the factors leading the relatively prosperous youth to a kind of alliance and solidarity with the "destitute," in religious-political associations included, S.E. Ibrahim emphasizes that young people, recent university and college graduates, are coming increasingly to recognize the fact that they are in a "class society," in which they occupy the "lowest rung on the social ladder." Coming from the middle strata, they are "structurally blocked" at a certain level in their "attempts to break upward." "Their talents and energy are not properly compensated nor, equally, are they fully recognized. They and their families feel that economically they are squeezed by high inflation. They suffer from the fact that they cannot obtain a fair share of the national wealth; and at the same time they see how it is being openly squandered. Their class has always been a reservoir of patriotism, and their parents and grandparents fought for independence. But they see that their homeland is under the oppression of new colonizers and what they call a corrupt way of life" (source 14, pp 23-24). Religion becomes for these young people a means of self-expression and protest, and the ideas of social justice contained in Islam, the moral basis of the new ideology.

The political atmosphere in Arab countries is propitious for the growth of religious protests among the youth and the appearance of extremist groups and organizations. Even the most "democratic" of them still preserve the features of an undeveloped civic society with rudimentary forms of class consciousness. The state earmarks for Islam the function of a kind of restraining force and barrier in the way of the penetration of bourgeois (or socialist) ideas capable, in the opinion of the authorities, of exerting a corrupting influence on the youth and the professional classes, whose support the authorities particularly need. It is for this reason that in a number of

instances the governments themselves are prompting the youth to seek a solution of political problems in religion and deliberately fence it off from participation in political life. As the French scholar J. (Kepel) observes, "the absence of freedom and democracy and a one-party and totalitarian system invariably give rise to the phenomenon of an opposition in which the irrationality of faith gains the ascendancy over logical thinking."¹⁵

In a number of Arab countries universities have given the official go-ahead for the creation of various "Islamic associations," which have been assigned the role of counterweight under the authorities' jurisdiction to the left, Marxist organizations which became widespread among the students in the 1960's. The authorities believe that the youth raised in a "spirit of Islam" and fidelity to Muslim traditions will be distracted from the "gravest delusion"—socialism and democracy. The policy pursued in addition to this in the bulk of Arab states of the suppression of progressive forces capable of rising to the defense of the working people's interests and the anti-communist sentiments ignited by official propaganda narrow considerably the sphere of activity of the communist parties (they operate legally only in some Arab countries) and democratic organizations, facilitating the tasks of the Muslim "fishers of men" and religious extremists.

The "living word" of Muslim preachers^d (they are distinguished by fervor, conviction, oratorical gifts and an ability to speak with the people in language comprehensible to them) contrasts sharply with the hollow, hortatory, insincere slogans with which the authorities address the youth. Young people disenchanted with their unsatisfying work and at times the complete absence thereof and deprived through the fault of the authorities of the possibility of genuine political self-expression are listening increasingly attentively to the calls of the religious advocates offering "to liberate man by means of Islam".

For some young representatives of the professional classes "political Islam" is associated with the creation of an atmosphere of "justice" and "freedom" and the burgeoning of all spheres of social and spiritual life under the protection of "renewed" religion adapted to the conditions of the present day. Rachid al-Gannouchi, leader of the Islamic Tendency Movement (Tunisia), is calling for the creation of a democratic Islamic state based on "freedom, equality and progress," for which the "Islamic revolution" in Iran no longer serves as a model.¹⁷

So the "Islamic wave" which has engulfed in countries of the East part of the youth is relatively complex in terms of its socio-psychological content. The relatively extensive enlistment of young people in the movement of "political Islam" is not, nonetheless, proof of the emergence in this region—by analogy with the West—of a "youth" counterculture or religion, although there are certain outward indications of similarity. Arab sociologists have painted a "median portrait" of the member of

a secret Muslim association. He is a bearded young man or young woman in a veil and traditional religious dress aged 16 to 25 (a student, unemployed, immigrant, lumpen). If he is a student or university graduate, he is associated with the natural and medical and technological faculties, to which those springing from the ordinary people have greater access, as distinct from the theological faculties, where the children of the secular or religious elite study. Class or political consciousness is not developed in the young Islamic "combatant" ("activist"), and he has a nebulous idea of the mechanism of modern economic life. Social inequality, the polarization of society and unemployment are, he imagines, the result of the activity of "hidden, faceless forces" embodied, depending on the situation, in specific images of the "European," "American," "imperialist" and "corrupt ruler". The political program of the member of the secret Muslim grouping is distinguished by doctrinal rigidity and an active position, and predominant therein are elements of rejection—of the West, the United States, Israel and "imported ideas," among which certain materialism, Darwinism, Marxism, socialism and nationalism. Any ruler entering into a deal with one of these enemies is a traitor to Islam. The current system is rejected entirely as "unrighteous" and "corrupt" ("All Muslims must obey the command of God, otherwise they are not Muslims, they are nonbelievers or, worse, atheists and enemies of God") (source 14, p 23). The young Islamic combatant loves success, is intolerant of other viewpoints and is ready to resort to violence to accomplish his ends.

There is considerably less room in his views for the positive, creative aspect. S.E. Ibrahim observes in this connection: "When the 'combatants' consent to a decoding of their ideology, position and feeling, the listener goes away with the clearest idea of that to which they are opposed, but with a very nugatory, albeit sharply drawn, picture of what they would do were they to come to power" (source 14, p 23). The sketchiness inherent in this "median" portrait cannot overshadow one essential feature—the "political Islam" movement is formed predominantly from representatives of the nonproletarian social strata disenchanted with the injustice of the economic and political systems, corruption and bad management and also the confrontation with the bourgeois value system. The scant and sparse data on the social composition of this Muslim political grouping or the other testify to the predominance among its young participants of representatives of urban strata of the nontraditional type. The parents of the young "Islamists" belong to the "poorest social strata". They are first-generation townspeople employed not at large enterprises but in small-scale, crafts production. It would not seem possible to determine what numbers of unemployed youth participate in the "political Islam" movements, but the fact that they have become a refuge for the indigent is confirmed by many facts, specifically, the widespread participation of the young unemployed in acts of protest at the time of the "bread riots" in Tunisia and Morocco in January 1984.¹⁸ The Muslim groupings

attract not only those from needy families or the poor. In Egypt, for example, quite a few young officers, whose living standard is relatively high, participate in them. At the end of 1986 some 33 persons, including 4 army officers, faced trial in Cairo charged with having formed a religious-extremist organization (source 16, p 41).

The leading role in the "political Islam" movements, however, experts unanimously believe, is performed by students. According to M. Kharmasi, the Islamic Tendency Movement in Tunisia, which is youth-oriented in its activity, is three-fourths made up of students and schoolchildren, young lecturers of higher educational institutions and teachers (source 13, p 56). In Morocco 15 Islamic groupings, which include together with students lecturers and Education Ministry officials, operate at Muhammed V University in Rabat (source 9, 1986, NO 2, p 271).

The children of representatives of the elite do not, in the main, share the Islamic "enthusiasms" of low-born intellectual youth. They are characterized as a whole by a secular and more pragmatic vision of the world and politics. Young people belonging to the highest strata of society see themselves more often as members of a national community (Egyptians, Lebanese, Arabs) and only then of a religious community, which testifies to the considerable advancement of their secularized thinking (source 9, 1982, vol 36, No 4, p 539).

So the Muslim political associations are formed not from the ranks of the prosperous and wealthy but predominantly from the poor and low-born intellectual youth who are particularly keenly aware of the disturbing instability of the surrounding world and consider unjust the laws in accordance with which their parents eke out a more than modest existence. And it is to this audience—inexperienced in political and religious problems, as a rule—that public figures, politicians and theologians propagandize the "Islamic alternative," showing its advantage over Western concepts and their "local nationalist versions" (Nasirism, Bathism, Bourguibism and others). A "moral fortress" against corruption and injustice in the cities is being created with the help of Islam.

One is struck by the fact that the leaders and theorists of the Muslim political associations, these singular "rulers of the thoughts" of the youth, are socially close to their young "brothers and sisters". Hasan al-Banna, the founder of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood Association, was a teacher; one of the present leaders of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood organization, Adnan Sa'd al-Din, comes from a family of small tradesmen and is lawyer and philosopher by education; Shukri Mustafa, leader of the Egyptian Gamaat al-Muslimin organization, was an agronomist; Khaled Ahmad Islambuli, who heads the group of militants who took part in the assassination of Sadat, was a junior officer; Rachid al-Gannouchi, a leader of the Tunisian Islamic Tendency Movement, is a philosophy lecturer, another, Abdel

Fattah Mourou, is a lawyer and so forth. They have all since the very start of their activity been youth-oriented, recognizing that economic difficulties, political instability and ideological confusion "work" for the slogans of a "renewed" Islamic social order "purged of Western pollution".

According to the Arab sociologist Ali Jessouti, the fanatical "Islamicists" employ very active means for propagandizing their views among the student youth: they interrupt lectures to deliver speeches, organize prayers when parties are in full swing and distribute brochures with calls for enrollment in an Islamic association. There are reports also of clashes between militant supporters of Islamization and representatives of student organizations and left and communist parties and unions inasmuch as the "Islamicists" advance as their political credo struggle against "politicians and intellectuals who are opponents of Islam". Representatives of "moderate" Islamic groupings call the youth to a kind of "flight from the present day": inasmuch as various doctrines of nationalism have receded into the past and bourgeois liberalism cannot ensure social justice it is necessary to return to the simplicity of relations of original Islam. "Inasmuch as we are condemned to poverty, let us live in poverty. A cotton jallabiyah (the Egyptian's traditional dress—D.M.) and a handful of beans for everyone, and God for all"—such is the credo of the "moderates" helping them win the sympathies of the "desstitute," among whom feelings of unrealized protest are strong.

In the socio-psychological respect the Muslim political associations represent "small contact groups". Membership of them marks the isolation of a young individual from the rest of society, which, as has been mentioned, is emphasized outwardly also, by dress. S.E. Ibrahim observes that the return to the veil as a symbol of the traditional way of life as a counterweight to the Western lifestyle is a kind of protective reaction to the changes in the surrounding world. "The female student of a medical faculty in a veil is a complex response to the complex world surrounding her, which includes a stream of foreigners, oil wealth, expensive consumer goods, high inflation and an 'alien' lifestyle.... She clings to her 'heritage,' which, it seems to her, can restore a sense of her own dignity and protect against the uncertainty and estrangement which she perceives" (source 14, p 19). The return to traditional Muslim dress enables, in addition, young people to conceal outward manifestations of social distinctions (source 8, p 193). A young person's affiliation with a religious-political organization occurs more often than not under the impact of events not directly related to religion (psychological trauma, an account related by a student hostel neighbor and such). For young girls this is an opportunity to take shelter from the "pernicious, corrupting influence of the West" inasmuch as Islamic traditions, understood very nebulously at times, are seen as the undisputed and dependable basis of the preservation of society's moral foundations. In addition, a demonstration of devotion to the standards of Islamic morality enhances for a young girl the

chances of a successful marriage insofar as, despite the appreciable modernization and secularization to which Arab society has been subjected in recent decades, a traditional, religious upbringing is preferred.

Consequently, the youth turns to Islam frequently not by virtue of a profound belief but under the influence of entirely different factors. In addition, many young people acknowledge that prior to joining a Muslim political association they did not even observe religious rituals. M. Kharmasi describes a young "Islamicist" who prior to enrollment in university "did not pray and did not attend the mosque." "Although outwardly all was well," the young man says, "I was oppressed and in a state of depression. I felt that some things did not add up, and life seemed to me very complex. One day a friend invited me to think about life, and I turned to my religion" (source 9, 1986, vol 40, p 667). Sociologists note that a change in value orientations is taking place in many young people and activists of Muslim associations of an extremist persuasion: a principal value for them now becomes not an aspiration to occupy a "decent place" in the social hierarchy (in the past the unattainability of this goal became a psychically traumatizing factor) but social action as such, and it is perceived as a sacral action and an integral component of religious practice. According to F. Ghanim, the young extremist breaks the social and psychological ties binding him to the "safe world" of society and the home. "He casts aside the past like an old skin or rotten tooth."⁷ The present-day community of "brothers and sisters" modeled after the type of medieval Shia organization is considered in the eyes of its devotees a prototype of the "new Islamic society".

Far from all the values of Islam are accepted by the disciples of the youth religious-political associations unconditionally. Experts call attention also to the attempts to "rectify" Islamic dogma distorted, from the standpoint of the fighters for religious "purity," by "corrupt rulers" and "parrot theologians" and to the endeavor to counterpose to the formal devotion to religion an inner profound faith. This does not mean, however, that the young people reject traditionalism and the religion of their "fathers". According to M. Kharmasi, 75 percent of the members of the Islamic Tendency Movement expressed approval of their parents' adherence to the performance of Islamic rituals and injunctions (source 13, p 44). As far as the parents are concerned, the majority of them by no means approves the "children's" preoccupation with religion. Their position is conditioned not only by secular considerations (the fear that their son or daughter might be subjected to danger and persecution for political activity and could be expelled from school or university and not find a good job). The return to Islamic tradition demanded by "children" sharing the ideas of "political Islam" is seen by the progressive members of the older generation as a departure from the gains which they made in the course of the national liberation struggle. The supporters of the emancipation of women, who fought for decades for the removal of the veil as an act symbolizing the granting to

women of greater rights in social life, cannot support the wearing of the veil by their daughters, whatever motives guide the latter. Thus the "fathers and sons" conflict in countries of the Arab East has assumed a highly distinctive form opposite to that which occurs in the West.

The fact of the youth's relatively extensive participation in the "political Islam" movements testifies that this religion could under certain conditions be a perfectly modern "civic force". "Political Islam" undoubtedly contains a strong charge of anticolonial, anti-imperialist potential, but simultaneously the conservative part of the movement shapes in part of the youth a social mentality which is irreconcilable with progressive Marxist ideology also. At the present time a certain decline in the assertiveness of the youth's "political Islam" may be observed in a number of states of the developing world. It is difficult to guess at whether there will be a new upsurge or not, but until the factors which have given rise to it at the present stage of the development of peoples of the East disappear, the Islamic social order will be seen by the youth as a realistic alternative to the current situation.

Sources

1. NEWSWEEK, New York.
2. JEUNE AFRIQUE, Paris-Dakar.
3. A. Dawisha, "The Arab Radicals," New York, 1986, p 102.
4. R.H. Dekmejian, "Islam in Revolution. Fundamentalism in the Arab World," New York, 1985.
5. NARODY AZII I AFRIKI No 2, 1985, p 74.
6. See for more detail E.Ya. Batalov, "Philosophy of Rebellion (Critique of the Ideology of Left Radicalism)," Moscow, 1973, p 7.
7. THE JERUSALEM QUARTERLY No 34, 1985, p 36.
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11. H. Boulares, "L'Islam: la peur et l'esperance," Paris, 1983, p 56.
12. "Africa. Encyclopedic Reference," Moscow, vol 2, 1963, p 43.
13. "Maghreb, Mashreck," Paris, No 103, 1984.

14. S.E. Ibrahim, "The New Arab Social Order," London, 1980.
15. LE MONDE, 6 March 1984.
16. THE MIDDLE EAST No 148, 1987.
17. THE ECONOMIST, London, 4 April 1987, p 41.

Footnotes

^a In Soviet scientific literature the religious searchings of the youth of the bourgeois West have been illustrated and evaluated in a whole number of works of P.S. Gurevich, Yu.N. Davydov, K.G. Myalo and others. Publications devoted to problems of the youth of Asian and African developing countries are as yet, unfortunately, extremely few (for example, A.L. Arefyev, Ye.M. Kriventsov, "Socioeconomic Situation of the Youth of Asian and African Developing Countries," Moscow, 1979; E.A. Shauro, "African Youth: Changes in Social Consciousness," Moscow, 1985), and there are no special studies on the influence of religion on the youth in these regions at all.

^b The standard criteria of age limits vary depending on the region. When calculating the proportion of youth in the economically active population of the majority of Asian and African developing countries UN experts define its age limits within the 10-25-year range.

^c Soviet experts call attention to the fact that traditional views of the prestigious nature of various spheres of employment are of considerable significance in the shaping of unemployment among persons with higher education, granted the determining role of economic factors. Some young people are even prepared to switch to the position of unemployed if the job is insufficiently prestigious.

^d Among Egyptian youth particular popularity is enjoyed by Shaykh Hafiz Salamah, former professor of theology at Cairo University (he is called the "Khomeini of the Nile Valley"), who sharply castigates the policy of the authorities and calls for the establishment in Egypt of Islamic government. His sermons are music to the ears of those who see that the "economic renewal and prosperity" promised by the regime have come to nothing (source 16, p 43).

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'First Major Study' of Marxism-Leninism in Africa Reviewed

18070039b Moscow RABOCHIY KLASS I
SOVREMENNYY MIR in Russian
No 4, Jul-Aug 88 pp 174-177

[A.S. Kaufman review: "Major Work of Africa Specialists"]

[Text] The monograph,* which was prepared and published by the USSR Academy of Sciences Africa Institute, will attract the attention of a broad readership interested in the regularities of the world revolutionary process and the general and the particular in its development. This is essentially the first major study of complex theoretical and political questions pertaining both to the history and the contemporary processes of the spread of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism in Africa. This is a major work not only in terms of its rich source-study base and not only in terms of the thoroughness and quality of the research performed by skilled authors but also in terms of the compass of the problems. The monograph's four sections encompass practically all aspects of the subject, which is indicated by the titles of the sections themselves: from the history of Africans' familiarization with socialist ideas; the revolutionary-transforming role of Marxist-Leninist theory; the ideological activity of revolutionary parties; Marxism-Leninism and the struggle of ideas. Each of these sections, organically linked in a single whole, represents an independent study to a considerable extent.

Socialist ideas on the continent spread initially (latter half of the 19th century) in countries of North and Southern Africa (where the level of social development was, as a whole, considerably higher than in Tropical Africa): it was at that time that the workers movement began to develop, and on the base thereof, socialist ideas to spread. At the start of the 20th century African organizations (primarily Africa's progressive intellectuals) became acquainted for the first time with the ideas of scientific socialism, specifically, its economic aspects (although, it should be said, the very understanding of these ideas was still of a bourgeois-reform nature to a large extent). The Great October Socialist Revolution imparted a profound stimulus to the national liberation movement, the spread of the ideas of scientific socialism and the origin of communist groups on the continent.

The origins of the communist movement and the emergence on this basis of Marxist-Leninist parties in Africa are a most important landmark in the history of the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat and the progressive forces of society for liberation from colonial shackles and for national liberty. The authors of the monograph devote to this problem a separate chapter, which examines questions associated with the activity of the communist parties of the metropolis countries in the propaganda of Marxist-Leninist ideas in Africa, with the forms and methods of this activity and with the spread of these ideas among young people and students. A separate

section is devoted to the activity of Africa's communist parties in the first postwar period. In general, the reader gains an idea of this activity, however, it seemed to us that it should have been illustrated more extensively, with the use of additional sources and literature and in closer connection with the subsequent chapters. The authors possibly did not have at their disposal all the necessary material on the corresponding period.

The second section of the monograph reveals the profound impact of the ideas of scientific socialism on contradictory social processes, on the role of various political parties and movements and on the anti-imperialist struggle in countries of the African continent. The work shows that despite the tremendous influence of religion, patriarchal traditions and moribund vestiges of the past, the revolutionary teaching of Marxism-Leninism blazed a trail for itself toward hearts and minds for it corresponded to the fundamental interests of the working masses. There was an upsurge in countries of the continent in national feelings initially expressed primarily in the growth of the nationalism of the main nations which had already taken shape, in an intensification of the anti-imperialist mood among the working masses at large, in progressive intellectuals' search for new concepts of social development and in the creation of various petty bourgeois organizations. Granted all their ideological misconceptions, the latter initiated the consolidation of national social forces.

The creation of the world's first socialist state increased interest in the theory of scientific socialism among the revolutionary intellectuals and the most progressive part of the proletariat; the ideas of the October Revolution penetrated Africa by various paths, predominantly via the communist parties of the metropoles and revolutionary intellectuals who came to African countries from Europe.

The authors' approach to the subject of the second section from wide-ranging positions of study of its component, interconnected parts would seem justified; this imparts to the section scale and, we would say, practically exhaustive fullness. Before turning to an evaluation of the section's first chapter, I would like to express disagreement with its title—"Problem of Combination of Marxism-Leninism and the Revolutionary-Liberation Movement". Strictly speaking, as a national movement, that is, uniting different classes, including the national bourgeoisie, the revolutionary-liberation or national liberation movement tackles tasks of a democratic nature, and for this reason speaking of the combination of such a movement and the ideas of Marxism-Leninism is inappropriate. But a heading is a heading, and the content of the chapter is rich and capacious enough. It provides an idea of the complex singularities of the spread of the ideas of scientific socialism in Africa and the big subjective and objective difficulties which are still encountered in the way of their dissemination. The authors see these difficulties, distinguishing the main ones: the multistructure of the economy, the incomplete

nature of the process of the formation of nations and classes, the persistence of traditional institutions and precapitalist relations and the big role of religion in social and political life. There can be no question under these conditions of a purely proletarian movement with all the ensuing consequences.

At the same time, without succumbing to pessimism and unwarranted extremes, the authors evaluate the great force of the ideas of scientific socialism in modern Africa from the standpoints of political realism while not losing sight of the revolutionary perspective. And, of course, absolutely correct and justified is the authors' important conclusion that the development of a number of African countries along the path of a socialist orientation, granted all the difficulties and individual setbacks for this course even, is incontrovertible proof not only of the extensive spread of these ideas in Africa but also of their direct materialization.

This question is studied comprehensively and very thoroughly and on the basis of a great deal of specific-historical material in the special section "The Socialist Orientation as a Factor of the Establishment of Scientific Socialism Under the Conditions of Emergent Countries". The authors formulate not only the general regularities which characterize the course of a socialist orientation but also reveal national singularities of the realization of this course in various African countries. In their opinion, approximately 20 Afro-Asian countries are currently proceeding along the path of a socialist orientation.

Upon an investigation of questions of the formation of the scientific-socialist views of revolutionary democracy the entire business cannot, evidently, be reduced to its movement toward scientific socialism only along the straight line of Marxist-Leninist enlightenment, as the authors do (p 74). Great, if not decisive, significance is attached to revolutionary democracy's acquisition of its own social experience in the course of the struggle for the implementation of various transformations. But describing this shift in Africa's ideological and political life—a shift of great historical significance—the authors rightly emphasize in one way or another that the left wing of revolutionary democracy switched on the eve and at the outset of the 1970s to the ideology of scientific socialism, which exerted a profound influence on the nature of the national-democratic revolutions in these countries, sharply extending their social content. Marxism-Leninism became the main source of the ideology of the revolutionary democrats in a number of countries. The authors are absolutely correct when they write that "the spread of scientific-socialist theory in the emergent countries was connected with the onset of a qualitatively new stage in the development of the national-democratic revolution and the increase in its ideological armament" (p 54). We would add that the radical accomplishment of the tasks of the national-democratic revolution on the paths of its transition to the socialist stage is altogether impossible without a party in possession of Marxist-Leninist theory.

The authors take a realistic view of the various difficulties and contradictions in the way of the spread of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism in countries of a socialist orientation ultimately connected with the national and historical singularities of these states. The profound stability of old ideas, notions and institutions is undoubtedly holding back society's progress, and this obstacle will evidently exist for a long time to come, what is more, in such countries. There are many factors objectively contributing to this. Among them we may put both attempts to see in traditions of the past and religious institutions significant elements of scientific socialism and assertions concerning the compatibility therewith of many postulates of religion, of Islam, for example. These actual historical facts and such relatively stable trends have to be reckoned with. All these complex questions are viewed in the book conclusively and at a sound theoretical level.

The material of the book in question, the actual data, the authors' theoretical and political reasoning—all this proves convincingly that the assertions that the course of a socialist orientation is exhausted and has demonstrated its ineffectiveness, that revolutionary democracy as a political force has already done all that it can and so forth (and such assertions may be encountered in scholarly literature) are wrong, lead to a denial of the possibility of the transition of economically backward countries to socialism, bypassing capitalism or interrupting its development, and could disorient revolutionary-democratic forces in the emergent countries.

The book's authors correctly highlight the significance of Africa's working class as the most consistent exponent of the ideas of scientific socialism, particularly in the present historical period, when the ideas of socialism are becoming a real ideological and political force on this continent. The study of this problem in a separate chapter would seem justified. It is a question of the formation and development of a working class, the growth of the union movement and the role of the unions in raising the political level of the working masses. In other words, the set of problems directly connected with the political possibilities and immediate prospects of the working class in African countries is examined. The authors do not exaggerate but nor do they underestimate these possibilities. We are not sure about the correctness of a separate section for the particular features of the work of Nigerian Marxists in Nigeria's labor unions. In itself this subject is revealed well, but its separation in a special section would not appear logical.

The chapter containing an analysis of the activity of African countries' communists and workers parties in the struggle for the dissemination and increased influence of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism in various strata of African society is of great interest. The authors extensively illustrate the main directions of the communist parties' political, ideological and propaganda activity, employing much new material here. In the 1980s, they write, the communist parties reached a new level of

ideological maturity and organizational cohesion, and there was a pronounced growth in their theoretical activity and influence on the revolutionary process in Africa (p 125). While evaluating highly this chapter as a whole, we would at the same time like to observe that it pays insufficient attention, in our view, to an examination of the big difficulties which are still being encountered by practically all African communist parties, and some of them find themselves in a very difficult situation. This is mentioned only in the context of problems of the political cooperation of the communists and revolutionary democrats, although the communist parties' difficulties, their nature and the ways of overcoming them go far beyond the framework merely of this question.

The big role which is now performed in political life by progressive African youth is well known. Its interest in the ideas of Marxism-Leninism is growing rapidly before our eyes. It may be said that considerable changes are occurring in its philosophy under the influence of these ideas, and part of the youth is accommodating the ideas of scientific socialism and being inspired by them. There are many young people—leading figures of the new generation—among African revolutionary democracy, and this is a phenomenon of great historical significance. These very pertinent issues, to which the authors have devoted two chapters, are studied comprehensively, on the basis of a large amount of factual material, a considerable part of which has been put to scholarly use for the first time.

The transition of a number of African countries to the path of a socialist orientation and the accession to the leadership of these countries of revolutionary-democratic forces in the shape of vanguard parties of the working people and also the considerable successes in the development of countries on this path, despite the big difficulties of various origins which are encountered, are incontrovertible testimony not only to the spread of scientific-socialist ideas but also to their victories in Africa. Social processes on the continent can now no longer be studied without regard for the influence of these ideas. Of course, it could be a question primarily of specific countries of a socialist orientation and of everything associated with this phenomenon. This is a general expression of the impact of Marxist-Leninist ideology on Africa's national liberation movement. Analyzing thoroughly and in depth the particular features of the spread of Marxist-Leninist ideology and the practical activity of the vanguard parties of the working people of Angola, Benin, Mozambique, Tanzania and Ethiopia and also the Congress Party for Malagasy Independence, which have proclaimed Marxism-Leninism their ideology, the authors emphasize that the mere fact of the creation of such parties, despite the tremendous difficulties which they are encountering in the way of their ideological-political and organizational cohesion and the strengthening of their ranks, is a truly historic landmark en route to the unification of all revolutionary forces advocating socialism in a single organization capable of heading revolutionary processes in Africa.

We would note in this connection that upon a study of the course of a socialist orientation being pursued by revolutionary democracy it is essential to consider the profound interaction of internal and external factors. However they interact, what is more, the internal factor remains decisive. No external circumstances, even the most propitious, can do the internal revolutionary forces' work for them. Whence arises the most important problem of the ideological, political and organizational maturity of the internal revolutionary factor in the shape of vanguard parties of the working people. The book's authors make a big contribution to the study and elaboration of the principles of the creation and activity of such parties. Specifically, the authors of the third section have performed a great deal of research and amplified and enlarged our understanding of numerous nebulous and little-studied questions related to complex problems of the theory and practice of a socialist orientation in the current historical period.

The book concludes with the chapter "Marxism-Leninism and the Struggle of Ideas". Of course, the spread of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism in Africa is a complex and contradictory process. Marxism-Leninism as a universal teaching passed Africa by, so to speak, for a number of years. But those times are passed. Marxism-Leninism is blazing its trail in Africa also. It may confidently be said that it is for this reason that the struggle of ideas in Africa between Marxists and consistent revolutionaries and the opponents of scientific socialism and their attempts to emasculate its revolutionary essence is intensifying. This is a struggle of progressive revolutionary ideas against ideas without a future.

Of course, such a big and complex work encompassing a multitude of problems and issues is not without shortcomings, omissions and contentious assertions also. We have already dwelt on some of them. As a whole, however, the work merits high appraisal as a substantial contribution to study of the processes of the spread and embodiment of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism in Africa.

Footnote

* "Rasprostraneniye Marksizma-Leninizma v Afrike (Voprosy istorii, teorii i praktiki) [Spread of Marxism-Leninism in Africa (History, Theory and Practice)]. Editorial board: N.I. Vysotskaya, An.A. Gromyko (exec. ed.), N.D. Kosukhin (leader of group of authors), G.B. Starushenko. Moscow, "Nauka", 1987, 333pp.

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South African 'Workers' Press Surveyed
*18070039c Moscow RABOCHIY KLASS I
SOVREMENNYY MIR in Russian
No 4, Jul-Aug 88 pp 183-185*

[Yu.I. Gorbunov survey: "The Worker Press of Southern Africa"]

[Text] An actual trend of the development of the democratic struggle in South Africa is, as A. Nzo, general secretary of the African National Congress (ANC), emphasized in a recent interview, the involvement in the thick of events of the most diverse social forces and strata, their association with the democratic struggle and the expansion of this process, which is irreversibly undermining the social base of apartheid.¹ Forced to maneuver, creating, for example, the appearance of this legal form or the other of opposition activity, the racist regime is in fact, however, gambling, as before, mainly on the power of the machinery of repression. A reminder of this was the P. Botha government's recent ban on the simultaneous activity of 17 leading antiracist organizations; they include the United Democratic Front (UDF), which was formed in 1983, and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), which has been operating since 1985.

In fact, was it fortuitous that it was such an action which "commemorated" the 10th anniversary of the pseudoreforms implemented by P. Botha? "The mountain gave forth a mouse". In addition, the government of the Nationalist Party, which has held power for four decades now, has now, as can be seen, perceived a need to gain the favor of extreme-right conservatives and reactionaries advocating "total" apartheid—as distinct from the "refined" version assiduously being developed by P. Botha. Whence the highly "unrefined" offensive of the "reformer" against the last vestiges of the legal antiracist opposition—to persuade those political opponents who are "even more to the right" that he, in any event, not only desires but can guarantee the permanency of the system of racial oppression. Will he?

The current situation emphasizes particularly clearly the fact that the apartheid regime is "resting" on a volcano, in whose interior a powerful process of the ongoing development, buildup and growth of protest forces has been under way all these years, despite the most brutal system of suppression. It is this which has forced the racist authorities to maneuver. They have been forced into this particularly by the rapid growth in the strength of the labor unions which has been under way since the latter half of the 1970s, predominantly thanks to African working people fighting stubbornly for recognition of their professional organizations. Maneuvering, the government carried out a distinctive, racist, "legalization" of the unions—without union liberties.² Specifically, without freedom of the union press.

But the mass worker movement has a press, which has all these years performed an important mobilizing role, what is more, just as the political organizations of fighters for their people's freedom—the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the ANC—long banned by the racist regime, have their press. Like theirs, it is published outside South Africa.

Operating in the country under virtually clandestine conditions, the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU), a progressive multiracial trade union center which was formed in 1955 with the active assistance of the ANC, has since January 1977 been publishing in London its WORKERS UNITY paper. It was envisaged publishing it bimonthly. Over the years South African workers have received over 70 issues of the paper.

In its program (1977) SACTU advanced the tasks of struggle for the unity of the country's working class divided by racial barriers, the granting of the African proletariat political and trade union freedoms, an end to racial discrimination and the unrestricted right to strike and form unions. In order to guide the working people in this struggle the SACTU London office set about publication of a workers paper in English.

It appeared when the protests of African youth in Soweto, a Johannesburg suburb, of 16 June 1976, which were brutally put down by the police, were still quite fresh in the memory. African schoolchildren were attending a peaceful demonstration to protest against the racist system of education for Bantu Africans and against the system of "separate development" of the country's races and nationalities. As is known, South African workers supported the youth's protest. Before the end of 1976 they had staged under their union's leadership two major strikes: initially a 3-day strike in Witwatersrand and Cape Province and then a second strike in Johannesburg and Capetown. In these strikes the working class demonstrated organization and cohesion; "Colored" workers stood together with their black class brothers. The events in Soweto and the national strikes shook the racist state to its foundations.

The first issue of the paper opened with an article on the lessons of the events in Soweto, which had initiated a new stage of the struggle against apartheid and for a democratic, nonracial South Africa. The struggle against apartheid, the article emphasized, is aimed not only at undermining the regime of racial domination of the white minority but also against the entire system of class exploitation, whose perpetuation this regime serves.

The newspaper published articles on individual detachments of the South African proletariat: dockers (WORKERS UNITY No 1, 1977). In subsequent references to the newspaper its name is omitted), miners (No 2, 1977), construction workers (No 3, 1977), farm laborers (Nos 4-5, 1977), garment workers (No 6, 1977) and others. The newspaper propagandizes the aims and tasks of the union movement and the class struggle of the

proletariat. It formulates the African workers' demands: the right to form their own trade unions and to strike, abolition of the pass laws and the contract migrant labor system, a minimum wage of 50 rand a week in the 1970s and, considering the increased cost of living, 75 rand a week in the 1980s, the outlawing of racial discrimination in employment and the reservation of jobs for white workers, compulsory education equal for all, an 8-hour work day, 4 weeks annual paid leave, free medical assistance, a pension at the age of 60 and women's equality in work and employment.

The newspaper has become a chronicle of the workers movement in South Africa in the past 11 years. It also publishes many theoretical articles, which explain the correlation of the national liberation and class struggle of the proletariat under the conditions of South Africa, reveal the social and class nature of the apartheid system (No 25, 1981) and show the need for the joint struggle of the unions and the UDF under ANC banners (No 40, 1984). In his interview carried in the paper SACP Chairman (now party general secretary) J. Slovo explained in detail that the ANC, the SACP and the unions of South African workers have common goals and tasks at this stage of the revolutionary process in the country—the extirpation of apartheid and the formation of a democratic republic; and that a leap forward from a racial society to socialism all at once is impossible and that the struggle is a long and difficult process which requires the participation of all workers, regardless of race, nationality, sex and such (No 63, 1986).

An expression of the alliance, which came about naturally and is the sole one of its kind, which exists between the national liberation movement in Southern Africa and the workers movement in the shape of progressive unions and the party of the working class is, specifically, the close cooperation among the journal SECHABA, the organ of the ANC, the SACP journal THE AFRICAN COMMUNIST and the newspaper WORKERS UNITY. This cooperation played an important part in the formation of the UDF in 1983 and COSATU in 1985 and the organization of the meeting of leaders of the SACTU, COSATU and the ANC in Lusaka in 1986.³ The newspaper was not slow in publishing the communique of this historic meeting (Nos 60, 61, 1986). The newspaper's role in a number of major strikes and other mass protests of the working people has been inestimable.

Whereas for many years SACTU had adapted itself more to the conditions of clandestine work, COSATU—until it also was virtually outlawed this April on the pretext of a ban on political activity—made extensive use of legal methods of mobilizing the workers for struggle for their rights and an end to apartheid. In 1987 the regime stepped up the repression of progressive union figures; the police organized raids or explosions at the premises of union branches in Johannesburg, East London, Kroonstad and other cities. Dozens of union leaders and hundreds of activists fell at the hands of members of punitive squads.⁴ At a conference in July delegates

proclaimed as the union's political program the Freedom Charter—the program of democratic transformations adopted by the ANC in 1955. In October 1987 the union conducted the first conference in the country's history on the organization of education for the workers.⁵

In all this activity, which is staged under the most difficult conditions of an inhuman repressive system, any success is rightly shared by the worker press also. Each issue of WORKERS UNITY is published in London both in the customary version and in a scaled-down version. The half-size newspaper reaches South Africa by undetectable routes and is distributed among the workers. The illegally distributed newspaper of South Africa's communists, UMSEBENZI (The Worker), which has been published since 1985 in English, is becoming increasingly popular also. It recounts in simple and comprehensible language events in the country and overseas and the role and tasks of the working class and its trade unions in the struggle against the apartheid regime. The newspaper contains several permanent columns: "How To Work Clandestinely," "History of the SACP," "Problems of the Transitional Period," "Fundamentals of Marxist Philosophy," "Political Economy," "Economic Knowledge" and others. The book-format newspaper provides on a separate page extracts from the SACP Program "Way to South Africa's Freedom".⁶

The National Union of Namibian Workers (NUNW) was formed in neighboring Namibia, illegally occupied by South Africa, at the start of 1970. The decision to form it was adopted by the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) at its congress in Tanga (Tanzania). At the end of the 1970's branches of the NUNW had been opened in a number of industrial centers of Namibia. Many strikes and mass protests have been staged by the working people with the help of their union. In 1980 the occupation authorities closed down NUNW headquarters in Windhoek, the administrative center of the territory. But NUNW activity did not come to an end. It began publication (as of October 1983) of the NAMIBIAN WORKER newspaper. The place of publication is Luanda—capital of Angola.

The first issue of the newspaper (NAMIBIAN WORKER No 1, 1983) described the opening of a NUNW trade union school (incidentally, the SWAPO Labor Department has published the brochure "Struggle for Trade Union Rights in Namibia"—on the position of Namibian working people and their exploitation by the transnational corporations and the history of the trade union movement in the country). The newspaper calls on the working people to strengthen the unity of their ranks and struggle for improved work conditions, higher wages, introduction of a social security system and for participation in the commission drawing up labor legislation; material to assist the workers' political education is carried.

The existence of the South African and Namibian workers movement's own press, including that of its trade unions, the character and content of the workers press

and also the popularity of the publications described here (as of some others also) and their efficacy—all this is a manifestation (and simultaneously an important factor) of the growth of the maturity of the working class in Southern Africa and its gradual conversion from "a class in itself" into "a class for itself".

Footnotes

1. MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN No 1, 1988, pp 129-130.

2. For more detail see I.A. Ulanovskaya, "Reform of the Unions Racist-Style" in RK i SM No 4, 1980; ibid., "South Africa's Progressive Unions Against the 'New' Reform of the Racists," ibid. No 1, 1984.

3. For the general sociopolitical background to these events see A.D. Grigoryan, "The Trade Union Movement in South Africa: Toward Struggle for New Frontiers," in RK i SM No 6, 1986.

4. ANC NEWS BRIEFING No 43, 1987, pp 15-16.

5. THE AFRICAN COMMUNIST No 111, 1987, pp 85-91.

6. UMSEBENZI No 2, vol 3, 1987 (2d Quarter). See also interview with D. Tloome, national chairman of the SACP, in PMS No 9, p 41.

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Central Committee Greetings to Reelected Cape Verde Party Chief

*PM0812110788 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
8 Dec 88 Second Edition p 1*

[Untitled CPSU Central Committee congratulatory message to Aristides Pereira on reelection as general secretary of the African Party for the Independence of Cape Verde]

[Text] To Comrade Aristides Pereira, general secretary of the African Party for the Independence of Cape Verde [PAICV] and president of the Republic of Cape Verde

Esteemed Comrade Aristides Pereira!

We cordially congratulate you on your reelection as general secretary of the PAICV and we wish you every success in your activity in this lofty and responsible post.

We express the confidence that the traditional friendly relations between our parties and countries will be further developed for the good of the peoples of the USSR and Cape Verde and the cause of peace throughout the world.

The CPSU Central Committee.